/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */

 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)

  * All rights reserved.

  *

  * This package is an SSL implementation written

  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.

  * 

  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as

  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions

  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,

  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation

  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms

  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

  * 

  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in

  * the code are not to be removed.

  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution

  * as the author of the parts of the library used.

  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or

  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.

  * 

  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

  * are met:

  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the

  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software

  *    must display the following acknowledgement:

  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by

  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"

  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library

  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).

  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 

  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:

  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"

  * 

  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND

  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL

  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT

  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY

  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

  * SUCH DAMAGE.

  * 

  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or

  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be

  * copied and put under another distribution licence

  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]

  */

 #include <stdio.h>

 #include <time.h>

 #include <errno.h>

 #include "cryptlib.h"

 #include <openssl/crypto.h>

 #include <openssl/lhash.h>

 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

 #include <openssl/evp.h>

 #include <openssl/asn1.h>

 #include <openssl/x509.h>

 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>

 #include <openssl/objects.h>

 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);

 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);

 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);

 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);

 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;

 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)

 	{

 	return ok;

 	}

 #if 0

 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)

 	{

 	return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);

 	}

 #endif

 EXPORT_C int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;

 	X509_NAME *xn;

 	int bad_chain = 0;

 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;

 	int depth,i,ok=0;

 	int num;

 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

 	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;

 	if (ctx->cert == NULL)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);

 		return -1;

 		}

 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;

 	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is

 	 * present and that the first entry is in place */

 	if (ctx->chain == NULL)

 		{

 		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||

 			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))

 			{

 			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 			goto end;

 			}

 		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

 		ctx->last_untrusted=1;

 		}

 	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */

 	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL

 	    && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		goto end;

 		}

 	num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);

 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);

 	depth=param->depth;

 	for (;;)

 		{

 		/* If we have enough, we break */

 		if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take

 		                         * note of it and, if appropriate, use the

 		                         * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error

 		                         * code later.

 		                         */

 		/* If we are self signed, we break */

 		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);

 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;

 		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */

 		if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)

 			{

 			xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);

 			if (xtmp != NULL)

 				{

 				if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))

 					{

 					X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 					goto end;

 					}

 				CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

 				(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);

 				ctx->last_untrusted++;

 				x=xtmp;

 				num++;

 				/* reparse the full chain for

 				 * the next one */

 				continue;

 				}

 			}

 		break;

 		}

 	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted

 	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,

 	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */

 	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it

  	 * is self signed.

  	 */

 	i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);

 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);

 	xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);

 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))

 		{

 		/* we have a self signed certificate */

 		if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)

 			{

 			/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if

 			 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact

 			 * match to avoid possible impersonation.

 			 */

 			ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);

 			if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 

 				{

 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;

 				ctx->current_cert=x;

 				ctx->error_depth=i-1;

 				if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);

 				bad_chain = 1;

 				ok=cb(0,ctx);

 				if (!ok) goto end;

 				}

 			else 

 				{

 				/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version

 				 * so we get any trust settings.

 				 */

 				X509_free(x);

 				x = xtmp;

 				(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);

 				ctx->last_untrusted=0;

 				}

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */

 			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);

 			ctx->last_untrusted--;

 			num--;

 			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);

 			}

 		}

 	/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */

 	for (;;)

 		{

 		/* If we have enough, we break */

 		if (depth < num) break;

 		/* If we are self signed, we break */

 		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);

 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;

 		ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);

 		if (ok < 0) return ok;

 		if (ok == 0) break;

 		x = xtmp;

 		if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))

 			{

 			X509_free(xtmp);

 			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 			return 0;

 			}

 		num++;

 		}

 	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */

 	xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);

 	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */

 	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))

 		{

 		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))

 			{

 			if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)

 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;

 			else

 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;

 			ctx->current_cert=x;

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);

 			num++;

 			ctx->last_untrusted=num;

 			ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;

 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;

 			chain_ss=NULL;

 			}

 		ctx->error_depth=num-1;

 		bad_chain = 1;

 		ok=cb(0,ctx);

 		if (!ok) goto end;

 		}

 	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */

 	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);

 	if (!ok) goto end;

 	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */

 	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);

 	if (!ok) goto end;

 	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */

 	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);

 	/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters

 	 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.

 	 */

 	ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);

 	if(!ok) goto end;

 	/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */

 	if (ctx->verify != NULL)

 		ok=ctx->verify(ctx);

 	else

 		ok=internal_verify(ctx);

 	if(!ok) goto end;

 	/* If we get this far evaluate policies */

 	if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))

 		ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);

 	if(!ok) goto end;

 	if (0)

 		{

 end:

 		X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);

 		}

 	if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);

 	if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);

 	return ok;

 	}

 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)

  */

 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)

 {

 	int i;

 	X509 *issuer;

 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)

 		{

 		issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);

 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))

 			return issuer;

 		}

 	return NULL;

 }

 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */

 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)

 {

 	int ret;

 	ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);

 	if (ret == X509_V_OK)

 		return 1;

 	/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */

 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))

 		return 0;

 	ctx->error = ret;

 	ctx->current_cert = x;

 	ctx->current_issuer = issuer;

 	return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 	return 0;

 }

 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */

 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)

 {

 	*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);

 	if (*issuer)

 		{

 		CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

 		return 1;

 		}

 	else

 		return 0;

 }

 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency

  * with the supplied purpose

  */

 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 {

 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY

 	return 1;

 #else

 	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;

 	X509 *x;

 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

 	int proxy_path_length = 0;

 	int allow_proxy_certs =

 		!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);

 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;

 	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:

 	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct

 	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).

 	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not

 	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.

 	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for

 	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.

 	*/

 	must_be_ca = -1;

 	/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software

 	   happy */

 	if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))

 		allow_proxy_certs = 1;

 	/* Check all untrusted certificates */

 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)

 		{

 		int ret;

 		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);

 		if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)

 			&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))

 			{

 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;

 			ctx->error_depth = i;

 			ctx->current_cert = x;

 			ok=cb(0,ctx);

 			if (!ok) goto end;

 			}

 		if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))

 			{

 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;

 			ctx->error_depth = i;

 			ctx->current_cert = x;

 			ok=cb(0,ctx);

 			if (!ok) goto end;

 			}

 		ret = X509_check_ca(x);

 		switch(must_be_ca)

 			{

 		case -1:

 			if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)

 				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))

 				{

 				ret = 0;

 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;

 				}

 			else

 				ret = 1;

 			break;

 		case 0:

 			if (ret != 0)

 				{

 				ret = 0;

 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;

 				}

 			else

 				ret = 1;

 			break;

 		default:

 			if ((ret == 0)

 				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)

 					&& (ret != 1)))

 				{

 				ret = 0;

 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;

 				}

 			else

 				ret = 1;

 			break;

 			}

 		if (ret == 0)

 			{

 			ctx->error_depth = i;

 			ctx->current_cert = x;

 			ok=cb(0,ctx);

 			if (!ok) goto end;

 			}

 		if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)

 			{

 			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,

 				must_be_ca > 0);

 			if ((ret == 0)

 				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)

 					&& (ret != 1)))

 				{

 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;

 				ctx->error_depth = i;

 				ctx->current_cert = x;

 				ok=cb(0,ctx);

 				if (!ok) goto end;

 				}

 			}

 		/* Check pathlen */

 		if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)

 			   && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))

 			{

 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;

 			ctx->error_depth = i;

 			ctx->current_cert = x;

 			ok=cb(0,ctx);

 			if (!ok) goto end;

 			}

 		/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next

 		   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE

 		   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a

 		   CA certificate.  */

 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)

 			{

 			if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)

 				{

 				ctx->error =

 					X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;

 				ctx->error_depth = i;

 				ctx->current_cert = x;

 				ok=cb(0,ctx);

 				if (!ok) goto end;

 				}

 			proxy_path_length++;

 			must_be_ca = 0;

 			}

 		else

 			must_be_ca = 1;

 		}

 	ok = 1;

  end:

 	return ok;

 #endif

 }

 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 {

 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY

 	return 1;

 #else

 	int i, ok;

 	X509 *x;

 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;

 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */

 	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;

 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);

 	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);

 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)

 		return 1;

 	ctx->error_depth = i;

 	ctx->current_cert = x;

 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)

 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;

 	else

 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;

 	ok = cb(0, ctx);

 	return ok;

 #endif

 }

 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	int i, last, ok;

 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))

 		return 1;

 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)

 		last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;

 	else

 		last = 0;

 	for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)

 		{

 		ctx->error_depth = i;

 		ok = check_cert(ctx);

 		if (!ok) return ok;

 		}

 	return 1;

 	}

 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL;

 	X509 *x;

 	int ok, cnum;

 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;

 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);

 	ctx->current_cert = x;

 	/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */

 	ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);

 	/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except

 	 * notify callback

 	 */

 	if(!ok)

 		{

 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;

 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 		goto err;

 		}

 	ctx->current_crl = crl;

 	ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);

 	if (!ok) goto err;

 	ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);

 	err:

 	ctx->current_crl = NULL;

 	X509_CRL_free(crl);

 	return ok;

 	}

 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */

 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)

 	{

 	time_t *ptime;

 	int i;

 	ctx->current_crl = crl;

 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)

 		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;

 	else

 		ptime = NULL;

 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);

 	if (i == 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;

 		if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	if (i > 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;

 		if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))

 		{

 		i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);

 		if (i == 0)

 			{

 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;

 			if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 				return 0;

 			}

 		if (i < 0)

 			{

 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;

 			if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 				return 0;

 			}

 		}

 	ctx->current_crl = NULL;

 	return 1;

 	}

 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name

  * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one

  * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise

  * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but

  * was invalid.

  */

 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,

 			X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)

 	{

 	int i;

 	X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;

 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)

 		{

 		crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);

 		if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))

 			continue;

 		if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))

 			{

 			*pcrl = crl;

 			CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

 			return 1;

 			}

 		best_crl = crl;

 		}

 	if (best_crl)

 		{

 		*pcrl = best_crl;

 		CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

 		}

 	return 0;

 	}

 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a

  * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...

  */

 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)

 	{

 	int ok;

 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL;

 	X509_OBJECT xobj;

 	X509_NAME *nm;

 	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);

 	ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);

 	if (ok)

 		{

 		*pcrl = crl;

 		return 1;

 		}

 	ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);

 	if (!ok)

 		{

 		/* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */

 		if (crl)

 			{

 			*pcrl = crl;

 			return 1;

 			}

 		return 0;

 		}

 	*pcrl = xobj.data.crl;

 	if (crl)

 		X509_CRL_free(crl);

 	return 1;

 	}

 /* Check CRL validity */

 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)

 	{

 	X509 *issuer = NULL;

 	EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;

 	int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;

 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;

 	chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;

 	/* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer

 	 * is next certificate in chain.

 	 */

 	if(cnum < chnum)

 		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);

 	else

 		{

 		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);

 		/* If not self signed, can't check signature */

 		if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))

 			{

 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;

 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 			if(!ok) goto err;

 			}

 		}

 	if(issuer)

 		{

 		/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */

 		if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&

 			!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))

 			{

 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;

 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 			if(!ok) goto err;

 			}

 		/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */

 		ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);

 		if(!ikey)

 			{

 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;

 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 			if (!ok) goto err;

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			/* Verify CRL signature */

 			if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)

 				{

 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;

 				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 				if (!ok) goto err;

 				}

 			}

 		}

 	ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);

 	if (!ok)

 		goto err;

 	ok = 1;

 	err:

 	EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);

 	return ok;

 	}

 /* Check certificate against CRL */

 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)

 	{

 	int idx, ok;

 	X509_REVOKED rtmp;

 	STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;

 	X509_EXTENSION *ext;

 	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */

 	rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);

 	/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.

 	 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.

  	 */

 	if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))

 		{

 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);

 		sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);

 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);

 		}

 	idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);

 	/* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than

 	 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.

 	 */

 	if(idx >= 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;

 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 		if (!ok) return 0;

 		}

 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)

 		return 1;

 	/* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we

 	 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be

 	 * rejected. 

 	 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications

 	 * shouldn't do this.

 	 */

 	exts = crl->crl->extensions;

 	for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)

 		{

 		ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);

 		if (ext->critical > 0)

 			{

 			ctx->error =

 				X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;

 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 			if(!ok) return 0;

 			break;

 			}

 		}

 	return 1;

 	}

 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	int ret;

 	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,

 				ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);

 	if (ret == 0)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		return 0;

 		}

 	/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */

 	if (ret == -1)

 		{

 		/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify

 		 * callback.

 		 */

 		X509 *x;

 		int i;

 		for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)

 			{

 			x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);

 			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))

 				continue;

 			ctx->current_cert = x;

 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;

 			ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 			}

 		return 1;

 		}

 	if (ret == -2)

 		{

 		ctx->current_cert = NULL;

 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;

 		return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);

 		}

 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)

 		{

 		ctx->current_cert = NULL;

 		ctx->error = X509_V_OK;

 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	return 1;

 	}

 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)

 	{

 	time_t *ptime;

 	int i;

 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)

 		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;

 	else

 		ptime = NULL;

 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);

 	if (i == 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;

 		ctx->current_cert=x;

 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	if (i > 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;

 		ctx->current_cert=x;

 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);

 	if (i == 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;

 		ctx->current_cert=x;

 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	if (i < 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;

 		ctx->current_cert=x;

 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))

 			return 0;

 		}

 	return 1;

 	}

 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	int ok=0,n;

 	X509 *xs,*xi;

 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;

 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;

 	n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);

 	ctx->error_depth=n-1;

 	n--;

 	xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);

 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))

 		xs=xi;

 	else

 		{

 		if (n <= 0)

 			{

 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;

 			ctx->current_cert=xi;

 			ok=cb(0,ctx);

 			goto end;

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			n--;

 			ctx->error_depth=n;

 			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);

 			}

 		}

 /*	ctx->error=0;  not needed */

 	while (n >= 0)

 		{

 		ctx->error_depth=n;

 		if (!xs->valid)

 			{

 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)

 				{

 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;

 				ctx->current_cert=xi;

 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);

 				if (!ok) goto end;

 				}

 			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)

 				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,

 				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should

 				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be

 				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but

 				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL

 				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has

 				 * been declared trusted. */

 				{

 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;

 				ctx->current_cert=xs;

 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);

 				if (!ok)

 					{

 					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

 					goto end;

 					}

 				}

 			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

 			pkey=NULL;

 			}

 		xs->valid = 1;

 		ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);

 		if (!ok)

 			goto end;

 		/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */

 		ctx->current_issuer=xi;

 		ctx->current_cert=xs;

 		ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);

 		if (!ok) goto end;

 		n--;

 		if (n >= 0)

 			{

 			xi=xs;

 			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);

 			}

 		}

 	ok=1;

 end:

 	return ok;

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)

 {

 	return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);

 }

 EXPORT_C int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)

 	{

 	char *str;

 	ASN1_TIME atm;

 	long offset;

 	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;

 	int i,j;

 	p=buff1;

 	i=ctm->length;

 	str=(char *)ctm->data;

 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)

 		{

 		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;

 		memcpy(p,str,10);

 		p+=10;

 		str+=10;

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		if (i < 13) return 0;

 		memcpy(p,str,12);

 		p+=12;

 		str+=12;

 		}

 	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))

 		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }

 	else

 		{ 

 		*(p++)= *(str++);

 		*(p++)= *(str++);

 		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */

 		if (*str == '.')

 			{

 			str++;

 			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;

 			}

 		}

 	*(p++)='Z';

 	*(p++)='\0';

 	if (*str == 'Z')

 		offset=0;

 	else

 		{

 		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))

 			return 0;

 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;

 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');

 		if (*str == '-')

 			offset= -offset;

 		}

 	atm.type=ctm->type;

 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);

 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;

 	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)

 		return 0;

 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)

 		{

 		i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');

 		if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */

 		j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');

 		if (j < 50) j+=100;

 		if (i < j) return -1;

 		if (i > j) return 1;

 		}

 	i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);

 	if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */

 		return -1;

 	else

 		return i;

 	}

 EXPORT_C ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)

 {

 	return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);

 }

 EXPORT_C ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)

 	{

 	time_t t;

 	int type = -1;

 	if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;

 	else time(&t);

 	t+=adj;

 	if (s) type = s->type;

 	if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);

 	if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);

 	return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)

 	{

 	EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;

 	int i,j;

 	if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;

 	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)

 		{

 		ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));

 		if (ktmp == NULL)

 			{

 			X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);

 			return 0;

 			}

 		if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))

 			break;

 		else

 			{

 			EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);

 			ktmp=NULL;

 			}

 		}

 	if (ktmp == NULL)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);

 		return 0;

 		}

 	/* first, populate the other certs */

 	for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)

 		{

 		ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));

 		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);

 		EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);

 		}

 	if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);

 	EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);

 	return 1;

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,

 	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)

 	{

 	/* This function is (usually) called only once, by

 	 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */

 	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,

 			new_func, dup_func, free_func);

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)

 	{

 	return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);

 	}

 EXPORT_C void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)

 	{

 	return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->error;

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)

 	{

 	ctx->error=err;

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->error_depth;

 	}

 EXPORT_C X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->current_cert;

 	}

 EXPORT_C STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->chain;

 	}

 EXPORT_C STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	int i;

 	X509 *x;

 	STACK_OF(X509) *chain;

 	if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;

 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)

 		{

 		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);

 		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

 		}

 	return chain;

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)

 	{

 	ctx->cert=x;

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)

 	{

 	ctx->untrusted=sk;

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)

 	{

 	ctx->crls=sk;

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)

 	{

 	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)

 	{

 	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);

 	}

 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust

  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its

  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by

  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default

  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.

  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own

  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they

  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.

  */

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,

 				int purpose, int trust)

 {

 	int idx;

 	/* If purpose not set use default */

 	if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;

 	/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */

 	if (purpose)

 		{

 		X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;

 		idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);

 		if (idx == -1)

 			{

 			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,

 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);

 			return 0;

 			}

 		ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);

 		if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)

 			{

 			idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);

 			if (idx == -1)

 				{

 				X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,

 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);

 				return 0;

 				}

 			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);

 			}

 		/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */

 		if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;

 		}

 	if (trust)

 		{

 		idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);

 		if (idx == -1)

 			{

 			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,

 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);

 			return 0;

 			}

 		}

 	if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;

 	if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;

 	return 1;

 }

 EXPORT_C X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)

 {

 	X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;

 	ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));

 	if (!ctx)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		return NULL;

 		}

 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));

 	return ctx;

 }

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 {

 	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);

 	OPENSSL_free(ctx);

 }

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,

 	     STACK_OF(X509) *chain)

 	{

 	int ret = 1;

 	ctx->ctx=store;

 	ctx->current_method=0;

 	ctx->cert=x509;

 	ctx->untrusted=chain;

 	ctx->crls = NULL;

 	ctx->last_untrusted=0;

 	ctx->other_ctx=NULL;

 	ctx->valid=0;

 	ctx->chain=NULL;

 	ctx->error=0;

 	ctx->explicit_policy=0;

 	ctx->error_depth=0;

 	ctx->current_cert=NULL;

 	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;

 	ctx->tree = NULL;

 	ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();

 	if (!ctx->param)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		return 0;

 		}

 	/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set

 	 * use defaults.

 	 */

 	if (store)

 		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);

 	else

 		ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;

 	if (store)

 		{

 		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;

 		ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;

 		}

 	else

 		ctx->cleanup = 0;

 	if (ret)

 		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,

 					X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));

 	if (ret == 0)

 		{

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		return 0;

 		}

 	if (store && store->check_issued)

 		ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;

 	else

 		ctx->check_issued = check_issued;

 	if (store && store->get_issuer)

 		ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;

 	else

 		ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;

 	if (store && store->verify_cb)

 		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;

 	else

 		ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;

 	if (store && store->verify)

 		ctx->verify = store->verify;

 	else

 		ctx->verify = internal_verify;

 	if (store && store->check_revocation)

 		ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;

 	else

 		ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;

 	if (store && store->get_crl)

 		ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;

 	else

 		ctx->get_crl = get_crl;

 	if (store && store->check_crl)

 		ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;

 	else

 		ctx->check_crl = check_crl;

 	if (store && store->cert_crl)

 		ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;

 	else

 		ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;

 	ctx->check_policy = check_policy;

 	/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As

 	 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a

 	 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */

 	/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */

 	if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,

 				&(ctx->ex_data)))

 		{

 		OPENSSL_free(ctx);

 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		return 0;

 		}

 	return 1;

 	}

 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.

  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.

  */

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)

 {

 	ctx->other_ctx = sk;

 	ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;

 }

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);

 	if (ctx->param != NULL)

 		{

 		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);

 		ctx->param=NULL;

 		}

 	if (ctx->tree != NULL)

 		{

 		X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);

 		ctx->tree=NULL;

 		}

 	if (ctx->chain != NULL)

 		{

 		sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);

 		ctx->chain=NULL;

 		}

 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));

 	memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)

 	{

 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)

 	{

 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)

 	{

 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,

 				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))

 	{

 	ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;

 	}

 EXPORT_C X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->tree;

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->explicit_policy;

 	}

 EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)

 	{

 	const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;

 	param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);

 	if (!param)

 		return 0;

 	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);

 	}

 EXPORT_C X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

 	{

 	return ctx->param;

 	}

 EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)

 	{

 	if (ctx->param)

 		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);

 	ctx->param = param;

 	}

 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)

 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)

 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)

 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)

 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)