sl@0: /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
sl@0: /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
sl@0:  * All rights reserved.
sl@0:  *
sl@0:  * This package is an SSL implementation written
sl@0:  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
sl@0:  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
sl@0:  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
sl@0:  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
sl@0:  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
sl@0:  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
sl@0:  * the code are not to be removed.
sl@0:  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
sl@0:  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
sl@0:  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
sl@0:  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
sl@0:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
sl@0:  * are met:
sl@0:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
sl@0:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
sl@0:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
sl@0:  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
sl@0:  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
sl@0:  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
sl@0:  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
sl@0:  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
sl@0:  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
sl@0:  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
sl@0:  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
sl@0:  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
sl@0:  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
sl@0:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
sl@0:  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
sl@0:  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
sl@0:  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
sl@0:  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
sl@0:  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
sl@0:  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
sl@0:  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
sl@0:  * SUCH DAMAGE.
sl@0:  * 
sl@0:  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
sl@0:  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
sl@0:  * copied and put under another distribution licence
sl@0:  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include <stdio.h>
sl@0: #include <time.h>
sl@0: #include <errno.h>
sl@0: 
sl@0: #include "cryptlib.h"
sl@0: #include <openssl/crypto.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/lhash.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/buffer.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/evp.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/asn1.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/x509.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
sl@0: #include <openssl/objects.h>
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
sl@0: static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
sl@0: static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
sl@0: static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
sl@0: const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: #if 0
sl@0: static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
sl@0: 	X509_NAME *xn;
sl@0: 	int bad_chain = 0;
sl@0: 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
sl@0: 	int depth,i,ok=0;
sl@0: 	int num;
sl@0: 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
sl@0: 	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
sl@0: 	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
sl@0: 	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
sl@0: 	if (ctx->chain == NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
sl@0: 			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			goto end;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		ctx->last_untrusted=1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
sl@0: 	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
sl@0: 	    && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		goto end;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
sl@0: 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
sl@0: 	depth=param->depth;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (;;)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* If we have enough, we break */
sl@0: 		if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
sl@0: 		                         * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
sl@0: 		                         * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
sl@0: 		                         * code later.
sl@0: 		                         */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
sl@0: 		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
sl@0: 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
sl@0: 		if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
sl@0: 			if (xtmp != NULL)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
sl@0: 					{
sl@0: 					X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 					goto end;
sl@0: 					}
sl@0: 				CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 				(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
sl@0: 				ctx->last_untrusted++;
sl@0: 				x=xtmp;
sl@0: 				num++;
sl@0: 				/* reparse the full chain for
sl@0: 				 * the next one */
sl@0: 				continue;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		break;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
sl@0: 	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
sl@0: 	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
sl@0:  	 * is self signed.
sl@0:  	 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
sl@0: 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
sl@0: 	xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
sl@0: 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* we have a self signed certificate */
sl@0: 		if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
sl@0: 			 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
sl@0: 			 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
sl@0: 			 */
sl@0: 			ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
sl@0: 			if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
sl@0: 				ctx->current_cert=x;
sl@0: 				ctx->error_depth=i-1;
sl@0: 				if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
sl@0: 				bad_chain = 1;
sl@0: 				ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 				if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			else 
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
sl@0: 				 * so we get any trust settings.
sl@0: 				 */
sl@0: 				X509_free(x);
sl@0: 				x = xtmp;
sl@0: 				(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
sl@0: 				ctx->last_untrusted=0;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
sl@0: 			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
sl@0: 			ctx->last_untrusted--;
sl@0: 			num--;
sl@0: 			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
sl@0: 	for (;;)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* If we have enough, we break */
sl@0: 		if (depth < num) break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
sl@0: 		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
sl@0: 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (ok < 0) return ok;
sl@0: 		if (ok == 0) break;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		x = xtmp;
sl@0: 		if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			X509_free(xtmp);
sl@0: 			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		num++;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
sl@0: 	xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
sl@0: 	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
sl@0: 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
sl@0: 			else
sl@0: 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert=x;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 
sl@0: 			sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
sl@0: 			num++;
sl@0: 			ctx->last_untrusted=num;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
sl@0: 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
sl@0: 			chain_ss=NULL;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		ctx->error_depth=num-1;
sl@0: 		bad_chain = 1;
sl@0: 		ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 		if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
sl@0: 	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
sl@0: 	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
sl@0: 	 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
sl@0: 	if(!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
sl@0: 	if (ctx->verify != NULL)
sl@0: 		ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ok=internal_verify(ctx);
sl@0: 	if(!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
sl@0: 	if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
sl@0: 		ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
sl@0: 	if(!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 	if (0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: end:
sl@0: 		X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
sl@0: 	if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509 *issuer;
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
sl@0: 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
sl@0: 			return issuer;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return NULL;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int ret;
sl@0: 	ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
sl@0: 	if (ret == X509_V_OK)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 	/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
sl@0: 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ctx->error = ret;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
sl@0: 	return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 	return 0;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
sl@0: 	if (*issuer)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
sl@0:  * with the supplied purpose
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: #else
sl@0: 	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
sl@0: 	X509 *x;
sl@0: 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
sl@0: 	int proxy_path_length = 0;
sl@0: 	int allow_proxy_certs =
sl@0: 		!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
sl@0: 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
sl@0: 	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
sl@0: 	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
sl@0: 	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
sl@0: 	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
sl@0: 	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
sl@0: 	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
sl@0: 	*/
sl@0: 	must_be_ca = -1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
sl@0: 	   happy */
sl@0: 	if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
sl@0: 		allow_proxy_certs = 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		int ret;
sl@0: 		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
sl@0: 		if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
sl@0: 			&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
sl@0: 			ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 			if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
sl@0: 			ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 			if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		ret = X509_check_ca(x);
sl@0: 		switch(must_be_ca)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 		case -1:
sl@0: 			if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
sl@0: 				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ret = 0;
sl@0: 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			else
sl@0: 				ret = 1;
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 		case 0:
sl@0: 			if (ret != 0)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ret = 0;
sl@0: 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			else
sl@0: 				ret = 1;
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 		default:
sl@0: 			if ((ret == 0)
sl@0: 				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
sl@0: 					&& (ret != 1)))
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ret = 0;
sl@0: 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			else
sl@0: 				ret = 1;
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (ret == 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 			if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
sl@0: 				must_be_ca > 0);
sl@0: 			if ((ret == 0)
sl@0: 				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
sl@0: 					&& (ret != 1)))
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
sl@0: 				ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 				ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 				ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 				if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		/* Check pathlen */
sl@0: 		if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
sl@0: 			   && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
sl@0: 			ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 			if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
sl@0: 		   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
sl@0: 		   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
sl@0: 		   CA certificate.  */
sl@0: 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ctx->error =
sl@0: 					X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
sl@0: 				ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 				ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 				ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 				if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			proxy_path_length++;
sl@0: 			must_be_ca = 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			must_be_ca = 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	ok = 1;
sl@0:  end:
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: #else
sl@0: 	int i, ok;
sl@0: 	X509 *x;
sl@0: 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
sl@0: 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
sl@0: /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
sl@0: 	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
sl@0: 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
sl@0: 	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
sl@0: 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 	ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
sl@0: 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
sl@0: 	ok = cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: #endif
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i, last, ok;
sl@0: 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
sl@0: 		last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		last = 0;
sl@0: 	for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error_depth = i;
sl@0: 		ok = check_cert(ctx);
sl@0: 		if (!ok) return ok;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
sl@0: 	X509 *x;
sl@0: 	int ok, cnum;
sl@0: 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
sl@0: 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
sl@0: 	ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 	/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
sl@0: 	ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
sl@0: 	/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
sl@0: 	 * notify callback
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	if(!ok)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
sl@0: 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	ctx->current_crl = crl;
sl@0: 	ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
sl@0: 	if (!ok) goto err;
sl@0: 	ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
sl@0: 	err:
sl@0: 	ctx->current_crl = NULL;
sl@0: 	X509_CRL_free(crl);
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	time_t *ptime;
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_crl = crl;
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
sl@0: 		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ptime = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
sl@0: 	if (i == 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
sl@0: 		if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (i > 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
sl@0: 		if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (i == 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
sl@0: 			if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 				return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (i < 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
sl@0: 			if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 				return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ctx->current_crl = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
sl@0:  * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
sl@0:  * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
sl@0:  * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
sl@0:  * was invalid.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
sl@0: 			X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
sl@0: 		if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
sl@0: 			continue;
sl@0: 		if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			*pcrl = crl;
sl@0: 			CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 			return 1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		best_crl = crl;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (best_crl)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		*pcrl = best_crl;
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 		
sl@0: 	return 0;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
sl@0:  * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
sl@0:  */
sl@0: static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ok;
sl@0: 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
sl@0: 	X509_OBJECT xobj;
sl@0: 	X509_NAME *nm;
sl@0: 	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
sl@0: 	ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
sl@0: 	if (ok)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		*pcrl = crl;
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!ok)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
sl@0: 		if (crl)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			*pcrl = crl;
sl@0: 			return 1;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	*pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
sl@0: 	if (crl)
sl@0: 		X509_CRL_free(crl);
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Check CRL validity */
sl@0: static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509 *issuer = NULL;
sl@0: 	EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
sl@0: 	int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
sl@0: 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
sl@0: 	chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
sl@0: 	/* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
sl@0: 	 * is next certificate in chain.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	if(cnum < chnum)
sl@0: 		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
sl@0: 		/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
sl@0: 		if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
sl@0: 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 			if(!ok) goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if(issuer)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
sl@0: 		if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
sl@0: 			!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
sl@0: 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 			if(!ok) goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
sl@0: 		ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if(!ikey)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
sl@0: 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 			if (!ok) goto err;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			/* Verify CRL signature */
sl@0: 			if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
sl@0: 				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 				if (!ok) goto err;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
sl@0: 	if (!ok)
sl@0: 		goto err;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ok = 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	err:
sl@0: 	EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Check certificate against CRL */
sl@0: static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int idx, ok;
sl@0: 	X509_REVOKED rtmp;
sl@0: 	STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
sl@0: 	X509_EXTENSION *ext;
sl@0: 	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
sl@0: 	rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
sl@0: 	/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
sl@0: 	 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
sl@0:  	 */
sl@0: 	if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
sl@0: 		sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
sl@0: 	/* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
sl@0: 	 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 	if(idx >= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
sl@0: 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 		if (!ok) return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
sl@0: 	 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
sl@0: 	 * rejected. 
sl@0: 	 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
sl@0: 	 * shouldn't do this.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	exts = crl->crl->extensions;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
sl@0: 		if (ext->critical > 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error =
sl@0: 				X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
sl@0: 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 			if(!ok) return 0;
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ret;
sl@0: 	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
sl@0: 				ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
sl@0: 	if (ret == 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
sl@0: 	if (ret == -1)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
sl@0: 		 * callback.
sl@0: 		 */
sl@0: 		X509 *x;
sl@0: 		int i;
sl@0: 		for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
sl@0: 			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
sl@0: 				continue;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert = x;
sl@0: 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
sl@0: 			ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		return 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (ret == -2)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
sl@0: 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
sl@0: 		return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
sl@0: 		ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
sl@0: 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	time_t *ptime;
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
sl@0: 		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ptime = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
sl@0: 	if (i == 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert=x;
sl@0: 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (i > 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert=x;
sl@0: 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
sl@0: 	if (i == 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert=x;
sl@0: 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (i < 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert=x;
sl@0: 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ok=0,n;
sl@0: 	X509 *xs,*xi;
sl@0: 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
sl@0: 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
sl@0: 	ctx->error_depth=n-1;
sl@0: 	n--;
sl@0: 	xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
sl@0: 		xs=xi;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (n <= 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
sl@0: 			ctx->current_cert=xi;
sl@0: 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
sl@0: 			goto end;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			n--;
sl@0: 			ctx->error_depth=n;
sl@0: 			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /*	ctx->error=0;  not needed */
sl@0: 	while (n >= 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->error_depth=n;
sl@0: 		if (!xs->valid)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
sl@0: 				ctx->current_cert=xi;
sl@0: 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
sl@0: 				if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
sl@0: 				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
sl@0: 				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
sl@0: 				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
sl@0: 				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
sl@0: 				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
sl@0: 				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
sl@0: 				 * been declared trusted. */
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
sl@0: 				ctx->current_cert=xs;
sl@0: 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
sl@0: 				if (!ok)
sl@0: 					{
sl@0: 					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
sl@0: 					goto end;
sl@0: 					}
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
sl@0: 			pkey=NULL;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		xs->valid = 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
sl@0: 		if (!ok)
sl@0: 			goto end;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
sl@0: 		ctx->current_issuer=xi;
sl@0: 		ctx->current_cert=xs;
sl@0: 		ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
sl@0: 		if (!ok) goto end;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		n--;
sl@0: 		if (n >= 0)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			xi=xs;
sl@0: 			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	ok=1;
sl@0: end:
sl@0: 	return ok;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	char *str;
sl@0: 	ASN1_TIME atm;
sl@0: 	long offset;
sl@0: 	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
sl@0: 	int i,j;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	p=buff1;
sl@0: 	i=ctm->length;
sl@0: 	str=(char *)ctm->data;
sl@0: 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
sl@0: 		memcpy(p,str,10);
sl@0: 		p+=10;
sl@0: 		str+=10;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if (i < 13) return 0;
sl@0: 		memcpy(p,str,12);
sl@0: 		p+=12;
sl@0: 		str+=12;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
sl@0: 		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{ 
sl@0: 		*(p++)= *(str++);
sl@0: 		*(p++)= *(str++);
sl@0: 		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
sl@0: 		if (*str == '.')
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			str++;
sl@0: 			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	*(p++)='Z';
sl@0: 	*(p++)='\0';
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (*str == 'Z')
sl@0: 		offset=0;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
sl@0: 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
sl@0: 		if (*str == '-')
sl@0: 			offset= -offset;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	atm.type=ctm->type;
sl@0: 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
sl@0: 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
sl@0: 		if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
sl@0: 		j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
sl@0: 		if (j < 50) j+=100;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 		if (i < j) return -1;
sl@0: 		if (i > j) return 1;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
sl@0: 	if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
sl@0: 		return -1;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		return i;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	time_t t;
sl@0: 	int type = -1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
sl@0: 	else time(&t);
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	t+=adj;
sl@0: 	if (s) type = s->type;
sl@0: 	if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
sl@0: 	if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
sl@0: 	return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
sl@0: 	int i,j;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
sl@0: 		if (ktmp == NULL)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
sl@0: 			break;
sl@0: 		else
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
sl@0: 			ktmp=NULL;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (ktmp == NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* first, populate the other certs */
sl@0: 	for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
sl@0: 		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
sl@0: 		EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	
sl@0: 	if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
sl@0: 	EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
sl@0: 	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
sl@0: 	 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
sl@0: 	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
sl@0: 			new_func, dup_func, free_func);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->error;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	ctx->error=err;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->error_depth;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->current_cert;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->chain;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int i;
sl@0: 	X509 *x;
sl@0: 	STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
sl@0: 	if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
sl@0: 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
sl@0: 		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return chain;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	ctx->cert=x;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	ctx->untrusted=sk;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	ctx->crls=sk;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
sl@0:  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
sl@0:  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
sl@0:  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
sl@0:  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
sl@0:  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
sl@0:  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
sl@0:  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
sl@0: 				int purpose, int trust)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	int idx;
sl@0: 	/* If purpose not set use default */
sl@0: 	if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
sl@0: 	/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
sl@0: 	if (purpose)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
sl@0: 		idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
sl@0: 		if (idx == -1)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
sl@0: 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
sl@0: 		if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
sl@0: 			if (idx == -1)
sl@0: 				{
sl@0: 				X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
sl@0: 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
sl@0: 				return 0;
sl@0: 				}
sl@0: 			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
sl@0: 		if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (trust)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
sl@0: 		if (idx == -1)
sl@0: 			{
sl@0: 			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
sl@0: 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
sl@0: 			return 0;
sl@0: 			}
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
sl@0: 	if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
sl@0: 	ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
sl@0: 	if (!ctx)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		return NULL;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
sl@0: 	return ctx;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
sl@0: 	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
sl@0: 	     STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	int ret = 1;
sl@0: 	ctx->ctx=store;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_method=0;
sl@0: 	ctx->cert=x509;
sl@0: 	ctx->untrusted=chain;
sl@0: 	ctx->crls = NULL;
sl@0: 	ctx->last_untrusted=0;
sl@0: 	ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
sl@0: 	ctx->valid=0;
sl@0: 	ctx->chain=NULL;
sl@0: 	ctx->error=0;
sl@0: 	ctx->explicit_policy=0;
sl@0: 	ctx->error_depth=0;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_cert=NULL;
sl@0: 	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
sl@0: 	ctx->tree = NULL;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (!ctx->param)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
sl@0: 	 * use defaults.
sl@0: 	 */
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store)
sl@0: 		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
sl@0: 		ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->cleanup = 0;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ret)
sl@0: 		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
sl@0: 					X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (ret == 0)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->check_issued)
sl@0: 		ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->get_issuer)
sl@0: 		ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->verify_cb)
sl@0: 		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->verify)
sl@0: 		ctx->verify = store->verify;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->verify = internal_verify;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->check_revocation)
sl@0: 		ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->get_crl)
sl@0: 		ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->check_crl)
sl@0: 		ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	if (store && store->cert_crl)
sl@0: 		ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
sl@0: 	else
sl@0: 		ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
sl@0: 
sl@0: 
sl@0: 	/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
sl@0: 	 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
sl@0: 	 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
sl@0: 	/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
sl@0: 	if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
sl@0: 				&(ctx->ex_data)))
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
sl@0: 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	return 1;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
sl@0:  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
sl@0:  */
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
sl@0: {
sl@0: 	ctx->other_ctx = sk;
sl@0: 	ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
sl@0: }
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
sl@0: 		ctx->param=NULL;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (ctx->tree != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
sl@0: 		ctx->tree=NULL;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	if (ctx->chain != NULL)
sl@0: 		{
sl@0: 		sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
sl@0: 		ctx->chain=NULL;
sl@0: 		}
sl@0: 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
sl@0: 	memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
sl@0: 				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->tree;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->explicit_policy;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
sl@0: 	param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
sl@0: 	if (!param)
sl@0: 		return 0;
sl@0: 	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	return ctx->param;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: EXPORT_C void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
sl@0: 	{
sl@0: 	if (ctx->param)
sl@0: 		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
sl@0: 	ctx->param = param;
sl@0: 	}
sl@0: 
sl@0: IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
sl@0: IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
sl@0: 
sl@0: IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
sl@0: 
sl@0: IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
sl@0: IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)