sl@0: /* v3_purp.c */
sl@0: /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
sl@0:  * project 2001.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: /* ====================================================================
sl@0:  * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
sl@0:  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
sl@0:  *    distribution.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
sl@0:  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
sl@0:  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
sl@0:  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
sl@0:  *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
sl@0:  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
sl@0:  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
sl@0:  *    acknowledgment:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
sl@0:  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
sl@0:  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
sl@0:  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
sl@0:  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
sl@0:  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
sl@0:  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
sl@0:  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
sl@0:  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
sl@0:  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
sl@0:  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * ====================================================================
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
sl@0:  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
sl@0:  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  */
sl@0:  
sl@0: /*
sl@0:  © Portions copyright (c) 2006 Nokia Corporation.  All rights reserved.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include <stdio.h>
sl@0: #include "cryptlib.h"
sl@0: #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
sl@0: #if (defined(SYMBIAN) && (defined(__WINSCW__) || defined(__WINS__)))
sl@0: #include "libcrypto_wsd_macros.h"
sl@0: #include "libcrypto_wsd.h"
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 
sl@0: static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
sl@0: static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
sl@0: 		const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
sl@0: static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
sl@0: 
sl@0: #ifndef EMULATOR
sl@0: static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
sl@0: };
sl@0: #else
sl@0: static const X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
sl@0: 	{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
sl@0: };
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
sl@0: 
sl@0: IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
sl@0: 
sl@0: #ifndef EMULATOR
sl@0: static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
sl@0: #else
sl@0: GET_STATIC_VAR_FROM_TLS(xptable,v3_purp,STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)*)
sl@0: #define xptable (*GET_WSD_VAR_NAME(xptable,v3_purp, s)())
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
sl@0: 		const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
sl@0:  * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
sl@0:  * things. */
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int idx;
sl@0: 	const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
sl@0: 	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	if(id == -1) return 1;
sl@0: 	idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
sl@0: 	if(idx == -1) return -1;
sl@0: 	pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
sl@0: 	return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
sl@0: 		X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	*p = purpose;
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
sl@0: 	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(idx < 0) return NULL;
sl@0: 	if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return ((X509_PURPOSE *)xstandard + idx);
sl@0: 	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
sl@0: 	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
sl@0: 		xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
sl@0: 		if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	return -1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	X509_PURPOSE tmp;
sl@0: 	int idx;
sl@0: 	if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
sl@0: 		return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
sl@0: 	tmp.purpose = purpose;
sl@0: 	if(!xptable) return -1;
sl@0: 	idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
sl@0: 	if(idx == -1) return -1;
sl@0: 	return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
sl@0: 			int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
sl@0: 					char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int idx;
sl@0: 	X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
sl@0: 	/* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
sl@0: 	flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
sl@0: 	/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
sl@0: 	flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
sl@0: 	/* Get existing entry if any */
sl@0: 	idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
sl@0: 	/* Need a new entry */
sl@0: 	if(idx == -1) {
sl@0: 		if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
sl@0: 			X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 		ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
sl@0: 	} else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
sl@0: 	if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	/* dup supplied name */
sl@0: 	ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
sl@0: 	ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
sl@0: 	if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
sl@0: 		X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
sl@0: 	ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
sl@0: 	/* Set all other flags */
sl@0: 	ptmp->flags |= flags;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ptmp->purpose = id;
sl@0: 	ptmp->trust = trust;
sl@0: 	ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
sl@0: 	ptmp->usr_data = arg;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
sl@0: 	if(idx == -1) {
sl@0: 		if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
sl@0: 			X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 		if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
sl@0: 			X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	if(!p) return;
sl@0: 	if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) 
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
sl@0: 			OPENSSL_free(p->name);
sl@0: 			OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(p);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	unsigned int i;
sl@0: 	sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
sl@0: 	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free((X509_PURPOSE *)xstandard + i);
sl@0: 	xptable = NULL;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return xp->purpose;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return xp->name;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return xp->sname;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return xp->trust;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return *a - *b;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	/* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
sl@0: 	 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
sl@0: 	 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
sl@0: 	 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
sl@0: 	 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
sl@0: 	 * searched using bsearch.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: #ifndef EMULATOR
sl@0: 	static int supported_nids[] = {
sl@0: 		NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
sl@0:         	NID_key_usage,		/* 83 */
sl@0: 		NID_subject_alt_name,	/* 85 */
sl@0: 		NID_basic_constraints,	/* 87 */
sl@0: 		NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
sl@0:         	NID_ext_key_usage,	/* 126 */
sl@0: 		NID_proxyCertInfo	/* 661 */
sl@0: 	};
sl@0: #else
sl@0: 	static const int supported_nids[] = {
sl@0: 		NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
sl@0:         	NID_key_usage,		/* 83 */
sl@0: 		NID_subject_alt_name,	/* 85 */
sl@0: 		NID_basic_constraints,	/* 87 */
sl@0:         	NID_ext_key_usage,	/* 126 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		NID_proxyCertInfo	/* 661 */
sl@0: 	};
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 	int ex_nid;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ex_nid == NID_undef) 
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids,
sl@0: 		sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
sl@0: 		(int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp))
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 	return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0:  
sl@0: 
sl@0: static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
sl@0: 	PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
sl@0: 	ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
sl@0: 	ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
sl@0: 	EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
sl@0: 	X509_EXTENSION *ex;
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
sl@0: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
sl@0: 	X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 	/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
sl@0: 	if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
sl@0: 			 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
sl@0: 	/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
sl@0: 	if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
sl@0: 	/* Handle basic constraints */
sl@0: 	if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
sl@0: 		if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
sl@0: 		if(bs->pathlen) {
sl@0: 			if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
sl@0: 						|| !bs->ca) {
sl@0: 				x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
sl@0: 				x->ex_pathlen = 0;
sl@0: 			} else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
sl@0: 		} else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
sl@0: 		BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
sl@0: 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	/* Handle proxy certificates */
sl@0: 	if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
sl@0: 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
sl@0: 		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0
sl@0: 		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) {
sl@0: 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 		if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
sl@0: 			x->ex_pcpathlen =
sl@0: 				ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
sl@0: 		} else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
sl@0: 		PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
sl@0: 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	/* Handle key usage */
sl@0: 	if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
sl@0: 		if(usage->length > 0) {
sl@0: 			x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
sl@0: 			if(usage->length > 1) 
sl@0: 				x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
sl@0: 		} else x->ex_kusage = 0;
sl@0: 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
sl@0: 		ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	x->ex_xkusage = 0;
sl@0: 	if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
sl@0: 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
sl@0: 		for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
sl@0: 			switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
sl@0: 				case NID_server_auth:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_client_auth:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_email_protect:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_code_sign:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_ms_sgc:
sl@0: 				case NID_ns_sgc:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_OCSP_sign:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_time_stamp:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 				case NID_dvcs:
sl@0: 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
sl@0: 				break;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 		sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
sl@0: 		if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
sl@0: 		else x->ex_nscert = 0;
sl@0: 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
sl@0: 		ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
sl@0: 	x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
sl@0: 		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
sl@0: 			continue;
sl@0: 		if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* CA checks common to all purposes
sl@0:  * return codes:
sl@0:  * 0 not a CA
sl@0:  * 1 is a CA
sl@0:  * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
sl@0:  * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
sl@0:  * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
sl@0: #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
sl@0: 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
sl@0: #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
sl@0: 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
sl@0: #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
sl@0: 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
sl@0: 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
sl@0: 		if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
sl@0: 		/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
sl@0: 		else return 0;
sl@0: 	} else {
sl@0: 		/* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
sl@0: 		if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
sl@0: 		/* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
sl@0: 		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
sl@0: 		/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
sl@0: 		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
sl@0: 			 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
sl@0: 		/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return check_ca(x);
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
sl@0: static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int ca_ret;
sl@0: 	ca_ret = check_ca(x);
sl@0: 	if(!ca_ret) return 0;
sl@0: 	/* check nsCertType if present */
sl@0: 	if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
sl@0: 	else return 0;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
sl@0: 	if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
sl@0: 	/* We need to do digital signatures with it */
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
sl@0: 	/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */	
sl@0: 	if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
sl@0: 	if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
sl@0: 	/* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int ret;
sl@0: 	ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
sl@0: 	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
sl@0: 	/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
sl@0: 	return ret;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* common S/MIME checks */
sl@0: static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
sl@0: 	if(ca) {
sl@0: 		int ca_ret;
sl@0: 		ca_ret = check_ca(x);
sl@0: 		if(!ca_ret) return 0;
sl@0: 		/* check nsCertType if present */
sl@0: 		if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
sl@0: 		else return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
sl@0: 		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
sl@0: 		/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
sl@0: 		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int ret;
sl@0: 	ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
sl@0: 	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
sl@0: 	return ret;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int ret;
sl@0: 	ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
sl@0: 	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
sl@0: 	return ret;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(ca) {
sl@0: 		int ca_ret;
sl@0: 		if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
sl@0: 		else return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
sl@0:  * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	/* Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know"
sl@0: 	   value (2)? */
sl@0: 	if(ca) return check_ca(x);
sl@0: 	/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
sl@0:  * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
sl@0:  * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
sl@0:  * subject name.
sl@0:  * These are:
sl@0:  * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
sl@0:  * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
sl@0:  * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
sl@0:  * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
sl@0:  * codes for X509_verify_cert()
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
sl@0: 			X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
sl@0: 				return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
sl@0: 	x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
sl@0: 	x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
sl@0: 	if(subject->akid) {
sl@0: 		/* Check key ids (if present) */
sl@0: 		if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
sl@0: 		 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
sl@0: 				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
sl@0: 		/* Check serial number */
sl@0: 		if(subject->akid->serial &&
sl@0: 			ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer),
sl@0: 						subject->akid->serial))
sl@0: 				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
sl@0: 		/* Check issuer name */
sl@0: 		if(subject->akid->issuer) {
sl@0: 			/* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
sl@0: 			 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
sl@0: 			 * There may be more than one but we only take any
sl@0: 			 * notice of the first.
sl@0: 			 */
sl@0: 			GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
sl@0: 			GENERAL_NAME *gen;
sl@0: 			X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
sl@0: 			int i;
sl@0: 			gens = subject->akid->issuer;
sl@0: 			for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
sl@0: 				gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
sl@0: 				if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
sl@0: 					nm = gen->d.dirn;
sl@0: 					break;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 			if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
sl@0: 				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 	if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
sl@0: 			return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
sl@0: 		return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
sl@0: 	return X509_V_OK;
sl@0: }
sl@0: