/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */

 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)

  * All rights reserved.

  *

  * This package is an SSL implementation written

  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.

  * 

  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as

  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions

  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,

  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation

  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms

  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

  * 

  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in

  * the code are not to be removed.

  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution

  * as the author of the parts of the library used.

  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or

  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.

  * 

  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

  * are met:

  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the

  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software

  *    must display the following acknowledgement:

  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by

  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"

  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library

  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).

  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 

  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:

  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"

  * 

  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND

  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL

  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT

  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY

  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

  * SUCH DAMAGE.

  * 

  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or

  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be

  * copied and put under another distribution licence

  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]

  */

 /* ====================================================================

  * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

  *

  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

  * are met:

  *

  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 

  *

  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

  *    distribution.

  *

  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"

  *

  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.

  *

  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

  *

  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

  *    acknowledgment:

  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"

  *

  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

  * ====================================================================

  *

  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim

  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

  *

  */

 /* ====================================================================

  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

  *

  * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 

  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.

  *

  * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source

  * license provided above.

  *

  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by

  * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.

  *

  */

 /*

  © Portions copyright (c) 2006 Nokia Corporation.  All rights reserved.

  */

 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG

 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

 #include <stdio.h>

 #include "ssl_locl.h"

 #include "kssl_lcl.h"

 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

 #include <openssl/rand.h>

 #include <openssl/objects.h>

 #include <openssl/evp.h>

 #include <openssl/hmac.h>

 #include <openssl/x509.h>

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

 #include <openssl/dh.h>

 #endif

 #include <openssl/bn.h>

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>

 #endif

 #include <openssl/md5.h>

 #if (defined(SYMBIAN) && (defined(__WINSCW__) || defined(__WINS__)))

 #include "libssl_wsd.h"

 #endif

 #ifdef EMULATOR

 	GET_STATIC_VAR_FROM_TLS(SSLv3_server_method_data,s3_srvr,SSL_METHOD)

 	#define SSLv3_server_method_data (*GET_WSD_VAR_NAME(SSLv3_server_method_data,s3_srvr,s)())

 #endif

 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);

 #endif

 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)

 	{

 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)

 		return(SSLv3_server_method());

 	else

 		return(NULL);

 	}

 EXPORT_C IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,

 			ssl3_accept,

 			ssl_undefined_function,

 			ssl3_get_server_method)

 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)

 	{

 	BUF_MEM *buf;

 	unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);

 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;

 	long num1;

 	int ret= -1;

 	int new_state,state,skip=0;

 	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);

 	ERR_clear_error();

 	clear_sys_error();

 	if (s->info_callback != NULL)

 		cb=s->info_callback;

 	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

 		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

 	/* init things to blank */

 	s->in_handshake++;

 	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);

 	if (s->cert == NULL)

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);

 		return(-1);

 		}

 	for (;;)

 		{

 		state=s->state;

 		switch (s->state)

 			{

 		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:

 			s->new_session=1;

 			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */

 		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:

 		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

 		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

 		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

 			s->server=1;

 			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);

 			if ((s->version>>8) != 3)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 				return -1;

 				}

 			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;

 			if (s->init_buf == NULL)

 				{

 				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)

 					{

 					ret= -1;

 					goto end;

 					}

 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))

 					{

 					ret= -1;

 					goto end;

 					}

 				s->init_buf=buf;

 				}

 			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))

 				{

 				ret= -1;

 				goto end;

 				}

 			s->init_num=0;

 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)

 				{

 				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that

 				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)

 				 */

 				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }

 				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;

 				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;

 				}

 			else

 				{

 				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,

 				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */

 				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;

 				}

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:

 			s->shutdown=0;

 			ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:

 			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:

 			s->shutdown=0;

 			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			s->new_session = 2;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:

 			ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			if (s->hit)

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

 			else

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:

 			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */

 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)

 				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))

 				{

 				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);

 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 				}

 			else

 				skip=1;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:

 			l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;

 			/* clear this, it may get reset by

 			 * send_server_key_exchange */

 			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

 				&& !(l & SSL_KRB5)

 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

 				)

 				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key

 				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs

 				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to

 				 * be able to handle this) */

 				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;

 			else

 				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;

 			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or

 			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate

 			 *

 			 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange

 			 * message only if the cipher suite is either

 			 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the

 			 * server certificate contains the server's 

 			 * public key for key exchange.

 			 */

 			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp

 			    || (l & SSL_kECDHE)

 			    || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))

 			    || ((l & SSL_kRSA)

 				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL

 				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)

 					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)

 					)

 				    )

 				)

 			    )

 				{

 				ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);

 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 				}

 			else

 				skip=1;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:

 			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */

 				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||

 				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,

 				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */

 				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&

 				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||

 				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites

 				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts

 				 * and in RFC 2246): */

 				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&

 				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification

 				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */

 				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||

                                  /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */

                                 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))

 				{

 				/* no cert request */

 				skip=1;

 				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;

 				}

 			else

 				{

 				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;

 				ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);

 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;

 #else

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;

 #endif

 				s->init_num=0;

 				}

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:

 			ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:

 			/* number of bytes to be flushed */

 			num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);

 			if (num1 > 0)

 				{

 				s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;

 				num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);

 				if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }

 				s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 				}

 			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:

 			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */

 			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);

 			if (ret <= 0)

 				goto end;

 			if (ret == 2)

 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;

 			else {

 				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)

 					{

 					ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);

 					if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 					}

 				s->init_num=0;

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;

 			}

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:

 			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);

 			if (ret <= 0) 

 				goto end;

 			if (ret == 2)

 				{

 				/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when

 				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in

 				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify

 				 * message is not sent.

 				 */

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

 				s->init_num = 0;

 				}

 			else   

 				{

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;

 				s->init_num=0;

 				/* We need to get hashes here so if there is

 				 * a client cert, it can be verified

 				 */ 

 				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,

 				    &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),

 				    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));

 				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,

 				    &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),

 				    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));

 				}

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:

 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */

 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:

 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,

 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			if (s->hit)

 				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;

 			else

 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:

 			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;

 			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))

 				{ ret= -1; goto end; }

 			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,

 				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,

 				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))

 				{

 				ret= -1;

 				goto end;

 				}

 			break;

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:

 		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:

 			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,

 				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,

 				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,

 				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);

 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

 			if (s->hit)

 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

 			else

 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;

 			s->init_num=0;

 			break;

 		case SSL_ST_OK:

 			/* clean a few things up */

 			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

 			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);

 			s->init_buf=NULL;

 			/* remove buffering on output */

 			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);

 			s->init_num=0;

 			if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */

 				{

 				/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless

 				 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */

 				s->new_session=0;

 				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);

 				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;

 				/* s->server=1; */

 				s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;

 				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);

 				}

 			ret = 1;

 			goto end;

 			/* break; */

 		default:

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);

 			ret= -1;

 			goto end;

 			/* break; */

 			}

 		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)

 			{

 			if (s->debug)

 				{

 				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)

 					goto end;

 				}

 			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))

 				{

 				new_state=s->state;

 				s->state=state;

 				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);

 				s->state=new_state;

 				}

 			}

 		skip=0;

 		}

 end:

 	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */

 	s->in_handshake--;

 	if (cb != NULL)

 		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);

 	return(ret);

 	}

 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)

 	{

 	unsigned char *p;

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)

 		{

 		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

 		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;

 		/* number of bytes to write */

 		s->init_num=4;

 		s->init_off=0;

 		}

 	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */

 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

 	}

 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int ok;

 	long n;

 	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,

 	 * so permit appropriate message length */

 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,

 		-1,

 		s->max_cert_list,

 		&ok);

 	if (!ok) return((int)n);

 	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;

 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)

 		{

 		/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,

 		 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)

 		 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared

 		 * when a handshake is not completed ... */

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

 		if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)

 			{

 			DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);

 			s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;

 			}

 #endif

 		return 2;

 		}

 	return 1;

 }

 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;

 	unsigned int cookie_len;

 	long n;

 	unsigned long id;

 	unsigned char *p,*d,*q;

 	SSL_CIPHER *c;

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

 	SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;

 #endif

 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;

 	/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.

 	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,

 	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.

 	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with

 	 * TLSv1.

 	 */

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)

 		{

 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;

 		}

 	s->first_packet=1;

 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,

 		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,

 		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,

 		&ok);

 	if (!ok) return((int)n);

 	s->first_packet=0;

 	d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

 	/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header

 	 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */

 	s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];

 	p+=2;

 	if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||

 	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);

 		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 

 			{

 			/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */

 			s->version = s->client_version;

 			}

 		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	/* load the client random */

 	memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

 	/* get the session-id */

 	j= *(p++);

 	s->hit=0;

 	/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation

 	 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option

 	 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.

 	 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,

 	 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications

 	 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with

 	 * an earlier library version)

 	 */

 	if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))

 		{

 		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))

 			goto err;

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);

 		if (i == 1)

 			{ /* previous session */

 			s->hit=1;

 			}

 		else if (i == -1)

 			goto err;

 		else /* i == 0 */

 			{

 			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))

 				goto err;

 			}

 		}

 	p+=j;

 	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)

 		{

 		/* cookie stuff */

 		cookie_len = *(p++);

 		if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&

 			s->d1->send_cookie == 0)

 			{

 			/* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */

 			if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)

 				{

 				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			}

 		/* 

 		 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the

 		 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it

 		 * does not cause an overflow.

 		 */

 		if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))

 			{

 			/* too much data */

 			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */

 		if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&

 			cookie_len > 0)

 			{

 			memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);

 			if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)

 				{

 				if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,

 					cookie_len) == 0)

 					{

 					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 

 						SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);

 					goto f_err;

 					}

 				/* else cookie verification succeeded */

 				}

 			else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 

 						  s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */

 				{

 					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 

 						SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);

 					goto f_err;

 				}

 			}

 		p += cookie_len;

 		}

 	n2s(p,i);

 	if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))

 		{

 		/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */

 		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	if ((p+i) >= (d+n))

 		{

 		/* not enough data */

 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))

 		== NULL))

 		{

 		goto err;

 		}

 	p+=i;

 	/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */

 	if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))

 		{

 		j=0;

 		id=s->session->cipher->id;

 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG

 		printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));

 #endif

 		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)

 			{

 			c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);

 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG

 			printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",

 				i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));

 #endif

 			if (c->id == id)

 				{

 				j=1;

 				break;

 				}

 			}

 		if (j == 0)

 			{

 			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))

 				{

 				/* Very bad for multi-threading.... */

 				s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);

 				}

 			else

 				{

 				/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher

 				 * list if we are asked to reuse it */

 				al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			}

 		}

 	/* compression */

 	i= *(p++);

 	if ((p+i) > (d+n))

 		{

 		/* not enough data */

 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	q=p;

 	for (j=0; j<i; j++)

 		{

 		if (p[j] == 0) break;

 		}

 	p+=i;

 	if (j >= i)

 		{

 		/* no compress */

 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other

 	 * options, we will now look for them.  We have i-1 compression

 	 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */

 	s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

 	if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)

 		{ /* See if we have a match */

 		int m,nn,o,v,done=0;

 		nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);

 		for (m=0; m<nn; m++)

 			{

 			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);

 			v=comp->id;

 			for (o=0; o<i; o++)

 				{

 				if (v == q[o])

 					{

 					done=1;

 					break;

 					}

 				}

 			if (done) break;

 			}

 		if (done)

 			s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;

 		else

 			comp=NULL;

 		}

 #endif

 	/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */

 #if 0   /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test

          * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,

          * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */

 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)

 		{

 		if (p < (d+n))

 			{

 			/* wrong number of bytes,

 			 * there could be more to follow */

 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 #endif

 	/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must

 	 * pick a cipher */

 	if (!s->hit)

 		{

 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

 		s->session->compress_meth=0;

 #else

 		s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;

 #endif

 		if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)

 			sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);

 		s->session->ciphers=ciphers;

 		if (ciphers == NULL)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		ciphers=NULL;

 		c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,

 				     SSL_get_ciphers(s));

 		if (c == NULL)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		/* Session-id reuse */

 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG

 		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;

 		SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;

 		SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;

 		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)

 			{

 			sk=s->session->ciphers;

 			for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)

 				{

 				c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);

 				if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)

 					nc=c;

 				if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))

 					ec=c;

 				}

 			if (nc != NULL)

 				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;

 			else if (ec != NULL)

 				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;

 			else

 				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;

 			}

 		else

 #endif

 		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;

 		}

 	/* we now have the following setup. 

 	 * client_random

 	 * cipher_list 		- our prefered list of ciphers

 	 * ciphers 		- the clients prefered list of ciphers

 	 * compression		- basically ignored right now

 	 * ssl version is set	- sslv3

 	 * s->session		- The ssl session has been setup.

 	 * s->hit		- session reuse flag

 	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.

 	 */

 	ret=1;

 	if (0)

 		{

 f_err:

 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 		}

 err:

 	if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);

 	return(ret);

 	}

 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)

 	{

 	unsigned char *buf;

 	unsigned char *p,*d;

 	int i,sl;

 	unsigned long l,Time;

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)

 		{

 		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

 		p=s->s3->server_random;

 		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */

 		l2n(Time,p);

 		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)

 			return -1;

 		/* Do the message type and length last */

 		d=p= &(buf[4]);

 		*(p++)=s->version>>8;

 		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;

 		/* Random stuff */

 		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

 		/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the

 		 * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the

 		 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send

 		 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length

 		 * session-id if we want it to be single use.

 		 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id

 		 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.

 		 */

 		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))

 			s->session->session_id_length=0;

 		sl=s->session->session_id_length;

 		if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 			return -1;

 			}

 		*(p++)=sl;

 		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);

 		p+=sl;

 		/* put the cipher */

 		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);

 		p+=i;

 		/* put the compression method */

 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

 			*(p++)=0;

 #else

 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)

 			*(p++)=0;

 		else

 			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;

 #endif

 		/* do the header */

 		l=(p-d);

 		d=buf;

 		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;

 		l2n3(l,d);

 		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;

 		/* number of bytes to write */

 		s->init_num=p-buf;

 		s->init_off=0;

 		}

 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */

 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

 	}

 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)

 	{

 	unsigned char *p;

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)

 		{

 		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

 		/* do the header */

 		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;

 		/* number of bytes to write */

 		s->init_num=4;

 		s->init_off=0;

 		}

 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */

 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

 	}

 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)

 	{

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

 	unsigned char *q;

 	int j,num;

 	RSA *rsa;

 	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];

 	unsigned int u;

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

 	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;

 	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;

 	int encodedlen = 0;

 	int curve_id = 0;

 	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 

 #endif

 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;

 	unsigned char *p,*d;

 	int al,i;

 	unsigned long type;

 	int n;

 	CERT *cert;

 	BIGNUM *r[4];

 	int nr[4],kn;

 	BUF_MEM *buf;

 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;

 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)

 		{

 		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;

 		cert=s->cert;

 		buf=s->init_buf;

 		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;

 		n=0;

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

 		if (type & SSL_kRSA)

 			{

 			rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;

 			if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))

 				{

 				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,

 				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

 				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));

 				if(rsa == NULL)

 				{

 					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);

 					goto f_err;

 				}

 				RSA_up_ref(rsa);

 				cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;

 				}

 			if (rsa == NULL)

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			r[0]=rsa->n;

 			r[1]=rsa->e;

 			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;

 			}

 		else

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

 			if (type & SSL_kEDH)

 			{

 			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;

 			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))

 				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,

 				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

 				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));

 			if (dhp == NULL)

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)

 				{

 				DH_free(dh);

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;

 			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||

 			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||

 			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))

 				{

 				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))

 				    {

 				    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 					   ERR_R_DH_LIB);

 				    goto err;

 				    }

 				}

 			else

 				{

 				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);

 				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);

 				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||

 					(dh->priv_key == NULL))

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

 					goto err;

 					}

 				}

 			r[0]=dh->p;

 			r[1]=dh->g;

 			r[2]=dh->pub_key;

 			}

 		else 

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 			if (type & SSL_kECDHE)

 			{

 			const EC_GROUP *group;

 			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;

 			if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))

 				{

 				ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,

 				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

 				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));

 				}

 			if (ecdhp == NULL)

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)

 				{

 				EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */

 			if (ecdhp == NULL)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			ecdh = ecdhp;

 			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;

 			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||

 			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||

 			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))

 				{

 				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))

 				    {

 				    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

 				    goto err;

 				    }

 				}

 			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||

 			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||

 			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&

 			    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH

 			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 

 			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.

 			 */

 			if ((curve_id = 

 			    nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))

 			    == 0)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			/* Encode the public key.

 			 * First check the size of encoding and

 			 * allocate memory accordingly.

 			 */

 			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 

 			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),

 			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 

 			    NULL, 0, NULL);

 			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 

 			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 

 			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();

 			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 

 			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 

 			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 

 			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);

 			if (encodedlen == 0) 

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;

 			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 

 			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.

 			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes

 			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams

 			 * structure. 

 			 */

 			n = 4 + encodedlen;

 			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message

 			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs

 			 */

 			r[0]=NULL;

 			r[1]=NULL;

 			r[2]=NULL;

 			r[3]=NULL;

 			}

 		else 

 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)

 			{

 			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);

 			n+=2+nr[i];

 			}

 		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))

 			{

 			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))

 				== NULL)

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			pkey=NULL;

 			kn=0;

 			}

 		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

 		p= &(d[4]);

 		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)

 			{

 			s2n(nr[i],p);

 			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);

 			p+=nr[i];

 			}

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 		if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 

 			{

 			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.

 			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:

 			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]

 			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by

 			 * the actual encoded point itself

 			 */

 			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;

 			p += 1;

 			*p = 0;

 			p += 1;

 			*p = curve_id;

 			p += 1;

 			*p = encodedlen;

 			p += 1;

 			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 

 			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 

 			    encodedlen);

 			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);

 			p += encodedlen;

 			}

 #endif

 		/* not anonymous */

 		if (pkey != NULL)

 			{

 			/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])

 			 * and p points to the space at the end. */

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

 			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)

 				{

 				q=md_buf;

 				j=0;

 				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)

 					{

 					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)

 						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);

 					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);

 					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,

 						(unsigned int *)&i);

 					q+=i;

 					j+=i;

 					}

 				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,

 					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);

 					goto err;

 					}

 				s2n(u,p);

 				n+=u+2;

 				}

 			else

 #endif

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)

 				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)

 				{

 				/* lets do DSS */

 				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);

 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);

 				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),

 					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);

 					goto err;

 					}

 				s2n(i,p);

 				n+=i+2;

 				}

 			else

 #endif

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)

 				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)

 				{

 				/* let's do ECDSA */

 				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);

 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);

 				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),

 					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);

 					goto err;

 					}

 				s2n(i,p);

 				n+=i+2;

 				}

 			else

 #endif

 				{

 				/* Is this error check actually needed? */

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			}

 		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;

 		l2n3(n,d);

 		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send

 		 * it off */

 		s->init_num=n+4;

 		s->init_off=0;

 		}

 	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;

 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);

 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

 f_err:

 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 err:

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);

 	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

 #endif

 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);

 	return(-1);

 	}

 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)

 	{

 	unsigned char *p,*d;

 	int i,j,nl,off,n;

 	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;

 	X509_NAME *name;

 	BUF_MEM *buf;

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)

 		{

 		buf=s->init_buf;

 		d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);

 		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */

 		p++;

 		n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);

 		d[0]=n;

 		p+=n;

 		n++;

 		off=n;

 		p+=2;

 		n+=2;

 		sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);

 		nl=0;

 		if (sk != NULL)

 			{

 			for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)

 				{

 				name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);

 				j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);

 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);

 					goto err;

 					}

 				p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);

 				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))

 					{

 					s2n(j,p);

 					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);

 					n+=2+j;

 					nl+=2+j;

 					}

 				else

 					{

 					d=p;

 					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);

 					j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;

 					n+=j;

 					nl+=j;

 					}

 				}

 			}

 		/* else no CA names */

 		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);

 		s2n(nl,p);

 		d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;

 		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;

 		l2n3(n,d);

 		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send

 		 * it off */

 		s->init_num=n+4;

 		s->init_off=0;

 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

 		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;

 		/* do the header */

 		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		*(p++)=0;

 		s->init_num += 4;

 #endif

 		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;

 		}

 	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */

 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

 err:

 	return(-1);

 	}

 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int i,al,ok;

 	long n;

 	unsigned long l;

 	unsigned char *p;

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

 	RSA *rsa=NULL;

 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

 	BIGNUM *pub=NULL;

 	DH *dh_srvr;

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

         KSSL_ERR kssl_err;

 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 	EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;

 	EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;

 	EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;

 	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 

 #endif

 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,

 		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 		2048, /* ??? */

 		&ok);

 	if (!ok) return((int)n);

 	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

 	l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

 	if (l & SSL_kRSA)

 		{

 		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */

 		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)

 			{

 			if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))

 				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;

 			/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should

 			 * be sent already */

 			if (rsa == NULL)

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;

 			if (	(pkey == NULL) ||

 				(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||

 				(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;

 			}

 		/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */

 		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&

 		    s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)

 			{

 			n2s(p,i);

 			if (n != i+2)

 				{

 				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);

 					goto err;

 					}

 				else

 					p-=2;

 				}

 			else

 				n=i;

 			}

 		i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);

 		al = -1;

 		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */

 			}

 		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))

 			{

 			/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the

 			 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the

 			 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).

 			 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol

 			 * version instead if the server does not support the requested

 			 * protocol version.

 			 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */

 			if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&

 				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */

 				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack

 				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version

 				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would

 				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext

 				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except

 				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,

 				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */

 				}

 			}

 		if (al != -1)

 			{

 			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure

 			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding

 			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */

 			ERR_clear_error();

 			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;

 			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;

 			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;

 			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */

 				goto err;

 			}

 		s->session->master_key_length=

 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

 				s->session->master_key,

 				p,i);

 		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);

 		}

 	else

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

 		if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))

 		{

 		n2s(p,i);

 		if (n != i+2)

 			{

 			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			else

 				{

 				p-=2;

 				i=(int)n;

 				}

 			}

 		if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)

 				{

 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			else

 				dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;

 			}

 		pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);

 		if (pub == NULL)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);

 		if (i <= 0)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);

 		s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;

 		BN_clear_free(pub);

 		pub=NULL;

 		s->session->master_key_length=

 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

 				s->session->master_key,p,i);

 		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);

 		}

 	else

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

         if (l & SSL_kKRB5)

                 {

                 krb5_error_code		krb5rc;

 		krb5_data		enc_ticket;

 		krb5_data		authenticator;

 		krb5_data		enc_pms;

                 KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;

 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX		ciph_ctx;

 		EVP_CIPHER		*enc = NULL;

 		unsigned char		iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];

 		unsigned char		pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH

                                                + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];

 		int                     padl, outl;

 		krb5_timestamp		authtime = 0;

 		krb5_ticket_times	ttimes;

 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);

                 if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();

 		n2s(p,i);

 		enc_ticket.length = i;

 		if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;

 		p+=enc_ticket.length;

 		n2s(p,i);

 		authenticator.length = i;

 		if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		authenticator.data = (char *)p;

 		p+=authenticator.length;

 		n2s(p,i);

 		enc_pms.length = i;

 		enc_pms.data = (char *)p;

 		p+=enc_pms.length;

 		/* Note that the length is checked again below,

 		** after decryption

 		*/

 		if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 			       SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +

 						enc_pms.length + 6))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto err;

 			}

                 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,

 					&kssl_err)) != 0)

                         {

 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG

                         printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",

                                 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);

                         if (kssl_err.text)

                                 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);

 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */

                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

                                 kssl_err.reason);

                         goto err;

                         }

 		/*  Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,

 		**  but will return authtime == 0.

 		*/

 		if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,

 					&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)

 			{

 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG

                         printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",

                                 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);

                         if (kssl_err.text)

                                 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);

 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */

                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

                                 kssl_err.reason);

                         goto err;

 			}

 		if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);

                         goto err;

 			}

 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG

                 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);

 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */

 		enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);

                 if (enc == NULL)

                     goto err;

 		memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);	/* per RFC 1510 */

 		if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,

 					(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		outl += padl;

 		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))

 		    {

 		    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the

 		     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the

 		     * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).

 		     * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of

 		     * the protocol version.

 		     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 

 		     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)

 		     */

 		    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))

 		        {

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 			       SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		    }

 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);

                 s->session->master_key_length=

                         s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

                                 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);

                 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)

                         {

                         size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);

                         if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 

                                 {

                                 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;

                                 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);

                                 }

                         }

                 /*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,

 		**  but it caused problems for apache.

                 **  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);

                 **  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;

                 */

                 }

 	else

 #endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 		if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))

 		{

 		int ret = 1;

 		int field_size = 0;

 		const EC_KEY   *tkey;

 		const EC_GROUP *group;

 		const BIGNUM *priv_key;

                 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */

 		if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 

 			{

                 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

                 	goto err;

 			}

 		/* Let's get server private key and group information */

 		if (l & SSL_kECDH) 

 			{ 

                         /* use the certificate */

 			tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			/* use the ephermeral values we saved when

 			 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.

 			 */

 			tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;

 			}

 		group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);

 		priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);

 		if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||

 		    !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 			       ERR_R_EC_LIB);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		/* Let's get client's public key */

 		if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 			goto err;

 			}

                 if (n == 0L) 

                         {

 			/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */

 			 if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 

 				 {

 				 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 				 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);

 				 goto f_err;

 				 }

                         if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))

 			    == NULL) || 

 			    (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))

                         	{

 				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client

 				 * authentication using ECDH certificates

 				 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is

 				 * never executed. When that support is

 				 * added, we ought to ensure the key 

 				 * received in the certificate is 

 				 * authorized for key agreement.

 				 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that

 				 * the two ECDH shares are for the same

 				 * group.

 				 */

                            	al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

                            	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				    SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);

                            	goto f_err;

                            	}

 			if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,

 			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 					ERR_R_EC_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

                         ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */

                         }

                 else

                         {

 			/* Get client's public key from encoded point

 			 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.

 			 */

 			if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 				goto err;

 				}

                         /* Get encoded point length */

                         i = *p; 

 			p += 1;

                         if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 

 			    clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);

 				goto err;

 				}

                         /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer

                          * currently, so set it to the start 

                          */ 

                         p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

                         }

 		/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */

 		field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);

 		if (field_size <= 0)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 

 			       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);

                 if (i <= 0)

                         {

                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 			    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

                         goto err;

                         }

 		EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);

 		EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);

 		if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 

 			EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);

 		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

 		/* Compute the master secret */

                 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \

 		    generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);

                 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);

                 return (ret);

 		}

 	else

 #endif

 		{

 		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

 				SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	return(1);

 f_err:

 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)

 err:

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);

 	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);

 	if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 

 		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);

 	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

 #endif

 	return(-1);

 	}

 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)

 	{

 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;

 	unsigned char *p;

 	int al,ok,ret=0;

 	long n;

 	int type=0,i,j;

 	X509 *peer;

 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,

 		-1,

 		514, /* 514? */

 		&ok);

 	if (!ok) return((int)n);

 	if (s->session->peer != NULL)

 		{

 		peer=s->session->peer;

 		pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);

 		type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		peer=NULL;

 		pkey=NULL;

 		}

 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)

 		{

 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;

 		if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		ret=1;

 		goto end;

 		}

 	if (peer == NULL)

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);

 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);

 		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);

 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */

 	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

 	n2s(p,i);

 	n-=2;

 	if (i > n)

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

 	if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);

 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 

 	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)

 		{

 		i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,

 			MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 

 							pkey->pkey.rsa);

 		if (i < 0)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		if (i == 0)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	else

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA

 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)

 		{

 		j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,

 			&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),

 			SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);

 		if (j <= 0)

 			{

 			/* bad signature */

 			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	else

 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA

 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)

 		{

 		j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,

 			&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),

 			SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);

 		if (j <= 0)

 			{

 			/* bad signature */

 			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,

 			    SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	else

 #endif

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 		al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	ret=1;

 	if (0)

 		{

 f_err:

 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 		}

 end:

 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

 	return(ret);

 	}

 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int i,ok,al,ret= -1;

 	X509 *x=NULL;

 	unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;

 	const unsigned char *p,*q;

 	unsigned char *d;

 	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;

 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,

 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,

 		-1,

 		s->max_cert_list,

 		&ok);

 	if (!ok) return((int)n);

 	if	(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)

 		{

 		if (	(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&

 			(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);

 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */

 		if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);

 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;

 		return(1);

 		}

 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)

 		{

 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

 	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 		goto err;

 		}

 	n2l3(p,llen);

 	if (llen+3 != n)

 		{

 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )

 		{

 		n2l3(p,l);

 		if ((l+nc+3) > llen)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		q=p;

 		x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);

 		if (x == NULL)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (p != (q+l))

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		x=NULL;

 		nc+=l+3;

 		}

 	if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)

 		{

 		/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */

 		if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */

 		else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&

 			 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);

 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);

 		if (!i)

 			{

 			al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */

 		X509_free(s->session->peer);

 	s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);

 	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;

 	/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL

 	 * when we arrive here. */

 	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)

 		{

 		s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();

 		if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		}

 	if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)

 		sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);

 	s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;

 	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the

 	 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */

 	sk=NULL;

 	ret=1;

 	if (0)

 		{

 f_err:

 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 		}

 err:

 	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);

 	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);

 	return(ret);

 	}

 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)

 	{

 	unsigned long l;

 	X509 *x;

 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)

 		{

 		x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);

 		if (x == NULL &&

                         /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */

                         (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms

                                 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))

                         != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 			return(0);

 			}

 		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);

 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;

 		s->init_num=(int)l;

 		s->init_off=0;

 		}

 	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */

 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

 	}

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */

 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)

 {

 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)

 	 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */

 	switch (nid) {

 	case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */

 		return 1;

 	case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */

 		return 2;

 	case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */

 		return 3;

 	case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 

 		return 4;

 	case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 

 		return 5;

 	case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */

 		return 6;

 	case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 

 		return 7;

 	case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 

 		return 8;

 	case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */

 		return 9;

 	case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 

 		return 10;

 	case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 

 		return 11;

 	case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */

 		return 12;

 	case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 

 		return 13;

 	case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 

 		return 14;

 	case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */

 		return 15;

 	case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 

 		return 16;

 	case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 

 		return 17;

 	case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */

 		return 18;

 	case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 

 		return 19;

 	case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 

 		return 20;

 	case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */

 		return 21;

 	case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 

 		return 22;

 	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 

 		return 23;

 	case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */

 		return 24;

 	case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */	

 		return 25;

 	default:

 		return 0;

 	}

 }

 #endif