sl@0: /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
sl@0: /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
sl@0:  * All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This package is an SSL implementation written
sl@0:  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
sl@0:  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
sl@0:  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
sl@0:  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
sl@0:  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
sl@0:  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
sl@0:  * the code are not to be removed.
sl@0:  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
sl@0:  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
sl@0:  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
sl@0:  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
sl@0:  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
sl@0:  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
sl@0:  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
sl@0:  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
sl@0:  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
sl@0:  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
sl@0:  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
sl@0:  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
sl@0:  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
sl@0:  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
sl@0:  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
sl@0:  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
sl@0:  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
sl@0:  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
sl@0:  * SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
sl@0:  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
sl@0:  * copied and put under another distribution licence
sl@0:  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
sl@0:  */
sl@0: /* ====================================================================
sl@0:  * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
sl@0:  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
sl@0:  *    distribution.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
sl@0:  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
sl@0:  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
sl@0:  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
sl@0:  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
sl@0:  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
sl@0:  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
sl@0:  *    acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
sl@0:  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
sl@0:  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
sl@0:  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
sl@0:  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
sl@0:  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
sl@0:  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
sl@0:  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
sl@0:  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
sl@0:  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * ====================================================================
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
sl@0:  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
sl@0:  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  */
sl@0:  /*
sl@0:  © Portions copyright (c) 2006 Nokia Corporation.  All rights reserved.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include <stdio.h>
sl@0: #include "cryptlib.h"
sl@0: #include <openssl/bn.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/rsa.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/rand.h>
sl@0: #if (defined(SYMBIAN) && (defined(__WINSCW__) || defined(__WINS__)))
sl@0: #include "libcrypto_wsd_macros.h"
sl@0: #include "libcrypto_wsd.h"
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 
sl@0: #ifndef RSA_NULL
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
sl@0: 
sl@0: #ifndef EMULATOR
sl@0: static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
sl@0: 	"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_mod_exp,
sl@0: 	BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if  e == 3 */
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_init,
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_finish,
sl@0: 	0, /* flags */
sl@0: 	NULL,
sl@0: 	0, /* rsa_sign */
sl@0: 	0, /* rsa_verify */
sl@0: 	NULL /* rsa_keygen */
sl@0: 	};
sl@0: #else
sl@0: GET_STATIC_VAR_FROM_TLS(rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth,rsa_eay,RSA_METHOD )
sl@0: #define rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth (*GET_WSD_VAR_NAME(rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth,rsa_eay,s)())
sl@0: const RSA_METHOD temp_s_rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
sl@0: 	"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_mod_exp,
sl@0: 	BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if  e == 3 */
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_init,
sl@0: 	RSA_eay_finish,
sl@0: 	0, /* flags */
sl@0: 	NULL,
sl@0: 	0, /* rsa_sign */
sl@0: 	0, /* rsa_verify */
sl@0: 	NULL /* rsa_keygen */
sl@0: 	};
sl@0: 
sl@0: #endif	
sl@0: EXPORT_C const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Usage example;
sl@0:  *    MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
sl@0:  */
sl@0: #define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
sl@0: 	if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
sl@0: 			!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
sl@0: 				CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, \
sl@0: 				(rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
sl@0: 		err_instr
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *f,*ret;
sl@0: 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
sl@0: 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
sl@0: 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
sl@0: 			return -1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
sl@0: 	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
sl@0: 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
sl@0: 	if (!f || !ret || !buf)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	switch (padding)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
sl@0: 		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
sl@0: 	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
sl@0: 	        i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
sl@0: 		i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
sl@0: 		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	default:
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (i <= 0) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
sl@0: 		{	
sl@0: 		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
sl@0: 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
sl@0: 	 * length of the modulus */
sl@0: 	j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
sl@0: 	i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
sl@0: 	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
sl@0: 		to[k]=0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	r=num;
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	if (ctx != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (buf != NULL) 
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return(r);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	BN_BLINDING *ret;
sl@0: 	int got_write_lock = 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 		got_write_lock = 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
sl@0: 			rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ret = rsa->blinding;
sl@0: 	if (ret == NULL)
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id())
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* rsa->blinding is ours! */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		*local = 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		*local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
sl@0: 		             * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
sl@0: 		             * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
sl@0: 		             * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
sl@0: 		             */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (!got_write_lock)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 				CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 				got_write_lock = 1;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			
sl@0: 			if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
sl@0: 				rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0:  err:
sl@0: 	if (got_write_lock)
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
sl@0: 	return ret;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if (local)
sl@0: 		return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		int ret;
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
sl@0: 		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
sl@0: 		return ret;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if (local)
sl@0: 		return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		int ret;
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
sl@0: 		ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
sl@0: 		return ret;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* signing */
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
sl@0: 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
sl@0: 	int local_blinding = 0;
sl@0: 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
sl@0: 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
sl@0: 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
sl@0: 	if(!f || !ret || !buf)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	switch (padding)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
sl@0: 		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
sl@0: 		i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
sl@0: 		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
sl@0: 	default:
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (i <= 0) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
sl@0: 		{	
sl@0: 		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 				blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (blinding == NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	if (blinding != NULL)
sl@0: 		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
sl@0: 		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->q != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
sl@0: 		{ 
sl@0: 		if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BIGNUM local_d;
sl@0: 		BIGNUM *d = NULL;
sl@0: 		
sl@0: 		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			BN_init(&local_d);
sl@0: 			d = &local_d;
sl@0: 			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			d = rsa->d;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
sl@0: 				rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (blinding)
sl@0: 		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
sl@0: 		if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
sl@0: 			res = f;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			res = ret;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		res = ret;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
sl@0: 	 * length of the modulus */
sl@0: 	j=BN_num_bytes(res);
sl@0: 	i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
sl@0: 	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
sl@0: 		to[k]=0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	r=num;
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	if (ctx != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (buf != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return(r);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
sl@0: 	int j,num=0,r= -1;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *p;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
sl@0: 	int local_blinding = 0;
sl@0: 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
sl@0: 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
sl@0: 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
sl@0: 	if(!f || !ret || !buf)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
sl@0: 	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
sl@0: 	if (flen > num)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* make data into a big number */
sl@0: 	if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 			blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
sl@0: 		if (blinding == NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	if (blinding != NULL)
sl@0: 		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* do the decrypt */
sl@0: 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
sl@0: 		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->q != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
sl@0: 		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BIGNUM local_d;
sl@0: 		BIGNUM *d = NULL;
sl@0: 		
sl@0: 		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			d = &local_d;
sl@0: 			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			d = rsa->d;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
sl@0: 		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
sl@0: 				rsa->_method_mod_n))
sl@0: 		  goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (blinding)
sl@0: 		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
sl@0: 			goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	p=buf;
sl@0: 	j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	switch (padding)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
sl@0: 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
sl@0:         case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
sl@0: 	        r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
sl@0:                 break;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0:  	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
sl@0: 		r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
sl@0: 		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	default:
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (r < 0)
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
sl@0: 
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	if (ctx != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (buf != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return(r);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* signature verification */
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
sl@0: 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *f,*ret;
sl@0: 	int i,num=0,r= -1;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *p;
sl@0: 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
sl@0: 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
sl@0: 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
sl@0: 			return -1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
sl@0: 	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
sl@0: 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
sl@0: 	if(!f || !ret || !buf)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
sl@0: 	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
sl@0: 	if (flen > num)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
sl@0: 		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
sl@0: 		BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	p=buf;
sl@0: 	i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	switch (padding)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
sl@0: 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
sl@0: 		r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
sl@0: 		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 	default:
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (r < 0)
sl@0: 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
sl@0: 
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	if (ctx != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
sl@0: 		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (buf != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return(r);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
sl@0: 	BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
sl@0: 	BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
sl@0: 	int bn_flags;
sl@0: 	int ret=0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
sl@0: 	r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 	vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct 
sl@0: 	 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
sl@0: 	/* We restore bn_flags back */
sl@0: 	rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
sl@0: 
sl@0:         /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
sl@0:          * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
sl@0:          */
sl@0: 	bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
sl@0: 	/* We restore bn_flags back */
sl@0: 	rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;	
sl@0: 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* compute I mod q */
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		c = &local_c;
sl@0: 		BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 		if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
sl@0: 		BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
sl@0: 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
sl@0: 		rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* compute I mod p */
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		c = &local_c;
sl@0: 		BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 		if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
sl@0: 		BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
sl@0: 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
sl@0: 		rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
sl@0: 	/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
sl@0: 	 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
sl@0: 	if (BN_is_negative(r0))
sl@0: 		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
sl@0: 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		pr1 = &local_r1;
sl@0: 		BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		pr1 = r1;
sl@0: 	if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
sl@0:          * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
sl@0: 	 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
sl@0: 	 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
sl@0: 	 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
sl@0:          * they ensure p > q [steve]
sl@0:          */
sl@0: 	if (BN_is_negative(r0))
sl@0: 		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
sl@0: 	if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 	if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
sl@0: 		/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
sl@0: 		 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
sl@0: 		 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
sl@0: 		 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
sl@0: 		if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
sl@0: 		if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
sl@0: 		if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
sl@0: 			if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
sl@0: 		if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
sl@0: 			 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
sl@0: 			 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 			BIGNUM local_d;
sl@0: 			BIGNUM *d = NULL;
sl@0: 		
sl@0: 			if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				d = &local_d;
sl@0: 				BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			else
sl@0: 				d = rsa->d;
sl@0: 			if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
sl@0: 						   rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	ret=1;
sl@0: err:
sl@0: 	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
sl@0: 	return(ret);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
sl@0: 	return(1);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
sl@0: 		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
sl@0: 	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
sl@0: 		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
sl@0: 	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
sl@0: 		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
sl@0: 	return(1);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: #endif