1.1 --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
1.2 +++ b/os/ossrv/ssl/libssl/src/s3_srvr.c Fri Jun 15 03:10:57 2012 +0200
1.3 @@ -0,0 +1,2638 @@
1.4 +/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
1.5 +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
1.6 + * All rights reserved.
1.7 + *
1.8 + * This package is an SSL implementation written
1.9 + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
1.10 + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
1.11 + *
1.12 + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
1.13 + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
1.14 + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
1.15 + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
1.16 + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
1.17 + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
1.18 + *
1.19 + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
1.20 + * the code are not to be removed.
1.21 + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
1.22 + * as the author of the parts of the library used.
1.23 + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
1.24 + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
1.25 + *
1.26 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1.27 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1.28 + * are met:
1.29 + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
1.30 + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1.31 + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1.32 + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1.33 + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1.34 + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
1.35 + * must display the following acknowledgement:
1.36 + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
1.37 + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
1.38 + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
1.39 + * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
1.40 + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
1.41 + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
1.42 + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
1.43 + *
1.44 + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
1.45 + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
1.46 + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
1.47 + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
1.48 + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
1.49 + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
1.50 + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
1.51 + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
1.52 + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
1.53 + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
1.54 + * SUCH DAMAGE.
1.55 + *
1.56 + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
1.57 + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
1.58 + * copied and put under another distribution licence
1.59 + * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
1.60 + */
1.61 +/* ====================================================================
1.62 + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
1.63 + *
1.64 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1.65 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1.66 + * are met:
1.67 + *
1.68 + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1.69 + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1.70 + *
1.71 + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1.72 + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
1.73 + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
1.74 + * distribution.
1.75 + *
1.76 + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
1.77 + * software must display the following acknowledgment:
1.78 + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
1.79 + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
1.80 + *
1.81 + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
1.82 + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
1.83 + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
1.84 + * openssl-core@openssl.org.
1.85 + *
1.86 + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
1.87 + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
1.88 + * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
1.89 + *
1.90 + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
1.91 + * acknowledgment:
1.92 + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
1.93 + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
1.94 + *
1.95 + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
1.96 + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
1.97 + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
1.98 + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
1.99 + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
1.100 + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1.101 + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
1.102 + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
1.103 + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
1.104 + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
1.105 + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
1.106 + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.107 + * ====================================================================
1.108 + *
1.109 + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
1.110 + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
1.111 + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
1.112 + *
1.113 + */
1.114 +/* ====================================================================
1.115 + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
1.116 + *
1.117 + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
1.118 + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
1.119 + *
1.120 + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
1.121 + * license provided above.
1.122 + *
1.123 + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
1.124 + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
1.125 + *
1.126 + */
1.127 +/*
1.128 + © Portions copyright (c) 2006 Nokia Corporation. All rights reserved.
1.129 + */
1.130 +
1.131 +#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1.132 +#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1.133 +
1.134 +#include <stdio.h>
1.135 +#include "ssl_locl.h"
1.136 +#include "kssl_lcl.h"
1.137 +#include <openssl/buffer.h>
1.138 +#include <openssl/rand.h>
1.139 +#include <openssl/objects.h>
1.140 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
1.141 +#include <openssl/hmac.h>
1.142 +#include <openssl/x509.h>
1.143 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1.144 +#include <openssl/dh.h>
1.145 +#endif
1.146 +#include <openssl/bn.h>
1.147 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1.148 +#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
1.149 +#endif
1.150 +#include <openssl/md5.h>
1.151 +
1.152 +#if (defined(SYMBIAN) && (defined(__WINSCW__) || defined(__WINS__)))
1.153 +#include "libssl_wsd.h"
1.154 +#endif
1.155 +
1.156 +#ifdef EMULATOR
1.157 +
1.158 + GET_STATIC_VAR_FROM_TLS(SSLv3_server_method_data,s3_srvr,SSL_METHOD)
1.159 +
1.160 + #define SSLv3_server_method_data (*GET_WSD_VAR_NAME(SSLv3_server_method_data,s3_srvr,s)())
1.161 +
1.162 +#endif
1.163 +
1.164 +static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
1.165 +
1.166 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.167 +static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
1.168 +#endif
1.169 +
1.170 +static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
1.171 + {
1.172 + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
1.173 + return(SSLv3_server_method());
1.174 + else
1.175 + return(NULL);
1.176 + }
1.177 +
1.178 +EXPORT_C IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
1.179 + ssl3_accept,
1.180 + ssl_undefined_function,
1.181 + ssl3_get_server_method)
1.182 +
1.183 +int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
1.184 + {
1.185 + BUF_MEM *buf;
1.186 + unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
1.187 + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1.188 + long num1;
1.189 + int ret= -1;
1.190 + int new_state,state,skip=0;
1.191 +
1.192 + RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
1.193 + ERR_clear_error();
1.194 + clear_sys_error();
1.195 +
1.196 + if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1.197 + cb=s->info_callback;
1.198 + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1.199 + cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1.200 +
1.201 + /* init things to blank */
1.202 + s->in_handshake++;
1.203 + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
1.204 +
1.205 + if (s->cert == NULL)
1.206 + {
1.207 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
1.208 + return(-1);
1.209 + }
1.210 +
1.211 + for (;;)
1.212 + {
1.213 + state=s->state;
1.214 +
1.215 + switch (s->state)
1.216 + {
1.217 + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
1.218 + s->new_session=1;
1.219 + /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
1.220 +
1.221 + case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
1.222 + case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
1.223 + case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
1.224 + case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
1.225 +
1.226 + s->server=1;
1.227 + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
1.228 +
1.229 + if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
1.230 + {
1.231 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1.232 + return -1;
1.233 + }
1.234 + s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
1.235 +
1.236 + if (s->init_buf == NULL)
1.237 + {
1.238 + if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
1.239 + {
1.240 + ret= -1;
1.241 + goto end;
1.242 + }
1.243 + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
1.244 + {
1.245 + ret= -1;
1.246 + goto end;
1.247 + }
1.248 + s->init_buf=buf;
1.249 + }
1.250 +
1.251 + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
1.252 + {
1.253 + ret= -1;
1.254 + goto end;
1.255 + }
1.256 +
1.257 + s->init_num=0;
1.258 +
1.259 + if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
1.260 + {
1.261 + /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
1.262 + * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
1.263 + */
1.264 + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
1.265 +
1.266 + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
1.267 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
1.268 + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
1.269 + }
1.270 + else
1.271 + {
1.272 + /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
1.273 + * we will just send a HelloRequest */
1.274 + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
1.275 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
1.276 + }
1.277 + break;
1.278 +
1.279 + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
1.280 + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
1.281 +
1.282 + s->shutdown=0;
1.283 + ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
1.284 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.285 + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
1.286 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
1.287 + s->init_num=0;
1.288 +
1.289 + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
1.290 + break;
1.291 +
1.292 + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
1.293 + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
1.294 + break;
1.295 +
1.296 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
1.297 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
1.298 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
1.299 +
1.300 + s->shutdown=0;
1.301 + ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
1.302 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.303 + s->new_session = 2;
1.304 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
1.305 + s->init_num=0;
1.306 + break;
1.307 +
1.308 + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
1.309 + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
1.310 + ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
1.311 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.312 +
1.313 + if (s->hit)
1.314 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
1.315 + else
1.316 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
1.317 + s->init_num=0;
1.318 + break;
1.319 +
1.320 + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
1.321 + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
1.322 + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
1.323 + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
1.324 + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
1.325 + {
1.326 + ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
1.327 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.328 + }
1.329 + else
1.330 + skip=1;
1.331 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
1.332 + s->init_num=0;
1.333 + break;
1.334 +
1.335 + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
1.336 + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
1.337 + l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1.338 +
1.339 + /* clear this, it may get reset by
1.340 + * send_server_key_exchange */
1.341 + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
1.342 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1.343 + && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
1.344 +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1.345 + )
1.346 + /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
1.347 + * even when forbidden by protocol specs
1.348 + * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
1.349 + * be able to handle this) */
1.350 + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1.351 + else
1.352 + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
1.353 +
1.354 +
1.355 + /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
1.356 + * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
1.357 + *
1.358 + * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
1.359 + * message only if the cipher suite is either
1.360 + * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
1.361 + * server certificate contains the server's
1.362 + * public key for key exchange.
1.363 + */
1.364 + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
1.365 + || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
1.366 + || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
1.367 + || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
1.368 + && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
1.369 + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
1.370 + && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
1.371 + )
1.372 + )
1.373 + )
1.374 + )
1.375 + {
1.376 + ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
1.377 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.378 + }
1.379 + else
1.380 + skip=1;
1.381 +
1.382 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
1.383 + s->init_num=0;
1.384 + break;
1.385 +
1.386 + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
1.387 + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
1.388 + if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
1.389 + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
1.390 + /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
1.391 + * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
1.392 + ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
1.393 + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
1.394 + /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
1.395 + * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
1.396 + * and in RFC 2246): */
1.397 + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
1.398 + /* ... except when the application insists on verification
1.399 + * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
1.400 + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
1.401 + /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
1.402 + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
1.403 + {
1.404 + /* no cert request */
1.405 + skip=1;
1.406 + s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
1.407 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
1.408 + }
1.409 + else
1.410 + {
1.411 + s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
1.412 + ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
1.413 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.414 +#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1.415 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
1.416 +#else
1.417 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
1.418 + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
1.419 +#endif
1.420 + s->init_num=0;
1.421 + }
1.422 + break;
1.423 +
1.424 + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
1.425 + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
1.426 + ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
1.427 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.428 + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
1.429 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
1.430 + s->init_num=0;
1.431 + break;
1.432 +
1.433 + case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
1.434 + /* number of bytes to be flushed */
1.435 + num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
1.436 + if (num1 > 0)
1.437 + {
1.438 + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1.439 + num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1.440 + if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
1.441 + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1.442 + }
1.443 +
1.444 + s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
1.445 + break;
1.446 +
1.447 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
1.448 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
1.449 + /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
1.450 + ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
1.451 + if (ret <= 0)
1.452 + goto end;
1.453 + if (ret == 2)
1.454 + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
1.455 + else {
1.456 + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
1.457 + {
1.458 + ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
1.459 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.460 + }
1.461 + s->init_num=0;
1.462 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
1.463 + }
1.464 + break;
1.465 +
1.466 + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
1.467 + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
1.468 + ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
1.469 + if (ret <= 0)
1.470 + goto end;
1.471 + if (ret == 2)
1.472 + {
1.473 + /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
1.474 + * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
1.475 + * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
1.476 + * message is not sent.
1.477 + */
1.478 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
1.479 + s->init_num = 0;
1.480 + }
1.481 + else
1.482 + {
1.483 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
1.484 + s->init_num=0;
1.485 +
1.486 + /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
1.487 + * a client cert, it can be verified
1.488 + */
1.489 + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
1.490 + &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1.491 + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
1.492 + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
1.493 + &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1.494 + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
1.495 + }
1.496 + break;
1.497 +
1.498 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
1.499 + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
1.500 +
1.501 + /* we should decide if we expected this one */
1.502 + ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
1.503 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.504 +
1.505 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
1.506 + s->init_num=0;
1.507 + break;
1.508 +
1.509 + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
1.510 + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
1.511 + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
1.512 + SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
1.513 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.514 + if (s->hit)
1.515 + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
1.516 +
1.517 + else
1.518 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
1.519 + s->init_num=0;
1.520 + break;
1.521 +
1.522 +
1.523 +
1.524 + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
1.525 + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
1.526 +
1.527 + s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1.528 + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1.529 + { ret= -1; goto end; }
1.530 +
1.531 + ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
1.532 + SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
1.533 +
1.534 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.535 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
1.536 + s->init_num=0;
1.537 +
1.538 + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1.539 + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
1.540 + {
1.541 + ret= -1;
1.542 + goto end;
1.543 + }
1.544 +
1.545 + break;
1.546 +
1.547 + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
1.548 + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
1.549 + ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
1.550 + SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
1.551 + s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
1.552 + s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
1.553 + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
1.554 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
1.555 + if (s->hit)
1.556 + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
1.557 + else
1.558 + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
1.559 + s->init_num=0;
1.560 + break;
1.561 +
1.562 + case SSL_ST_OK:
1.563 + /* clean a few things up */
1.564 + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1.565 +
1.566 + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1.567 + s->init_buf=NULL;
1.568 +
1.569 + /* remove buffering on output */
1.570 + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
1.571 +
1.572 + s->init_num=0;
1.573 +
1.574 + if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1.575 + {
1.576 + /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
1.577 + * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1.578 +
1.579 + s->new_session=0;
1.580 +
1.581 + ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1.582 +
1.583 + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
1.584 + /* s->server=1; */
1.585 + s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
1.586 +
1.587 + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
1.588 + }
1.589 +
1.590 + ret = 1;
1.591 + goto end;
1.592 + /* break; */
1.593 +
1.594 + default:
1.595 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
1.596 + ret= -1;
1.597 + goto end;
1.598 + /* break; */
1.599 + }
1.600 +
1.601 + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
1.602 + {
1.603 + if (s->debug)
1.604 + {
1.605 + if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
1.606 + goto end;
1.607 + }
1.608 +
1.609 +
1.610 + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
1.611 + {
1.612 + new_state=s->state;
1.613 + s->state=state;
1.614 + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
1.615 + s->state=new_state;
1.616 + }
1.617 + }
1.618 + skip=0;
1.619 + }
1.620 +end:
1.621 + /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
1.622 +
1.623 + s->in_handshake--;
1.624 + if (cb != NULL)
1.625 + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
1.626 + return(ret);
1.627 + }
1.628 +
1.629 +int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
1.630 + {
1.631 + unsigned char *p;
1.632 +
1.633 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
1.634 + {
1.635 + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1.636 + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1.637 + *(p++)=0;
1.638 + *(p++)=0;
1.639 + *(p++)=0;
1.640 +
1.641 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
1.642 + /* number of bytes to write */
1.643 + s->init_num=4;
1.644 + s->init_off=0;
1.645 + }
1.646 +
1.647 + /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
1.648 + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1.649 + }
1.650 +
1.651 +int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
1.652 + {
1.653 + int ok;
1.654 + long n;
1.655 +
1.656 + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
1.657 + * so permit appropriate message length */
1.658 + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1.659 + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
1.660 + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
1.661 + -1,
1.662 + s->max_cert_list,
1.663 + &ok);
1.664 + if (!ok) return((int)n);
1.665 + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1.666 + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
1.667 + {
1.668 + /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
1.669 + * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
1.670 + * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
1.671 + * when a handshake is not completed ... */
1.672 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1.673 + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1.674 + {
1.675 + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1.676 + s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
1.677 + }
1.678 +#endif
1.679 + return 2;
1.680 + }
1.681 + return 1;
1.682 +}
1.683 +
1.684 +int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
1.685 + {
1.686 + int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
1.687 + unsigned int cookie_len;
1.688 + long n;
1.689 + unsigned long id;
1.690 + unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
1.691 + SSL_CIPHER *c;
1.692 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1.693 + SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
1.694 +#endif
1.695 + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
1.696 +
1.697 + /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
1.698 + * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
1.699 + * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
1.700 + * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
1.701 + * TLSv1.
1.702 + */
1.703 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1.704 + {
1.705 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1.706 + }
1.707 + s->first_packet=1;
1.708 + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1.709 + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
1.710 + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
1.711 + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1.712 + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1.713 + &ok);
1.714 +
1.715 + if (!ok) return((int)n);
1.716 + s->first_packet=0;
1.717 + d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1.718 +
1.719 + /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
1.720 + * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
1.721 + s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
1.722 + p+=2;
1.723 +
1.724 + if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1.725 + (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
1.726 + {
1.727 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1.728 + if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
1.729 + {
1.730 + /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1.731 + s->version = s->client_version;
1.732 + }
1.733 + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1.734 + goto f_err;
1.735 + }
1.736 +
1.737 + /* load the client random */
1.738 + memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.739 + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1.740 +
1.741 + /* get the session-id */
1.742 + j= *(p++);
1.743 +
1.744 + s->hit=0;
1.745 + /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
1.746 + * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
1.747 + * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
1.748 + * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
1.749 + * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
1.750 + * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
1.751 + * an earlier library version)
1.752 + */
1.753 + if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1.754 + {
1.755 + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1.756 + goto err;
1.757 + }
1.758 + else
1.759 + {
1.760 + i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1.761 + if (i == 1)
1.762 + { /* previous session */
1.763 + s->hit=1;
1.764 + }
1.765 + else if (i == -1)
1.766 + goto err;
1.767 + else /* i == 0 */
1.768 + {
1.769 + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1.770 + goto err;
1.771 + }
1.772 + }
1.773 +
1.774 + p+=j;
1.775 +
1.776 + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
1.777 + {
1.778 + /* cookie stuff */
1.779 + cookie_len = *(p++);
1.780 +
1.781 + if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1.782 + s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
1.783 + {
1.784 + /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
1.785 + if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
1.786 + {
1.787 + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.788 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1.789 + goto f_err;
1.790 + }
1.791 + }
1.792 +
1.793 + /*
1.794 + * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1.795 + * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1.796 + * does not cause an overflow.
1.797 + */
1.798 + if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1.799 + {
1.800 + /* too much data */
1.801 + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.802 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1.803 + goto f_err;
1.804 + }
1.805 +
1.806 + /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1.807 + if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1.808 + cookie_len > 0)
1.809 + {
1.810 + memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1.811 +
1.812 + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1.813 + {
1.814 + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1.815 + cookie_len) == 0)
1.816 + {
1.817 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.818 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1.819 + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1.820 + goto f_err;
1.821 + }
1.822 + /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1.823 + }
1.824 + else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1.825 + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1.826 + {
1.827 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.828 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1.829 + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1.830 + goto f_err;
1.831 + }
1.832 + }
1.833 +
1.834 + p += cookie_len;
1.835 + }
1.836 +
1.837 + n2s(p,i);
1.838 + if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1.839 + {
1.840 + /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1.841 + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1.842 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1.843 + goto f_err;
1.844 + }
1.845 + if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1.846 + {
1.847 + /* not enough data */
1.848 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.849 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.850 + goto f_err;
1.851 + }
1.852 + if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1.853 + == NULL))
1.854 + {
1.855 + goto err;
1.856 + }
1.857 + p+=i;
1.858 +
1.859 + /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1.860 + if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1.861 + {
1.862 + j=0;
1.863 + id=s->session->cipher->id;
1.864 +
1.865 +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1.866 + printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1.867 +#endif
1.868 + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1.869 + {
1.870 + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1.871 +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1.872 + printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1.873 + i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1.874 +#endif
1.875 + if (c->id == id)
1.876 + {
1.877 + j=1;
1.878 + break;
1.879 + }
1.880 + }
1.881 + if (j == 0)
1.882 + {
1.883 + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1.884 + {
1.885 + /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
1.886 + s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1.887 + }
1.888 + else
1.889 + {
1.890 + /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1.891 + * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1.892 + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1.893 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1.894 + goto f_err;
1.895 + }
1.896 + }
1.897 + }
1.898 +
1.899 + /* compression */
1.900 + i= *(p++);
1.901 + if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1.902 + {
1.903 + /* not enough data */
1.904 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.905 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.906 + goto f_err;
1.907 + }
1.908 + q=p;
1.909 + for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1.910 + {
1.911 + if (p[j] == 0) break;
1.912 + }
1.913 +
1.914 + p+=i;
1.915 + if (j >= i)
1.916 + {
1.917 + /* no compress */
1.918 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.919 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1.920 + goto f_err;
1.921 + }
1.922 +
1.923 +
1.924 + /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1.925 + * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1.926 + * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1.927 + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1.928 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1.929 + if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1.930 + { /* See if we have a match */
1.931 + int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1.932 +
1.933 + nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1.934 + for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1.935 + {
1.936 + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1.937 + v=comp->id;
1.938 + for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1.939 + {
1.940 + if (v == q[o])
1.941 + {
1.942 + done=1;
1.943 + break;
1.944 + }
1.945 + }
1.946 + if (done) break;
1.947 + }
1.948 + if (done)
1.949 + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1.950 + else
1.951 + comp=NULL;
1.952 + }
1.953 +#endif
1.954 +
1.955 + /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1.956 +#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1.957 + * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1.958 + * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1.959 + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1.960 + {
1.961 + if (p < (d+n))
1.962 + {
1.963 + /* wrong number of bytes,
1.964 + * there could be more to follow */
1.965 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.966 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.967 + goto f_err;
1.968 + }
1.969 + }
1.970 +#endif
1.971 +
1.972 + /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1.973 + * pick a cipher */
1.974 +
1.975 + if (!s->hit)
1.976 + {
1.977 +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1.978 + s->session->compress_meth=0;
1.979 +#else
1.980 + s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1.981 +#endif
1.982 + if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1.983 + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1.984 + s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1.985 + if (ciphers == NULL)
1.986 + {
1.987 + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1.988 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1.989 + goto f_err;
1.990 + }
1.991 + ciphers=NULL;
1.992 + c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1.993 + SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1.994 +
1.995 + if (c == NULL)
1.996 + {
1.997 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.998 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1.999 + goto f_err;
1.1000 + }
1.1001 + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1.1002 + }
1.1003 + else
1.1004 + {
1.1005 + /* Session-id reuse */
1.1006 +#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1.1007 + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1.1008 + SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1.1009 + SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1.1010 +
1.1011 + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1.1012 + {
1.1013 + sk=s->session->ciphers;
1.1014 + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1.1015 + {
1.1016 + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1.1017 + if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1.1018 + nc=c;
1.1019 + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1.1020 + ec=c;
1.1021 + }
1.1022 + if (nc != NULL)
1.1023 + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1.1024 + else if (ec != NULL)
1.1025 + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1.1026 + else
1.1027 + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1.1028 + }
1.1029 + else
1.1030 +#endif
1.1031 + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1.1032 + }
1.1033 +
1.1034 + /* we now have the following setup.
1.1035 + * client_random
1.1036 + * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1.1037 + * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1.1038 + * compression - basically ignored right now
1.1039 + * ssl version is set - sslv3
1.1040 + * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1.1041 + * s->hit - session reuse flag
1.1042 + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1.1043 + */
1.1044 +
1.1045 + ret=1;
1.1046 + if (0)
1.1047 + {
1.1048 +f_err:
1.1049 + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1.1050 + }
1.1051 +err:
1.1052 + if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1.1053 + return(ret);
1.1054 + }
1.1055 +
1.1056 +int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1.1057 + {
1.1058 + unsigned char *buf;
1.1059 + unsigned char *p,*d;
1.1060 + int i,sl;
1.1061 + unsigned long l,Time;
1.1062 +
1.1063 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1.1064 + {
1.1065 + buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1.1066 + p=s->s3->server_random;
1.1067 + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1.1068 + l2n(Time,p);
1.1069 + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1.1070 + return -1;
1.1071 + /* Do the message type and length last */
1.1072 + d=p= &(buf[4]);
1.1073 +
1.1074 + *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1.1075 + *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1.1076 +
1.1077 + /* Random stuff */
1.1078 + memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1079 + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1.1080 +
1.1081 + /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1.1082 + * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1.1083 + * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1.1084 + * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1.1085 + * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1.1086 + * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1.1087 + * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1.1088 + */
1.1089 + if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1.1090 + s->session->session_id_length=0;
1.1091 +
1.1092 + sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1.1093 + if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1.1094 + {
1.1095 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1.1096 + return -1;
1.1097 + }
1.1098 + *(p++)=sl;
1.1099 + memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1.1100 + p+=sl;
1.1101 +
1.1102 + /* put the cipher */
1.1103 + i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1.1104 + p+=i;
1.1105 +
1.1106 + /* put the compression method */
1.1107 +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1.1108 + *(p++)=0;
1.1109 +#else
1.1110 + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1.1111 + *(p++)=0;
1.1112 + else
1.1113 + *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1.1114 +#endif
1.1115 +
1.1116 + /* do the header */
1.1117 + l=(p-d);
1.1118 + d=buf;
1.1119 + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1.1120 + l2n3(l,d);
1.1121 +
1.1122 + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1.1123 + /* number of bytes to write */
1.1124 + s->init_num=p-buf;
1.1125 + s->init_off=0;
1.1126 + }
1.1127 +
1.1128 + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1.1129 + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1.1130 + }
1.1131 +
1.1132 +int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1.1133 + {
1.1134 + unsigned char *p;
1.1135 +
1.1136 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1.1137 + {
1.1138 + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1.1139 +
1.1140 + /* do the header */
1.1141 + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1.1142 + *(p++)=0;
1.1143 + *(p++)=0;
1.1144 + *(p++)=0;
1.1145 +
1.1146 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1.1147 + /* number of bytes to write */
1.1148 + s->init_num=4;
1.1149 + s->init_off=0;
1.1150 + }
1.1151 +
1.1152 + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1.1153 + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1.1154 + }
1.1155 +
1.1156 +int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1.1157 + {
1.1158 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1.1159 + unsigned char *q;
1.1160 + int j,num;
1.1161 + RSA *rsa;
1.1162 + unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1.1163 + unsigned int u;
1.1164 +#endif
1.1165 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1.1166 + DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1.1167 +#endif
1.1168 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.1169 + EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1.1170 + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1.1171 + int encodedlen = 0;
1.1172 + int curve_id = 0;
1.1173 + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1.1174 +#endif
1.1175 + EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1.1176 + unsigned char *p,*d;
1.1177 + int al,i;
1.1178 + unsigned long type;
1.1179 + int n;
1.1180 + CERT *cert;
1.1181 + BIGNUM *r[4];
1.1182 + int nr[4],kn;
1.1183 + BUF_MEM *buf;
1.1184 + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1.1185 +
1.1186 + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1.1187 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1.1188 + {
1.1189 + type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1.1190 + cert=s->cert;
1.1191 +
1.1192 + buf=s->init_buf;
1.1193 +
1.1194 + r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1.1195 + n=0;
1.1196 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1.1197 + if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1.1198 + {
1.1199 + rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1.1200 + if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1.1201 + {
1.1202 + rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1.1203 + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1.1204 + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1.1205 + if(rsa == NULL)
1.1206 + {
1.1207 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1208 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1.1209 + goto f_err;
1.1210 + }
1.1211 + RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1.1212 + cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1.1213 + }
1.1214 + if (rsa == NULL)
1.1215 + {
1.1216 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1217 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1.1218 + goto f_err;
1.1219 + }
1.1220 + r[0]=rsa->n;
1.1221 + r[1]=rsa->e;
1.1222 + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1.1223 + }
1.1224 + else
1.1225 +#endif
1.1226 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1.1227 + if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1.1228 + {
1.1229 + dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1.1230 + if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1.1231 + dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1.1232 + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1.1233 + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1.1234 + if (dhp == NULL)
1.1235 + {
1.1236 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1237 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1.1238 + goto f_err;
1.1239 + }
1.1240 +
1.1241 + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1.1242 + {
1.1243 + DH_free(dh);
1.1244 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1.1245 + goto err;
1.1246 + }
1.1247 +
1.1248 + if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1.1249 + {
1.1250 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1.1251 + goto err;
1.1252 + }
1.1253 +
1.1254 + s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1.1255 + if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1.1256 + dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1.1257 + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1.1258 + {
1.1259 + if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1.1260 + {
1.1261 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1262 + ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1.1263 + goto err;
1.1264 + }
1.1265 + }
1.1266 + else
1.1267 + {
1.1268 + dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1.1269 + dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1.1270 + if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1.1271 + (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1.1272 + {
1.1273 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1.1274 + goto err;
1.1275 + }
1.1276 + }
1.1277 + r[0]=dh->p;
1.1278 + r[1]=dh->g;
1.1279 + r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1.1280 + }
1.1281 + else
1.1282 +#endif
1.1283 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.1284 + if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1.1285 + {
1.1286 + const EC_GROUP *group;
1.1287 +
1.1288 + ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1.1289 + if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1.1290 + {
1.1291 + ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1.1292 + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1.1293 + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1.1294 + }
1.1295 + if (ecdhp == NULL)
1.1296 + {
1.1297 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1298 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1.1299 + goto f_err;
1.1300 + }
1.1301 +
1.1302 + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1.1303 + {
1.1304 + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1.1305 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1.1306 + goto err;
1.1307 + }
1.1308 +
1.1309 + /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1.1310 + if (ecdhp == NULL)
1.1311 + {
1.1312 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.1313 + goto err;
1.1314 + }
1.1315 + if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1.1316 + {
1.1317 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.1318 + goto err;
1.1319 + }
1.1320 + ecdh = ecdhp;
1.1321 +
1.1322 + s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1.1323 + if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1.1324 + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1.1325 + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1.1326 + {
1.1327 + if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1.1328 + {
1.1329 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.1330 + goto err;
1.1331 + }
1.1332 + }
1.1333 +
1.1334 + if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1.1335 + (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1.1336 + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1.1337 + {
1.1338 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.1339 + goto err;
1.1340 + }
1.1341 +
1.1342 + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1.1343 + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1.1344 + {
1.1345 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1.1346 + goto err;
1.1347 + }
1.1348 +
1.1349 + /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1.1350 + * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1.1351 + * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1.1352 + */
1.1353 + if ((curve_id =
1.1354 + nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1.1355 + == 0)
1.1356 + {
1.1357 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1.1358 + goto err;
1.1359 + }
1.1360 +
1.1361 + /* Encode the public key.
1.1362 + * First check the size of encoding and
1.1363 + * allocate memory accordingly.
1.1364 + */
1.1365 + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1.1366 + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1.1367 + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1.1368 + NULL, 0, NULL);
1.1369 +
1.1370 + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1.1371 + OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1.1372 + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1.1373 + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1.1374 + {
1.1375 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.1376 + goto err;
1.1377 + }
1.1378 +
1.1379 +
1.1380 + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1.1381 + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1.1382 + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1.1383 + encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1.1384 +
1.1385 + if (encodedlen == 0)
1.1386 + {
1.1387 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.1388 + goto err;
1.1389 + }
1.1390 +
1.1391 + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1.1392 +
1.1393 + /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1.1394 + * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1.1395 + * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1.1396 + * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1.1397 + * structure.
1.1398 + */
1.1399 + n = 4 + encodedlen;
1.1400 +
1.1401 + /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1.1402 + * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1.1403 + */
1.1404 + r[0]=NULL;
1.1405 + r[1]=NULL;
1.1406 + r[2]=NULL;
1.1407 + r[3]=NULL;
1.1408 + }
1.1409 + else
1.1410 +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1.1411 + {
1.1412 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1413 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1.1414 + goto f_err;
1.1415 + }
1.1416 + for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1.1417 + {
1.1418 + nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1.1419 + n+=2+nr[i];
1.1420 + }
1.1421 +
1.1422 + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1.1423 + {
1.1424 + if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1.1425 + == NULL)
1.1426 + {
1.1427 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.1428 + goto f_err;
1.1429 + }
1.1430 + kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1.1431 + }
1.1432 + else
1.1433 + {
1.1434 + pkey=NULL;
1.1435 + kn=0;
1.1436 + }
1.1437 +
1.1438 + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1.1439 + {
1.1440 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1.1441 + goto err;
1.1442 + }
1.1443 + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1.1444 + p= &(d[4]);
1.1445 +
1.1446 + for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1.1447 + {
1.1448 + s2n(nr[i],p);
1.1449 + BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1.1450 + p+=nr[i];
1.1451 + }
1.1452 +
1.1453 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.1454 + if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1.1455 + {
1.1456 + /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1.1457 + * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1.1458 + * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1.1459 + * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1.1460 + * the actual encoded point itself
1.1461 + */
1.1462 + *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1.1463 + p += 1;
1.1464 + *p = 0;
1.1465 + p += 1;
1.1466 + *p = curve_id;
1.1467 + p += 1;
1.1468 + *p = encodedlen;
1.1469 + p += 1;
1.1470 + memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1.1471 + (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1.1472 + encodedlen);
1.1473 + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1.1474 + p += encodedlen;
1.1475 + }
1.1476 +#endif
1.1477 +
1.1478 + /* not anonymous */
1.1479 + if (pkey != NULL)
1.1480 + {
1.1481 + /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1.1482 + * and p points to the space at the end. */
1.1483 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1.1484 + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1.1485 + {
1.1486 + q=md_buf;
1.1487 + j=0;
1.1488 + for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1.1489 + {
1.1490 + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1.1491 + ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1.1492 + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1493 + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1494 + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1.1495 + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1.1496 + (unsigned int *)&i);
1.1497 + q+=i;
1.1498 + j+=i;
1.1499 + }
1.1500 + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1.1501 + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1.1502 + {
1.1503 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1.1504 + goto err;
1.1505 + }
1.1506 + s2n(u,p);
1.1507 + n+=u+2;
1.1508 + }
1.1509 + else
1.1510 +#endif
1.1511 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1.1512 + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1.1513 + {
1.1514 + /* lets do DSS */
1.1515 + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1.1516 + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1517 + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1518 + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1.1519 + if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1.1520 + (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1.1521 + {
1.1522 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1.1523 + goto err;
1.1524 + }
1.1525 + s2n(i,p);
1.1526 + n+=i+2;
1.1527 + }
1.1528 + else
1.1529 +#endif
1.1530 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1.1531 + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1.1532 + {
1.1533 + /* let's do ECDSA */
1.1534 + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1.1535 + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1536 + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1.1537 + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1.1538 + if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1.1539 + (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1.1540 + {
1.1541 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1.1542 + goto err;
1.1543 + }
1.1544 + s2n(i,p);
1.1545 + n+=i+2;
1.1546 + }
1.1547 + else
1.1548 +#endif
1.1549 + {
1.1550 + /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1.1551 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1552 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1.1553 + goto f_err;
1.1554 + }
1.1555 + }
1.1556 +
1.1557 + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1.1558 + l2n3(n,d);
1.1559 +
1.1560 + /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1.1561 + * it off */
1.1562 + s->init_num=n+4;
1.1563 + s->init_off=0;
1.1564 + }
1.1565 +
1.1566 + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1.1567 + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1.1568 + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1.1569 +f_err:
1.1570 + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1.1571 +err:
1.1572 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.1573 + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1.1574 + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1.1575 +#endif
1.1576 + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1.1577 + return(-1);
1.1578 + }
1.1579 +
1.1580 +int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1.1581 + {
1.1582 + unsigned char *p,*d;
1.1583 + int i,j,nl,off,n;
1.1584 + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1.1585 + X509_NAME *name;
1.1586 + BUF_MEM *buf;
1.1587 +
1.1588 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1.1589 + {
1.1590 + buf=s->init_buf;
1.1591 +
1.1592 + d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1.1593 +
1.1594 + /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1.1595 + p++;
1.1596 + n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1.1597 + d[0]=n;
1.1598 + p+=n;
1.1599 + n++;
1.1600 +
1.1601 + off=n;
1.1602 + p+=2;
1.1603 + n+=2;
1.1604 +
1.1605 + sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1.1606 + nl=0;
1.1607 + if (sk != NULL)
1.1608 + {
1.1609 + for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1.1610 + {
1.1611 + name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1.1612 + j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1.1613 + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1.1614 + {
1.1615 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1.1616 + goto err;
1.1617 + }
1.1618 + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1.1619 + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1.1620 + {
1.1621 + s2n(j,p);
1.1622 + i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1.1623 + n+=2+j;
1.1624 + nl+=2+j;
1.1625 + }
1.1626 + else
1.1627 + {
1.1628 + d=p;
1.1629 + i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1.1630 + j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1.1631 + n+=j;
1.1632 + nl+=j;
1.1633 + }
1.1634 + }
1.1635 + }
1.1636 + /* else no CA names */
1.1637 + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1.1638 + s2n(nl,p);
1.1639 +
1.1640 + d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1.1641 + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1.1642 + l2n3(n,d);
1.1643 +
1.1644 + /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1.1645 + * it off */
1.1646 +
1.1647 + s->init_num=n+4;
1.1648 + s->init_off=0;
1.1649 +#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1.1650 + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1.1651 +
1.1652 + /* do the header */
1.1653 + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1.1654 + *(p++)=0;
1.1655 + *(p++)=0;
1.1656 + *(p++)=0;
1.1657 + s->init_num += 4;
1.1658 +#endif
1.1659 +
1.1660 + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1.1661 + }
1.1662 +
1.1663 + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1.1664 + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1.1665 +err:
1.1666 + return(-1);
1.1667 + }
1.1668 +
1.1669 +int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1.1670 + {
1.1671 + int i,al,ok;
1.1672 + long n;
1.1673 + unsigned long l;
1.1674 + unsigned char *p;
1.1675 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1.1676 + RSA *rsa=NULL;
1.1677 + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1.1678 +#endif
1.1679 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1.1680 + BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1.1681 + DH *dh_srvr;
1.1682 +#endif
1.1683 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1.1684 + KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1.1685 +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1.1686 +
1.1687 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.1688 + EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1.1689 + EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1.1690 + EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1.1691 + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1.1692 +#endif
1.1693 +
1.1694 + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1.1695 + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1.1696 + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1.1697 + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1698 + 2048, /* ??? */
1.1699 + &ok);
1.1700 +
1.1701 + if (!ok) return((int)n);
1.1702 + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1.1703 +
1.1704 + l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1.1705 +
1.1706 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1.1707 + if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1.1708 + {
1.1709 + /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1.1710 + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1.1711 + {
1.1712 + if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1.1713 + rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1.1714 + /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1.1715 + * be sent already */
1.1716 + if (rsa == NULL)
1.1717 + {
1.1718 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1719 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1.1720 + goto f_err;
1.1721 +
1.1722 + }
1.1723 + }
1.1724 + else
1.1725 + {
1.1726 + pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1.1727 + if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1.1728 + (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1.1729 + (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1.1730 + {
1.1731 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1732 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1.1733 + goto f_err;
1.1734 + }
1.1735 + rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1.1736 + }
1.1737 +
1.1738 + /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1.1739 + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1.1740 + s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1.1741 + {
1.1742 + n2s(p,i);
1.1743 + if (n != i+2)
1.1744 + {
1.1745 + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1.1746 + {
1.1747 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1.1748 + goto err;
1.1749 + }
1.1750 + else
1.1751 + p-=2;
1.1752 + }
1.1753 + else
1.1754 + n=i;
1.1755 + }
1.1756 +
1.1757 + i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1.1758 +
1.1759 + al = -1;
1.1760 +
1.1761 + if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1.1762 + {
1.1763 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.1764 + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1.1765 + }
1.1766 +
1.1767 + if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1.1768 + {
1.1769 + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1.1770 + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1.1771 + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1.1772 + * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1.1773 + * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1.1774 + * protocol version.
1.1775 + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1.1776 + if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1.1777 + (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1.1778 + {
1.1779 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.1780 + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1.1781 +
1.1782 + /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1.1783 + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1.1784 + * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1.1785 + * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1.1786 + * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1.1787 + * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1.1788 + * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1.1789 + }
1.1790 + }
1.1791 +
1.1792 + if (al != -1)
1.1793 + {
1.1794 + /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1.1795 + * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1.1796 + * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1.1797 + ERR_clear_error();
1.1798 + i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1.1799 + p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1.1800 + p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1.1801 + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1.1802 + goto err;
1.1803 + }
1.1804 +
1.1805 + s->session->master_key_length=
1.1806 + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1.1807 + s->session->master_key,
1.1808 + p,i);
1.1809 + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1.1810 + }
1.1811 + else
1.1812 +#endif
1.1813 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1.1814 + if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1.1815 + {
1.1816 + n2s(p,i);
1.1817 + if (n != i+2)
1.1818 + {
1.1819 + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1.1820 + {
1.1821 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1.1822 + goto err;
1.1823 + }
1.1824 + else
1.1825 + {
1.1826 + p-=2;
1.1827 + i=(int)n;
1.1828 + }
1.1829 + }
1.1830 +
1.1831 + if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1.1832 + {
1.1833 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1834 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1.1835 + goto f_err;
1.1836 + }
1.1837 + else
1.1838 + {
1.1839 + if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1.1840 + {
1.1841 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.1842 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1.1843 + goto f_err;
1.1844 + }
1.1845 + else
1.1846 + dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1.1847 + }
1.1848 +
1.1849 + pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1.1850 + if (pub == NULL)
1.1851 + {
1.1852 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1.1853 + goto err;
1.1854 + }
1.1855 +
1.1856 + i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1.1857 +
1.1858 + if (i <= 0)
1.1859 + {
1.1860 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1.1861 + goto err;
1.1862 + }
1.1863 +
1.1864 + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1.1865 + s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1.1866 +
1.1867 + BN_clear_free(pub);
1.1868 + pub=NULL;
1.1869 + s->session->master_key_length=
1.1870 + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1.1871 + s->session->master_key,p,i);
1.1872 + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1.1873 + }
1.1874 + else
1.1875 +#endif
1.1876 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1.1877 + if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1.1878 + {
1.1879 + krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1.1880 + krb5_data enc_ticket;
1.1881 + krb5_data authenticator;
1.1882 + krb5_data enc_pms;
1.1883 + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1.1884 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1.1885 + EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1.1886 + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1.1887 + unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1.1888 + + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1.1889 + int padl, outl;
1.1890 + krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1.1891 + krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1.1892 +
1.1893 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1.1894 +
1.1895 + if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1.1896 +
1.1897 + n2s(p,i);
1.1898 + enc_ticket.length = i;
1.1899 +
1.1900 + if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1.1901 + {
1.1902 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1903 + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1.1904 + goto err;
1.1905 + }
1.1906 +
1.1907 + enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1.1908 + p+=enc_ticket.length;
1.1909 +
1.1910 + n2s(p,i);
1.1911 + authenticator.length = i;
1.1912 +
1.1913 + if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1.1914 + {
1.1915 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1916 + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1.1917 + goto err;
1.1918 + }
1.1919 +
1.1920 + authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1.1921 + p+=authenticator.length;
1.1922 +
1.1923 + n2s(p,i);
1.1924 + enc_pms.length = i;
1.1925 + enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1.1926 + p+=enc_pms.length;
1.1927 +
1.1928 + /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1.1929 + ** after decryption
1.1930 + */
1.1931 + if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1.1932 + {
1.1933 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1934 + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1.1935 + goto err;
1.1936 + }
1.1937 +
1.1938 + if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1.1939 + enc_pms.length + 6))
1.1940 + {
1.1941 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1942 + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1.1943 + goto err;
1.1944 + }
1.1945 +
1.1946 + if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1.1947 + &kssl_err)) != 0)
1.1948 + {
1.1949 +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1.1950 + printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1.1951 + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1.1952 + if (kssl_err.text)
1.1953 + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1.1954 +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1.1955 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1956 + kssl_err.reason);
1.1957 + goto err;
1.1958 + }
1.1959 +
1.1960 + /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1.1961 + ** but will return authtime == 0.
1.1962 + */
1.1963 + if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1.1964 + &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1.1965 + {
1.1966 +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1.1967 + printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1.1968 + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1.1969 + if (kssl_err.text)
1.1970 + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1.1971 +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1.1972 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1973 + kssl_err.reason);
1.1974 + goto err;
1.1975 + }
1.1976 +
1.1977 + if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1.1978 + {
1.1979 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1.1980 + goto err;
1.1981 + }
1.1982 +
1.1983 +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1.1984 + kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1.1985 +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1.1986 +
1.1987 + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1.1988 + if (enc == NULL)
1.1989 + goto err;
1.1990 +
1.1991 + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1.1992 +
1.1993 + if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1.1994 + {
1.1995 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.1996 + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1.1997 + goto err;
1.1998 + }
1.1999 + if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1.2000 + (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1.2001 + {
1.2002 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2003 + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1.2004 + goto err;
1.2005 + }
1.2006 + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1.2007 + {
1.2008 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2009 + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1.2010 + goto err;
1.2011 + }
1.2012 + if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
1.2013 + {
1.2014 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2015 + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1.2016 + goto err;
1.2017 + }
1.2018 + outl += padl;
1.2019 + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1.2020 + {
1.2021 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2022 + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1.2023 + goto err;
1.2024 + }
1.2025 + if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1.2026 + {
1.2027 + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1.2028 + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1.2029 + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1.2030 + * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
1.2031 + * the protocol version.
1.2032 + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
1.2033 + * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
1.2034 + */
1.2035 + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
1.2036 + {
1.2037 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2038 + SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1.2039 + goto err;
1.2040 + }
1.2041 + }
1.2042 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
1.2043 +
1.2044 + s->session->master_key_length=
1.2045 + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1.2046 + s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
1.2047 +
1.2048 + if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
1.2049 + {
1.2050 + size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
1.2051 + if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
1.2052 + {
1.2053 + s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
1.2054 + memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
1.2055 + }
1.2056 + }
1.2057 +
1.2058 +
1.2059 + /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
1.2060 + ** but it caused problems for apache.
1.2061 + ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
1.2062 + ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
1.2063 + */
1.2064 + }
1.2065 + else
1.2066 +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1.2067 +
1.2068 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.2069 + if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
1.2070 + {
1.2071 + int ret = 1;
1.2072 + int field_size = 0;
1.2073 + const EC_KEY *tkey;
1.2074 + const EC_GROUP *group;
1.2075 + const BIGNUM *priv_key;
1.2076 +
1.2077 + /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
1.2078 + if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
1.2079 + {
1.2080 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2081 + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.2082 + goto err;
1.2083 + }
1.2084 +
1.2085 + /* Let's get server private key and group information */
1.2086 + if (l & SSL_kECDH)
1.2087 + {
1.2088 + /* use the certificate */
1.2089 + tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
1.2090 + }
1.2091 + else
1.2092 + {
1.2093 + /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
1.2094 + * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
1.2095 + */
1.2096 + tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
1.2097 + }
1.2098 +
1.2099 + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
1.2100 + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
1.2101 +
1.2102 + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
1.2103 + !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
1.2104 + {
1.2105 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2106 + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1.2107 + goto err;
1.2108 + }
1.2109 +
1.2110 + /* Let's get client's public key */
1.2111 + if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
1.2112 + {
1.2113 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2114 + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.2115 + goto err;
1.2116 + }
1.2117 +
1.2118 + if (n == 0L)
1.2119 + {
1.2120 + /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
1.2121 +
1.2122 + if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
1.2123 + {
1.2124 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.2125 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1.2126 + goto f_err;
1.2127 + }
1.2128 + if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
1.2129 + == NULL) ||
1.2130 + (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
1.2131 + {
1.2132 + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
1.2133 + * authentication using ECDH certificates
1.2134 + * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
1.2135 + * never executed. When that support is
1.2136 + * added, we ought to ensure the key
1.2137 + * received in the certificate is
1.2138 + * authorized for key agreement.
1.2139 + * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
1.2140 + * the two ECDH shares are for the same
1.2141 + * group.
1.2142 + */
1.2143 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.2144 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2145 + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
1.2146 + goto f_err;
1.2147 + }
1.2148 +
1.2149 + if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
1.2150 + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
1.2151 + {
1.2152 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2153 + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1.2154 + goto err;
1.2155 + }
1.2156 + ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
1.2157 + }
1.2158 + else
1.2159 + {
1.2160 + /* Get client's public key from encoded point
1.2161 + * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
1.2162 + */
1.2163 + if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
1.2164 + {
1.2165 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2166 + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.2167 + goto err;
1.2168 + }
1.2169 +
1.2170 + /* Get encoded point length */
1.2171 + i = *p;
1.2172 + p += 1;
1.2173 + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
1.2174 + clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
1.2175 + {
1.2176 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2177 + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1.2178 + goto err;
1.2179 + }
1.2180 + /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
1.2181 + * currently, so set it to the start
1.2182 + */
1.2183 + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1.2184 + }
1.2185 +
1.2186 + /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
1.2187 + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
1.2188 + if (field_size <= 0)
1.2189 + {
1.2190 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2191 + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.2192 + goto err;
1.2193 + }
1.2194 + i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
1.2195 + if (i <= 0)
1.2196 + {
1.2197 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2198 + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1.2199 + goto err;
1.2200 + }
1.2201 +
1.2202 + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
1.2203 + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
1.2204 + if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
1.2205 + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
1.2206 + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1.2207 +
1.2208 + /* Compute the master secret */
1.2209 + s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
1.2210 + generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
1.2211 +
1.2212 + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
1.2213 + return (ret);
1.2214 + }
1.2215 + else
1.2216 +#endif
1.2217 + {
1.2218 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.2219 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1.2220 + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
1.2221 + goto f_err;
1.2222 + }
1.2223 +
1.2224 + return(1);
1.2225 +f_err:
1.2226 + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1.2227 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
1.2228 +err:
1.2229 +#endif
1.2230 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.2231 + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
1.2232 + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
1.2233 + if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
1.2234 + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
1.2235 + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1.2236 +#endif
1.2237 + return(-1);
1.2238 + }
1.2239 +
1.2240 +int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
1.2241 + {
1.2242 + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1.2243 + unsigned char *p;
1.2244 + int al,ok,ret=0;
1.2245 + long n;
1.2246 + int type=0,i,j;
1.2247 + X509 *peer;
1.2248 +
1.2249 + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1.2250 + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
1.2251 + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
1.2252 + -1,
1.2253 + 514, /* 514? */
1.2254 + &ok);
1.2255 +
1.2256 + if (!ok) return((int)n);
1.2257 +
1.2258 + if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1.2259 + {
1.2260 + peer=s->session->peer;
1.2261 + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
1.2262 + type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
1.2263 + }
1.2264 + else
1.2265 + {
1.2266 + peer=NULL;
1.2267 + pkey=NULL;
1.2268 + }
1.2269 +
1.2270 + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
1.2271 + {
1.2272 + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
1.2273 + if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
1.2274 + {
1.2275 + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1.2276 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
1.2277 + goto f_err;
1.2278 + }
1.2279 + ret=1;
1.2280 + goto end;
1.2281 + }
1.2282 +
1.2283 + if (peer == NULL)
1.2284 + {
1.2285 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
1.2286 + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1.2287 + goto f_err;
1.2288 + }
1.2289 +
1.2290 + if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
1.2291 + {
1.2292 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
1.2293 + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1.2294 + goto f_err;
1.2295 + }
1.2296 +
1.2297 + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
1.2298 + {
1.2299 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1.2300 + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1.2301 + goto f_err;
1.2302 + }
1.2303 +
1.2304 + /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
1.2305 + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1.2306 + n2s(p,i);
1.2307 + n-=2;
1.2308 + if (i > n)
1.2309 + {
1.2310 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.2311 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.2312 + goto f_err;
1.2313 + }
1.2314 +
1.2315 + j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1.2316 + if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
1.2317 + {
1.2318 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
1.2319 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.2320 + goto f_err;
1.2321 + }
1.2322 +
1.2323 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1.2324 + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1.2325 + {
1.2326 + i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
1.2327 + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
1.2328 + pkey->pkey.rsa);
1.2329 + if (i < 0)
1.2330 + {
1.2331 + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1.2332 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1.2333 + goto f_err;
1.2334 + }
1.2335 + if (i == 0)
1.2336 + {
1.2337 + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1.2338 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
1.2339 + goto f_err;
1.2340 + }
1.2341 + }
1.2342 + else
1.2343 +#endif
1.2344 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1.2345 + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1.2346 + {
1.2347 + j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
1.2348 + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
1.2349 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
1.2350 + if (j <= 0)
1.2351 + {
1.2352 + /* bad signature */
1.2353 + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1.2354 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
1.2355 + goto f_err;
1.2356 + }
1.2357 + }
1.2358 + else
1.2359 +#endif
1.2360 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1.2361 + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1.2362 + {
1.2363 + j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
1.2364 + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
1.2365 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
1.2366 + if (j <= 0)
1.2367 + {
1.2368 + /* bad signature */
1.2369 + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1.2370 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
1.2371 + SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
1.2372 + goto f_err;
1.2373 + }
1.2374 + }
1.2375 + else
1.2376 +#endif
1.2377 + {
1.2378 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1.2379 + al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1.2380 + goto f_err;
1.2381 + }
1.2382 +
1.2383 +
1.2384 + ret=1;
1.2385 + if (0)
1.2386 + {
1.2387 +f_err:
1.2388 + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1.2389 + }
1.2390 +end:
1.2391 + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1.2392 + return(ret);
1.2393 + }
1.2394 +
1.2395 +int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
1.2396 + {
1.2397 + int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
1.2398 + X509 *x=NULL;
1.2399 + unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
1.2400 + const unsigned char *p,*q;
1.2401 + unsigned char *d;
1.2402 + STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
1.2403 +
1.2404 + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1.2405 + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
1.2406 + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
1.2407 + -1,
1.2408 + s->max_cert_list,
1.2409 + &ok);
1.2410 +
1.2411 + if (!ok) return((int)n);
1.2412 +
1.2413 + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
1.2414 + {
1.2415 + if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
1.2416 + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
1.2417 + {
1.2418 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
1.2419 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.2420 + goto f_err;
1.2421 + }
1.2422 + /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
1.2423 + if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
1.2424 + {
1.2425 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
1.2426 + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1.2427 + goto f_err;
1.2428 + }
1.2429 + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
1.2430 + return(1);
1.2431 + }
1.2432 +
1.2433 + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
1.2434 + {
1.2435 + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1.2436 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1.2437 + goto f_err;
1.2438 + }
1.2439 + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1.2440 +
1.2441 + if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
1.2442 + {
1.2443 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.2444 + goto err;
1.2445 + }
1.2446 +
1.2447 + n2l3(p,llen);
1.2448 + if (llen+3 != n)
1.2449 + {
1.2450 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.2451 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.2452 + goto f_err;
1.2453 + }
1.2454 + for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
1.2455 + {
1.2456 + n2l3(p,l);
1.2457 + if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
1.2458 + {
1.2459 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.2460 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.2461 + goto f_err;
1.2462 + }
1.2463 +
1.2464 + q=p;
1.2465 + x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
1.2466 + if (x == NULL)
1.2467 + {
1.2468 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1.2469 + goto err;
1.2470 + }
1.2471 + if (p != (q+l))
1.2472 + {
1.2473 + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1.2474 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1.2475 + goto f_err;
1.2476 + }
1.2477 + if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
1.2478 + {
1.2479 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.2480 + goto err;
1.2481 + }
1.2482 + x=NULL;
1.2483 + nc+=l+3;
1.2484 + }
1.2485 +
1.2486 + if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
1.2487 + {
1.2488 + /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
1.2489 + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1.2490 + {
1.2491 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.2492 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
1.2493 + goto f_err;
1.2494 + }
1.2495 + /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
1.2496 + else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
1.2497 + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
1.2498 + {
1.2499 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
1.2500 + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1.2501 + goto f_err;
1.2502 + }
1.2503 + }
1.2504 + else
1.2505 + {
1.2506 + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
1.2507 + if (!i)
1.2508 + {
1.2509 + al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1.2510 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
1.2511 + goto f_err;
1.2512 + }
1.2513 + }
1.2514 +
1.2515 + if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
1.2516 + X509_free(s->session->peer);
1.2517 + s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
1.2518 + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1.2519 +
1.2520 + /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
1.2521 + * when we arrive here. */
1.2522 + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
1.2523 + {
1.2524 + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1.2525 + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
1.2526 + {
1.2527 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1.2528 + goto err;
1.2529 + }
1.2530 + }
1.2531 + if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
1.2532 + sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
1.2533 + s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
1.2534 + /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
1.2535 + * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
1.2536 +
1.2537 + sk=NULL;
1.2538 +
1.2539 + ret=1;
1.2540 + if (0)
1.2541 + {
1.2542 +f_err:
1.2543 + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1.2544 + }
1.2545 +err:
1.2546 + if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
1.2547 + if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
1.2548 + return(ret);
1.2549 + }
1.2550 +
1.2551 +int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1.2552 + {
1.2553 + unsigned long l;
1.2554 + X509 *x;
1.2555 +
1.2556 + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
1.2557 + {
1.2558 + x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
1.2559 + if (x == NULL &&
1.2560 + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1.2561 + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
1.2562 + & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
1.2563 + != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
1.2564 + {
1.2565 + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1.2566 + return(0);
1.2567 + }
1.2568 +
1.2569 + l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
1.2570 + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
1.2571 + s->init_num=(int)l;
1.2572 + s->init_off=0;
1.2573 + }
1.2574 +
1.2575 + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
1.2576 + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1.2577 + }
1.2578 +
1.2579 +
1.2580 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1.2581 +/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
1.2582 +static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
1.2583 +{
1.2584 + /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
1.2585 + * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
1.2586 + switch (nid) {
1.2587 + case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
1.2588 + return 1;
1.2589 + case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
1.2590 + return 2;
1.2591 + case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
1.2592 + return 3;
1.2593 + case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
1.2594 + return 4;
1.2595 + case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
1.2596 + return 5;
1.2597 + case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
1.2598 + return 6;
1.2599 + case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
1.2600 + return 7;
1.2601 + case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
1.2602 + return 8;
1.2603 + case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
1.2604 + return 9;
1.2605 + case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
1.2606 + return 10;
1.2607 + case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
1.2608 + return 11;
1.2609 + case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
1.2610 + return 12;
1.2611 + case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
1.2612 + return 13;
1.2613 + case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
1.2614 + return 14;
1.2615 + case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
1.2616 + return 15;
1.2617 + case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
1.2618 + return 16;
1.2619 + case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
1.2620 + return 17;
1.2621 + case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
1.2622 + return 18;
1.2623 + case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
1.2624 + return 19;
1.2625 + case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
1.2626 + return 20;
1.2627 + case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
1.2628 + return 21;
1.2629 + case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
1.2630 + return 22;
1.2631 + case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
1.2632 + return 23;
1.2633 + case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
1.2634 + return 24;
1.2635 + case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
1.2636 + return 25;
1.2637 + default:
1.2638 + return 0;
1.2639 + }
1.2640 +}
1.2641 +#endif