sl@0: /* pcy_tree.c */
sl@0: /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
sl@0:  * project 2004.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: /* ====================================================================
sl@0:  * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
sl@0:  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
sl@0:  *    distribution.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
sl@0:  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
sl@0:  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
sl@0:  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
sl@0:  *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
sl@0:  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
sl@0:  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
sl@0:  *    acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
sl@0:  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
sl@0:  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
sl@0:  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
sl@0:  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
sl@0:  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
sl@0:  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
sl@0:  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
sl@0:  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
sl@0:  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * ====================================================================
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
sl@0:  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
sl@0:  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include "cryptlib.h"
sl@0: #include <openssl/x509.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include "pcy_int.h"
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Initialize policy tree. Return values:
sl@0:  *  0 Some internal error occured.
sl@0:  * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
sl@0:  *  1 Tree initialized OK.
sl@0:  *  2 Policy tree is empty.
sl@0:  *  5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
sl@0:  *  6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
sl@0: 			unsigned int flags)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
sl@0: 	const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
sl@0: 	X509 *x;
sl@0: 	int ret = 1;
sl@0: 	int i, n;
sl@0: 	int explicit_policy;
sl@0: 	int any_skip;
sl@0: 	int map_skip;
sl@0: 	*ptree = NULL;
sl@0: 	n = sk_X509_num(certs);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Disable policy mapping for now... */
sl@0: 	flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
sl@0: 		explicit_policy = 0;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		explicit_policy = n + 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
sl@0: 		any_skip = 0;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		any_skip = n + 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
sl@0: 		map_skip = 0;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		map_skip = n + 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
sl@0: 	if (n == 1)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 	/* First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the
sl@0: 	 * trust anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can
sl@0: 	 * calculate explicit_policy value at this point.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
sl@0: 		X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
sl@0: 		cache = policy_cache_set(x);
sl@0: 		/* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
sl@0: 		if (cache == NULL)
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		/* If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue */
sl@0: 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
sl@0: 			ret = -1;
sl@0: 		/* Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies)
sl@0: 		 * and haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
sl@0: 			ret = 2;
sl@0: 		if (explicit_policy > 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			explicit_policy--;
sl@0: 			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
sl@0: 				&& (cache->explicit_skip != -1)
sl@0: 				&& (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
sl@0: 				explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ret != 1)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
sl@0: 			return 6;
sl@0: 		return ret;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If we get this far initialize the tree */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!tree)
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	tree->flags = 0;
sl@0: 	tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
sl@0: #ifdef SYMBIAN	
sl@0: 	if (!tree->levels)
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 	tree->nlevel = 0;
sl@0: 	tree->extra_data = NULL;
sl@0: 	tree->auth_policies = NULL;
sl@0: 	tree->user_policies = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!tree)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(tree);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	tree->nlevel = n;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	level = tree->levels;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
sl@0: 		goto bad_tree;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		level++;
sl@0: 		x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
sl@0: 		cache = policy_cache_set(x);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		level->cert = x;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (!cache->anyPolicy)
sl@0: 				level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
sl@0: 		if (any_skip == 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* Any matching allowed if certificate is self
sl@0: 			 * issued and not the last in the chain.
sl@0: 			 */
sl@0: 			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) || (i == 0))
sl@0: 				level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			any_skip--;
sl@0: 			if ((cache->any_skip > 0)
sl@0: 				&& (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
sl@0: 				any_skip = cache->any_skip;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (map_skip == 0)
sl@0: 			level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			map_skip--;
sl@0: 			if ((cache->map_skip > 0)
sl@0: 				&& (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
sl@0: 				map_skip = cache->map_skip;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	*ptree = tree;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (explicit_policy)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		return 5;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	bad_tree:
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* This corresponds to RFC3280 XXXX XXXXX:
sl@0:  * link any data from CertificatePolicies onto matching parent
sl@0:  * or anyPolicy if no match.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
sl@0: 				const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_NODE *parent;
sl@0: 	last = curr - 1;
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
sl@0: 		/* If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
sl@0: 		 * CertificatePolicies entry. 
sl@0: 		 * However such an identical node would be created
sl@0: 		 * if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
sl@0: 		 * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create
sl@0: 		 * link because then it will have the mapping flags
sl@0: 		 * right and we can prune it later.
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
sl@0: 			&& !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
sl@0: 			continue;
sl@0: 		/* Look for matching node in parent */
sl@0: 		parent = level_find_node(last, data->valid_policy);
sl@0: 		/* If no match link to anyPolicy */
sl@0: 		if (!parent)
sl@0: 			parent = last->anyPolicy;
sl@0: 		if (parent && !level_add_node(curr, data, parent, NULL))
sl@0: 				return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* This corresponds to RFC3280 XXXX XXXXX:
sl@0:  * Create new data for any unmatched policies in the parent and link
sl@0:  * to anyPolicy.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
sl@0: 			const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
sl@0: 			X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	last = curr - 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced
sl@0: 		 * nodes.
sl@0: 		 *
sl@0: 		 * Note: need something better for policy mapping
sl@0: 		 * because each node may have multiple children 
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		if (node->nchild)
sl@0: 			continue;
sl@0: 		/* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and
sl@0: 		 * id from unmatched node.
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy, 
sl@0: 						node_critical(node));
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (data == NULL)
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		data->qualifier_set = curr->anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
sl@0: 		data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
sl@0: 		if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			policy_data_free(data);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
sl@0: 	if (last->anyPolicy)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
sl@0: 						last->anyPolicy, NULL))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
sl@0:  * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
sl@0:  * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, i);
sl@0: 		/* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
sl@0: 		if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			node->parent->nchild--;
sl@0: 			OPENSSL_free(node);
sl@0: 			(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for(;;)	{
sl@0: 		--curr;
sl@0: 		for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, i);
sl@0: 			if (node->nchild == 0)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				node->parent->nchild--;
sl@0: 				OPENSSL_free(node);
sl@0: 				(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(curr->nodes, i);
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
sl@0: 				curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
sl@0: 			OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
sl@0: 			curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (curr == tree->levels)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
sl@0: 			if (!curr->anyPolicy)
sl@0: 					return 2;
sl@0: 			return 1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
sl@0: 						 X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	if (!*pnodes)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
sl@0: 		if (!*pnodes)
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Calculate the authority set based on policy tree.
sl@0:  * The 'pnodes' parameter is used as a store for the set of policy nodes
sl@0:  * used to calculate the user set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy
sl@0:  * then pnodes will just point to the authority set. If however the authority
sl@0:  * set is anyPolicy then the set of valid policies (other than anyPolicy)
sl@0:  * is store in pnodes. The return value of '2' is used in this case to indicate
sl@0:  * that pnodes should be freed.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
sl@0: 					STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
sl@0: 	STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
sl@0: 	int i, j;
sl@0: 	curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
sl@0: 	if (curr->anyPolicy)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		addnodes = pnodes;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		/* Add policies to authority set */
sl@0: 		addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	curr = tree->levels;
sl@0: 	for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't
sl@0: 		 * appear on lower levels so end search.
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 		curr++;
sl@0: 		for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
sl@0: 			if ((node->parent == anyptr)
sl@0: 				&& !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
sl@0: 					return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (addnodes == pnodes)
sl@0: 		return 2;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	*pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
sl@0: 				STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
sl@0: 				STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
sl@0: 	ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set:
sl@0: 	 * this will happen if it is a leaf node.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
sl@0: 		if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
sl@0: 			return 1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
sl@0: 		node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
sl@0: 		if (!node)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (!anyPolicy)
sl@0: 				continue;
sl@0: 			/* Create a new node with policy ID from user set
sl@0: 			 * and qualifiers from anyPolicy.
sl@0: 			 */
sl@0: 			extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid,
sl@0: 						node_critical(anyPolicy));
sl@0: 			if (!extra)
sl@0: 				return 0;
sl@0: 			extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
sl@0: 			extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
sl@0: 						| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
sl@0: 			node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
sl@0: 						tree);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (!tree->user_policies)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
sl@0: 			if (!tree->user_policies)
sl@0: 				return 1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ret, i;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
sl@0: 	const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for(i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
sl@0: 		if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
sl@0: 			&& !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
sl@0: 		if (ret != 1)
sl@0: 			return ret;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(node);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!tree)
sl@0: 		return;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
sl@0: 	sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for(i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (curr->cert)
sl@0: 			X509_free(curr->cert);
sl@0: 		if (curr->nodes)
sl@0: 			sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes,
sl@0: 						policy_node_free);
sl@0: 		if (curr->anyPolicy)
sl@0: 			policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (tree->extra_data)
sl@0: 		sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data,
sl@0: 						policy_data_free);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
sl@0: 	OPENSSL_free(tree);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Application policy checking function.
sl@0:  * Return codes:
sl@0:  *  0 	Internal Error.
sl@0:  *  1   Successful.
sl@0:  * -1   One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
sl@0:  * -2	User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
sl@0: 			STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
sl@0: 			STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
sl@0: 			unsigned int flags)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ret;
sl@0: 	X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
sl@0: 	STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
sl@0: 	*ptree = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	*pexplicit_policy = 0;
sl@0: 	ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	switch (ret)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
sl@0: 		case 2:
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Some internal error */
sl@0: 		case 0:
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		case 6:
sl@0: 		*pexplicit_policy = 1;
sl@0: 		return -2;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
sl@0: 		case 5:
sl@0: 		*pexplicit_policy = 1;
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Tree OK: continue */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		case 1:
sl@0: 		if (!tree)
sl@0: 			/*
sl@0: 			 * tree_init() returns success and a null tree
sl@0: 			 * if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
sl@0: 			 * I'm not sure that returning success here is
sl@0: 			 * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
sl@0: 			 * as an internal error which our caller
sl@0: 			 * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
sl@0: 			 */
sl@0: 			return 1;
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (!tree) goto error;
sl@0: 	ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ret <= 0)
sl@0: 		goto error;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Return value 2 means tree empty */
sl@0: 	if (ret == 2)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
sl@0: 		if (*pexplicit_policy)
sl@0: 			return -2;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			return 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Tree is not empty: continue */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!ret)
sl@0: 		goto error;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
sl@0: 		goto error;
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	if (ret == 2)
sl@0: 		sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (tree)
sl@0: 		*ptree = tree;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (*pexplicit_policy)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
sl@0: 		if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
sl@0: 			return -2;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	error:
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: