sl@0: /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
sl@0: /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
sl@0:  * All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This package is an SSL implementation written
sl@0:  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
sl@0:  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
sl@0:  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
sl@0:  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
sl@0:  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
sl@0:  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
sl@0:  * the code are not to be removed.
sl@0:  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
sl@0:  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
sl@0:  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
sl@0:  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
sl@0:  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
sl@0:  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
sl@0:  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
sl@0:  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
sl@0:  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
sl@0:  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
sl@0:  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
sl@0:  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
sl@0:  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
sl@0:  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
sl@0:  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
sl@0:  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
sl@0:  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
sl@0:  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
sl@0:  * SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
sl@0:  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
sl@0:  * copied and put under another distribution licence
sl@0:  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
sl@0:  */
sl@0: /* ====================================================================
sl@0:  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
sl@0:  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
sl@0:  *    distribution.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
sl@0:  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
sl@0:  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
sl@0:  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
sl@0:  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
sl@0:  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
sl@0:  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
sl@0:  *    acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
sl@0:  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
sl@0:  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
sl@0:  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
sl@0:  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
sl@0:  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
sl@0:  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
sl@0:  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
sl@0:  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
sl@0:  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * ====================================================================
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
sl@0:  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
sl@0:  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include <stdio.h>
sl@0: #include <errno.h>
sl@0: #define USE_SOCKETS
sl@0: #include "ssl_locl.h"
sl@0: #include <openssl/evp.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/buffer.h>
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
sl@0: 			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
sl@0: static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
sl@0: 
sl@0: int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
sl@0: 	 * packet by another n bytes.
sl@0: 	 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
sl@0: 	 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
sl@0: 	 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
sl@0: 	 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	int i,off,newb;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!extend)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* start with empty packet ... */
sl@0: 		if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
sl@0: 			s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
sl@0: 		s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
sl@0: 		s->packet_length = 0;
sl@0: 		/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
sl@0: 	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
sl@0: 		extend)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
sl@0: 			n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		s->packet_length+=n;
sl@0: 		s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
sl@0: 		s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
sl@0: 		return(n);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* else we need to read more data */
sl@0: 	if (!s->read_ahead)
sl@0: 		max=n;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 		/* avoid buffer overflow */
sl@0: 		int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
sl@0: 		if (max > max_max)
sl@0: 			max = max_max;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	if (n > max) /* does not happen */
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	off = s->packet_length;
sl@0: 	newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
sl@0: 	/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
sl@0: 	 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
sl@0: 	 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
sl@0: 	if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/*  off > 0 */
sl@0: 		memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
sl@0: 		s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	while (newb < n)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
sl@0: 		 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		clear_sys_error();
sl@0: 		if (s->rbio != NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
sl@0: 			i=BIO_read(s->rbio,	&(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
sl@0: 			i = -1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (i <= 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
sl@0: 			return(i);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		newb+=i;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
sl@0: 	s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
sl@0: 	s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
sl@0: 	s->packet_length += n;
sl@0: 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 	return(n);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Call this to get a new input record.
sl@0:  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
sl@0:  * or non-blocking IO.
sl@0:  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
sl@0:  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
sl@0:  * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data
sl@0:  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
sl@0:  */
sl@0: /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
sl@0: static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
sl@0: 	int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
sl@0: 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
sl@0: 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *p;
sl@0: 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
sl@0: 	short version;
sl@0: 	unsigned int mac_size;
sl@0: 	int clear=0;
sl@0: 	size_t extra;
sl@0: 	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sl@0: 	sess=s->session;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
sl@0: 		extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		extra=0;
sl@0: 	if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
sl@0: 		 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: again:
sl@0: 	/* check if we have the header */
sl@0: 	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
sl@0: 		(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
sl@0: 		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
sl@0: 		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		p=s->packet;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
sl@0: 		rr->type= *(p++);
sl@0: 		ssl_major= *(p++);
sl@0: 		ssl_minor= *(p++);
sl@0: 		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
sl@0: 		n2s(p,rr->length);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Lets check version */
sl@0: 		if (!s->first_packet)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (version != s->version)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
sl@0: 				/* Send back error using their
sl@0: 				 * version number :-) */
sl@0: 				s->version=version;
sl@0: 				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
sl@0: 				goto f_err;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
sl@0: 		i=rr->length;
sl@0: 		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
sl@0: 		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
sl@0: 		/* now n == rr->length,
sl@0: 		 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
sl@0: 	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
sl@0: 	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
sl@0: 	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
sl@0: 	 * the decryption or by the decompression
sl@0: 	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
sl@0: 	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
sl@0: 	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* check is not needed I believe */
sl@0: 	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
sl@0: 		goto f_err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
sl@0: 	rr->data=rr->input;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
sl@0: 	if (enc_err <= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (enc_err == 0)
sl@0: 			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
sl@0: 		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
sl@0: 		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
sl@0: 		 * the MAC computation anyway. */
sl@0: 		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
sl@0: printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
sl@0: { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
sl@0: printf("\n");
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
sl@0: 	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
sl@0: 		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
sl@0: 		(s->read_hash == NULL))
sl@0: 		clear=1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!clear)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: #else
sl@0: 			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
sl@0: #endif			
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
sl@0: 		if (rr->length >= mac_size)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			rr->length -= mac_size;
sl@0: 			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
sl@0: #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: #else
sl@0: 			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
sl@0: 			rr->length = 0;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
sl@0: 		if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
sl@0: 		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
sl@0: 		 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
sl@0: 		 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
sl@0: 		 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
sl@0: 		al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
sl@0: 		goto f_err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* r->length is now just compressed */
sl@0: 	if (s->expand != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
sl@0: 		goto f_err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	rr->off=0;
sl@0: 	/* So at this point the following is true
sl@0: 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record
sl@0: 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record
sl@0: 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte
sl@0: 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment
sl@0: 	 *			   after use :-).
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
sl@0: 	s->packet_length=0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* just read a 0 length packet */
sl@0: 	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return(1);
sl@0: 
sl@0: f_err:
sl@0: 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	return(ret);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
sl@0: 	i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
sl@0: 		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
sl@0: 	if (i < 0)
sl@0: 		return(0);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		rr->length=i;
sl@0: 	rr->data=rr->comp;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 	return(1);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
sl@0: 	i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
sl@0: 		SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
sl@0: 		wr->input,(int)wr->length);
sl@0: 	if (i < 0)
sl@0: 		return(0);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		wr->length=i;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	wr->input=wr->data;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 	return(1);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
sl@0:  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
sl@0: 	unsigned int tot,n,nw;
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 	tot=s->s3->wnum;
sl@0: 	s->s3->wnum=0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
sl@0: 		if (i < 0) return(i);
sl@0: 		if (i == 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return -1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	n=(len-tot);
sl@0: 	for (;;)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
sl@0: 			nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			nw=n;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
sl@0: 		if (i <= 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->s3->wnum=tot;
sl@0: 			return i;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if ((i == (int)n) ||
sl@0: 			(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
sl@0: 			 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
sl@0: 			 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
sl@0: 			s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
sl@0: 			
sl@0: 			return tot+i;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		n-=i;
sl@0: 		tot+=i;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
sl@0: 			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	unsigned char *p,*plen;
sl@0: 	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
sl@0: 	int prefix_len = 0;
sl@0: 	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
sl@0: 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
sl@0: 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
sl@0: 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
sl@0: 		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
sl@0: 		if (i <= 0)
sl@0: 			return(i);
sl@0: 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
sl@0: 	wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
sl@0: 	sess=s->session;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
sl@0: 		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
sl@0: 		(s->write_hash == NULL))
sl@0: 		clear=1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (clear)
sl@0: 		mac_size=0;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
sl@0: 	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
sl@0: 		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
sl@0: 			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
sl@0: 			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
sl@0: 			 * together with the actual payload) */
sl@0: 			prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
sl@0: 			if (prefix_len <= 0)
sl@0: 				goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 			if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				/* insufficient space */
sl@0: 				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 				goto err;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		
sl@0: 		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* write the header */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	*(p++)=type&0xff;
sl@0: 	wr->type=type;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
sl@0: 	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* field where we are to write out packet length */
sl@0: 	plen=p; 
sl@0: 	p+=2;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
sl@0: 	wr->data=p;
sl@0: 	wr->length=(int)len;
sl@0: 	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
sl@0: 	 * wr->data */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* first we compress */
sl@0: 	if (s->compress != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
sl@0: 		wr->input=wr->data;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
sl@0: 	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
sl@0: 	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (mac_size != 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
sl@0: 		wr->length+=mac_size;
sl@0: 		wr->input=p;
sl@0: 		wr->data=p;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
sl@0: 	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* record length after mac and block padding */
sl@0: 	s2n(wr->length,plen);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we should now have
sl@0: 	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
sl@0: 	 * wr->length long */
sl@0: 	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
sl@0: 	wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (create_empty_fragment)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* we are in a recursive call;
sl@0: 		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		return wr->length;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* now let's set up wb */
sl@0: 	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
sl@0: 	wb->offset = 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
sl@0: 	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
sl@0: 	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
sl@0: 	s->s3->wpend_type=type;
sl@0: 	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we now just need to write the buffer */
sl@0: 	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	return -1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
sl@0: int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
sl@0: 	unsigned int len)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* XXXX */
sl@0: 	if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
sl@0: 		|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
sl@0: 			!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
sl@0: 		|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
sl@0: 		return(-1);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (;;)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		clear_sys_error();
sl@0: 		if (s->wbio != NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
sl@0: 			i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
sl@0: 				(char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
sl@0: 				(unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
sl@0: 			i= -1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
sl@0: 			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 			return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else if (i <= 0)
sl@0: 			return(i);
sl@0: 		s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
sl@0: 		s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
sl@0:  * 'type' is one of the following:
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
sl@0:  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
sl@0:  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
sl@0:  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
sl@0:  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
sl@0:  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
sl@0:  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
sl@0:  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
sl@0:  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
sl@0:  *     Change cipher spec protocol
sl@0:  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
sl@0:  *     Alert protocol
sl@0:  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
sl@0:  *     Handshake protocol
sl@0:  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
sl@0:  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
sl@0:  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
sl@0:  *     Application data protocol
sl@0:  *             none of our business
sl@0:  */
sl@0: int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int al,i,j,ret;
sl@0: 	unsigned int n;
sl@0: 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
sl@0: 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
sl@0: 		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
sl@0: 			return(-1);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
sl@0: 	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
sl@0: 		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
sl@0: 		unsigned char *dst = buf;
sl@0: 		unsigned int k;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* peek == 0 */
sl@0: 		n = 0;
sl@0: 		while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			*dst++ = *src++;
sl@0: 			len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
sl@0: 			n++;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
sl@0: 		for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
sl@0: 			s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
sl@0: 		return n;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
sl@0: 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
sl@0: 		if (i < 0) return(i);
sl@0: 		if (i == 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return(-1);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: start:
sl@0: 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record
sl@0: 	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
sl@0: 	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
sl@0: 	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
sl@0: 	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* get new packet if necessary */
sl@0: 	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
sl@0: 		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
sl@0: 	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
sl@0: 		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
sl@0: 		goto f_err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
sl@0: 	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
sl@0: 	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		rr->length=0;
sl@0: 		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 		return(0);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
sl@0: 		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
sl@0: 		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
sl@0: 			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (len <= 0) return(len);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
sl@0: 			n = rr->length;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			n = (unsigned int)len;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
sl@0: 		if (!peek)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			rr->length-=n;
sl@0: 			rr->off+=n;
sl@0: 			if (rr->length == 0)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
sl@0: 				rr->off=0;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		return(n);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
sl@0: 	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
sl@0: 	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
sl@0: 		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
sl@0: 		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
sl@0: 			dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
sl@0: 			dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
sl@0: 			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
sl@0: 			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
sl@0: 			if (rr->length < n)
sl@0: 				n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
sl@0: 			while (n-- > 0)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
sl@0: 				rr->length--;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 			if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
sl@0: 				goto start; /* fragment was too small */
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
sl@0: 	 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
sl@0: 	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
sl@0: 	if ((!s->server) &&
sl@0: 		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
sl@0: 		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
sl@0: 		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
sl@0: 			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
sl@0: 			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->msg_callback)
sl@0: 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
sl@0: 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
sl@0: 			!s->s3->renegotiate)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
sl@0: 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				i=s->handshake_func(s);
sl@0: 				if (i < 0) return(i);
sl@0: 				if (i == 0)
sl@0: 					{
sl@0: 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
sl@0: 					return(-1);
sl@0: 					}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
sl@0: 					{
sl@0: 					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
sl@0: 						{
sl@0: 						BIO *bio;
sl@0: 						/* In the case where we try to read application data,
sl@0: 						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
sl@0: 						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
sl@0: 						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
sl@0: 						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
sl@0: 						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
sl@0: 						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
sl@0: 						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
sl@0: 						return(-1);
sl@0: 						}
sl@0: 					}
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
sl@0: 		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
sl@0: 		goto start;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
sl@0: 		int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->msg_callback)
sl@0: 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
sl@0: 			cb=s->info_callback;
sl@0: 		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
sl@0: 			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (cb != NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
sl@0: 			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
sl@0: 			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
sl@0: 				return(0);
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			char tmp[16];
sl@0: 
sl@0: 			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
sl@0: 			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
sl@0: 			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
sl@0: 			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
sl@0: 			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
sl@0: 			return(0);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		goto start;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
sl@0: 		rr->length=0;
sl@0: 		return(0);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
sl@0: 		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
sl@0: 		if (	(rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
sl@0: 			(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
sl@0: 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		rr->length=0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->msg_callback)
sl@0: 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
sl@0: 		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			goto start;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
sl@0: 	if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&	!s->in_handshake)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
sl@0: 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
sl@0:        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
sl@0:        * protocol violations): */
sl@0: 			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
sl@0: 				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
sl@0: 				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
sl@0: #else
sl@0: 			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 			s->new_session=1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
sl@0: 		if (i < 0) return(i);
sl@0: 		if (i == 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return(-1);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				BIO *bio;
sl@0: 				/* In the case where we try to read application data,
sl@0: 				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
sl@0: 				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
sl@0: 				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
sl@0: 				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
sl@0: 				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
sl@0: 				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
sl@0: 				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
sl@0: 				return(-1);
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		goto start;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	switch (rr->type)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 	default:
sl@0: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
sl@0: 		/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
sl@0: 		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			rr->length = 0;
sl@0: 			goto start;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
sl@0: 		goto f_err;
sl@0: 	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
sl@0: 	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
sl@0: 	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
sl@0: 		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
sl@0: 		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
sl@0: 		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
sl@0: 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
sl@0: 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 		goto f_err;
sl@0: 	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
sl@0: 		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
sl@0: 		 * but have application data.  If the library was
sl@0: 		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
sl@0: 		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
sl@0: 		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
sl@0: 		 * we will indulge it.
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
sl@0: 			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
sl@0: 			((
sl@0: 				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
sl@0: 				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
sl@0: 				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
sl@0: 				) || (
sl@0: 					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
sl@0: 					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
sl@0: 					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
sl@0: 					)
sl@0: 				))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
sl@0: 			return(-1);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
sl@0: 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
sl@0: 			goto f_err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	/* not reached */
sl@0: 
sl@0: f_err:
sl@0: 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	return(-1);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	const char *sender;
sl@0: 	int slen;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
sl@0: 		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
sl@0: 		if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
sl@0: 		return(0);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we have to record the message digest at
sl@0: 	 * this point so we can get it before we read
sl@0: 	 * the finished message */
sl@0: 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
sl@0: 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
sl@0: 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sl@0: 		&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
sl@0: 		&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
sl@0: 		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return(1);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
sl@0: 	desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
sl@0: 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
sl@0: 		desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
sl@0: 	if (desc < 0) return;
sl@0: 	/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
sl@0: 	if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
sl@0: 		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
sl@0: 	s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
sl@0: 	s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
sl@0: 	if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
sl@0: 		s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
sl@0: 	/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
sl@0: 	 * some time in the future */
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i,j;
sl@0: 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
sl@0: 	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
sl@0: 	if (i <= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
sl@0: 		 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
sl@0: 		 * we will not worry too much. */
sl@0: 		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
sl@0: 			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->msg_callback)
sl@0: 			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
sl@0: 			cb=s->info_callback;
sl@0: 		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
sl@0: 			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (cb != NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
sl@0: 			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return(i);
sl@0: 	}