/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */

/* 

 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu

 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  

 */

/* ====================================================================

 * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

 *

 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

 * are met:

 *

 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 

 *

 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

 *    distribution.

 *

 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

 *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.

 *

 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

 *

 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

 *    acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

 * ====================================================================

 *

 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim

 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

 *

 */

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)

 * All rights reserved.

 *

 * This package is an SSL implementation written

 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.

 * 

 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as

 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions

 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,

 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation

 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms

 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

 * 

 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in

 * the code are not to be removed.

 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution

 * as the author of the parts of the library used.

 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or

 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.

 * 

 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

 * are met:

 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the

 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software

 *    must display the following acknowledgement:

 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by

 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"

 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library

 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).

 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 

 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:

 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"

 * 

 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND

 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL

 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT

 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY

 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

 * SUCH DAMAGE.

 * 

 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or

 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be

 * copied and put under another distribution licence

 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]

 */

/*

 © Portions copyright (c) 2006 Nokia Corporation.  All rights reserved.

 */

#include <stdio.h>

#include "ssl_locl.h"

#include <openssl/buffer.h>

#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include <openssl/objects.h>

#include <openssl/evp.h>

#include <openssl/x509.h>

#include <openssl/md5.h>

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

#include <openssl/dh.h>

#endif

#if (defined(SYMBIAN) && (defined(__WINSCW__) || defined(__WINS__)))

#include "libssl_wsd.h"

#endif

#ifdef EMULATOR

	GET_STATIC_VAR_FROM_TLS(DTLSv1_server_method_data,d1_srvr,SSL_METHOD)

	#define DTLSv1_server_method_data (*GET_WSD_VAR_NAME(DTLSv1_server_method_data,d1_srvr,s)())

#endif

static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);

static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);

static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)

	{

	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)

		return(DTLSv1_server_method());

	else

		return(NULL);

	}

EXPORT_C IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,

			dtls1_accept,

			ssl_undefined_function,

			dtls1_get_server_method)

int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)

	{

	BUF_MEM *buf;

	unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);

	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;

	long num1;

	int ret= -1;

	int new_state,state,skip=0;

	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);

	ERR_clear_error();

	clear_sys_error();

	if (s->info_callback != NULL)

		cb=s->info_callback;

	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

	/* init things to blank */

	s->in_handshake++;

	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);

	if (s->cert == NULL)

		{

		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);

		return(-1);

		}

	for (;;)

		{

		state=s->state;

		switch (s->state)

			{

		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:

			s->new_session=1;

			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */

		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:

		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

			s->server=1;

			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);

			if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))

				{

				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

				return -1;

				}

			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;

			if (s->init_buf == NULL)

				{

				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)

					{

					ret= -1;

					goto end;

					}

				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))

					{

					ret= -1;

					goto end;

					}

				s->init_buf=buf;

				}

			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))

				{

				ret= -1;

				goto end;

				}

			s->init_num=0;

			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)

				{

				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that

				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)

				 */

				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }

				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;

				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;

				}

			else

				{

				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,

				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */

				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;

				}

            if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))

                s->d1->send_cookie = 1;

            else

                s->d1->send_cookie = 0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:

			s->shutdown=0;

			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

			s->init_num=0;

			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:

			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:

			s->shutdown=0;

			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->new_session = 2;

			if ( s->d1->send_cookie)

				s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;

			else

				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:

		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:

			ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);

			if ( ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->d1->send_cookie = 0;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;

			/* HelloVerifyRequests resets Finished MAC */

			if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)

				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:

			ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			if (s->hit)

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

			else

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:

			/* Check if it is anon DH */

			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))

				{

				ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);

				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

				}

			else

				skip=1;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:

			l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;

			/* clear this, it may get reset by

			 * send_server_key_exchange */

			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

				&& !(l & SSL_KRB5)

#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

				)

				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key

				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs

				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to

				 * be able to handle this) */

				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;

			else

				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;

			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or

			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */

			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp

			    || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))

			    || ((l & SSL_kRSA)

				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL

				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)

					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)

					)

				    )

				)

			    )

				{

				ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);

				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

				}

			else

				skip=1;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:

			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */

				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||

				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,

				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */

				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&

				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||

				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites

				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts

				 * and in RFC 2246): */

				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&

				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification

				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */

				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||

                                 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */

                                (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))

				{

				/* no cert request */

				skip=1;

				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;

				}

			else

				{

				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;

				ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);

				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;

#else

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;

#endif

				s->init_num=0;

				}

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:

			ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:

			/* number of bytes to be flushed */

			num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);

			if (num1 > 0)

				{

				s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;

				num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);

				if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }

				s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

				}

			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:

			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */

			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);

			if (ret <= 0)

				goto end;

			if (ret == 2)

				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;

			else {

				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we

				 * have not asked for it :-) */

				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);

				if (ret <= 0) goto end;

				s->init_num=0;

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;

			}

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:

			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			/* We need to get hashes here so if there is

			 * a client cert, it can be verified */ 

			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,

				&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),

				&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));

			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,

				&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),

				&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:

			/* we should decide if we expected this one */

			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:

			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,

				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			if (s->hit)

				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;

			else

				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:

			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;

			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))

				{ ret= -1; goto end; }

			ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,

				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;

			s->init_num=0;

			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,

				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))

				{

				ret= -1;

				goto end;

				}

			dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:

		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:

			ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,

				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,

				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,

				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);

			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

			if (s->hit)

				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

			else

				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;

			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL_ST_OK:

			/* clean a few things up */

			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

#if 0

			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);

			s->init_buf=NULL;

#endif

			/* remove buffering on output */

			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);

			s->init_num=0;

			if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */

				{

				/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless

				 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */

				s->new_session=0;

				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);

				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;

				/* s->server=1; */

				s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;

				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);

				}

			ret = 1;

			/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */

			s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;

			/* next message is server hello */

			s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;

			goto end;

			/* break; */

		default:

			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);

			ret= -1;

			goto end;

			/* break; */

			}

		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)

			{

			if (s->debug)

				{

				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)

					goto end;

				}

			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))

				{

				new_state=s->state;

				s->state=state;

				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);

				s->state=new_state;

				}

			}

		skip=0;

		}

end:

	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */

	s->in_handshake--;

	if (cb != NULL)

		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);

	return(ret);

	}

int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)

	{

	unsigned char *p;

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)

		{

		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);

		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;

		/* number of bytes to write */

		s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;

		s->init_off=0;

		/* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit 

		 * requests for it */

		}

	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */

	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

	}

int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)

	{

	unsigned int msg_len;

	unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;

	if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)

		{

		buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);

		if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)

			*(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,

			*(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;

		else

			*(p++) = s->version >> 8,

			*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;

		if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL &&

		    s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, 

		    &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)

			{

			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

			return 0;

			}

		/* else the cookie is assumed to have 

		 * been initialized by the application */

		*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;

		memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);

		p += s->d1->cookie_len;

		msg_len = p - msg;

		dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,

			DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);

		s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;

		/* number of bytes to write */

		s->init_num=p-buf;

		s->init_off=0;

		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */

		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);

		}

	/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */

	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

	}

int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)

	{

	unsigned char *buf;

	unsigned char *p,*d;

	int i;

	unsigned int sl;

	unsigned long l,Time;

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)

		{

		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		p=s->s3->server_random;

		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */

		l2n(Time,p);

		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));

		/* Do the message type and length last */

		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);

		if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)

			*(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,

			*(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;

		else

			*(p++)=s->version>>8,

			*(p++)=s->version&0xff;

		/* Random stuff */

		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

		/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the

		 * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the

		 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send

		 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length

		 * session-id if we want it to be single use.

		 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id

		 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.

		 */

		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))

			s->session->session_id_length=0;

		sl=s->session->session_id_length;

		if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)

			{

			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

			return -1;

			}

		*(p++)=sl;

		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);

		p+=sl;

		/* put the cipher */

		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);

		p+=i;

		/* put the compression method */

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

		*(p++)=0;

#else

		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)

			*(p++)=0;

		else

			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;

#endif

		/* do the header */

		l=(p-d);

		d=buf;

		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);

		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;

		/* number of bytes to write */

		s->init_num=p-buf;

		s->init_off=0;

		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */

		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);

		}

	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */

	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

	}

int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)

	{

	unsigned char *p;

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)

		{

		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		/* do the header */

		p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);

		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;

		/* number of bytes to write */

		s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;

		s->init_off=0;

		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */

		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);

		}

	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */

	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

	}

int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)

	{

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

	unsigned char *q;

	int j,num;

	RSA *rsa;

	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];

	unsigned int u;

#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;

#endif

	EVP_PKEY *pkey;

	unsigned char *p,*d;

	int al,i;

	unsigned long type;

	int n;

	CERT *cert;

	BIGNUM *r[4];

	int nr[4],kn;

	BUF_MEM *buf;

	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;

	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)

		{

		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;

		cert=s->cert;

		buf=s->init_buf;

		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;

		n=0;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

		if (type & SSL_kRSA)

			{

			rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;

			if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))

				{

				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,

				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));

				if(rsa == NULL)

				{

					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);

					goto f_err;

				}

				RSA_up_ref(rsa);

				cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;

				}

			if (rsa == NULL)

				{

				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);

				goto f_err;

				}

			r[0]=rsa->n;

			r[1]=rsa->e;

			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;

			}

		else

#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

			if (type & SSL_kEDH)

			{

			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;

			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))

				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,

				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));

			if (dhp == NULL)

				{

				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);

				goto f_err;

				}

			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)

				{

				DH_free(dh);

				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

				goto err;

				}

			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)

				{

				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

				goto err;

				}

			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;

			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||

			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||

			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))

				{

				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))

				    {

				    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,

					   ERR_R_DH_LIB);

				    goto err;

				    }

				}

			else

				{

				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);

				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);

				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||

					(dh->priv_key == NULL))

					{

					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

					goto err;

					}

				}

			r[0]=dh->p;

			r[1]=dh->g;

			r[2]=dh->pub_key;

			}

		else 

#endif

			{

			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);

			goto f_err;

			}

		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)

			{

			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);

			n+=2+nr[i];

			}

		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))

			{

			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))

				== NULL)

				{

				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

				goto f_err;

				}

			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

			}

		else

			{

			pkey=NULL;

			kn=0;

			}

		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))

			{

			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);

			goto err;

			}

		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);

		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)

			{

			s2n(nr[i],p);

			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);

			p+=nr[i];

			}

		/* not anonymous */

		if (pkey != NULL)

			{

			/* n is the length of the params, they start at

			 * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space

			 * at the end. */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)

				{

				q=md_buf;

				j=0;

				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)

					{

					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)

						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);

					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);

					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,

						(unsigned int *)&i);

					q+=i;

					j+=i;

					}

				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,

					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)

					{

					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);

					goto err;

					}

				s2n(u,p);

				n+=u+2;

				}

			else

#endif

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)

				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)

				{

				/* lets do DSS */

				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);

				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);

				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),

					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))

					{

					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);