sl@0: /* p12_kiss.c */ sl@0: /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL sl@0: * project 1999. sl@0: */ sl@0: /* ==================================================================== sl@0: * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. sl@0: * sl@0: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without sl@0: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions sl@0: * are met: sl@0: * sl@0: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright sl@0: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. sl@0: * sl@0: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright sl@0: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in sl@0: * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the sl@0: * distribution. sl@0: * sl@0: * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this sl@0: * software must display the following acknowledgment: sl@0: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project sl@0: * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" sl@0: * sl@0: * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to sl@0: * endorse or promote products derived from this software without sl@0: * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact sl@0: * licensing@OpenSSL.org. sl@0: * sl@0: * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" sl@0: * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written sl@0: * permission of the OpenSSL Project. sl@0: * sl@0: * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following sl@0: * acknowledgment: sl@0: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project sl@0: * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" sl@0: * sl@0: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY sl@0: * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE sl@0: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR sl@0: * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR sl@0: * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, sl@0: * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT sl@0: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; sl@0: * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) sl@0: * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, sl@0: * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) sl@0: * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED sl@0: * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. sl@0: * ==================================================================== sl@0: * sl@0: * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young sl@0: * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim sl@0: * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). sl@0: * sl@0: */ sl@0: sl@0: #include sl@0: #include "cryptlib.h" sl@0: #include sl@0: sl@0: /* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */ sl@0: sl@0: static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, sl@0: EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca); sl@0: sl@0: static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, sl@0: int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, sl@0: STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, sl@0: char *keymatch); sl@0: sl@0: static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, sl@0: EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca, sl@0: ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch); sl@0: sl@0: /* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert sl@0: * and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, sl@0: * or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be sl@0: * passed unitialised. sl@0: */ sl@0: sl@0: EXPORT_C int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, sl@0: STACK_OF(X509) **ca) sl@0: { sl@0: sl@0: /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */ sl@0: sl@0: if(!p12) { sl@0: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: /* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */ sl@0: if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) { sl@0: if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new_null())) { sl@0: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: if(pkey) *pkey = NULL; sl@0: if(cert) *cert = NULL; sl@0: sl@0: /* Check the mac */ sl@0: sl@0: /* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases sl@0: * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that sl@0: * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length sl@0: * password are two different things... sl@0: */ sl@0: sl@0: if(!pass || !*pass) { sl@0: if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL; sl@0: else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = ""; sl@0: else { sl@0: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); sl@0: goto err; sl@0: } sl@0: } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) { sl@0: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); sl@0: goto err; sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca)) sl@0: { sl@0: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR); sl@0: goto err; sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: return 1; sl@0: sl@0: err: sl@0: sl@0: if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); sl@0: if (cert && *cert) X509_free(*cert); sl@0: if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free(*ca, X509_free); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: /* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */ sl@0: sl@0: static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, sl@0: EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca) sl@0: { sl@0: STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes; sl@0: STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags; sl@0: int i, bagnid; sl@0: PKCS7 *p7; sl@0: ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL; sl@0: sl@0: char keymatch = 0; sl@0: if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0; sl@0: for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) { sl@0: p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i); sl@0: bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type); sl@0: if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) { sl@0: bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7); sl@0: } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { sl@0: bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen); sl@0: } else continue; sl@0: if (!bags) { sl@0: sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, sl@0: &keyid, &keymatch)) { sl@0: sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); sl@0: sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); sl@0: } sl@0: sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); sl@0: if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid); sl@0: return 1; sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: sl@0: static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, sl@0: int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, sl@0: STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, sl@0: char *keymatch) sl@0: { sl@0: int i; sl@0: for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) { sl@0: if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i), sl@0: pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid, sl@0: keymatch)) return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: return 1; sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: #define MATCH_KEY 0x1 sl@0: #define MATCH_CERT 0x2 sl@0: #define MATCH_ALL 0x3 sl@0: sl@0: static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, sl@0: EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca, sl@0: ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, sl@0: char *keymatch) sl@0: { sl@0: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8; sl@0: X509 *x509; sl@0: ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL, *ckid = NULL; sl@0: ASN1_TYPE *attrib; sl@0: ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL; sl@0: sl@0: if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName))) sl@0: fname = attrib->value.bmpstring; sl@0: sl@0: if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID))) { sl@0: lkey = attrib->value.octet_string; sl@0: ckid = lkey; sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: /* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */ sl@0: if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) { sl@0: if (*keyid) { sl@0: if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL; sl@0: } else { sl@0: if (!(*keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(lkey))) { sl@0: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAG,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: } sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) sl@0: { sl@0: case NID_keyBag: sl@0: if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1; sl@0: if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) return 0; sl@0: *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY; sl@0: break; sl@0: sl@0: case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag: sl@0: if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1; sl@0: if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen))) sl@0: return 0; sl@0: *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); sl@0: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); sl@0: if (!(*pkey)) return 0; sl@0: *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY; sl@0: break; sl@0: sl@0: case NID_certBag: sl@0: if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate ) sl@0: return 1; sl@0: if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0; sl@0: if(ckid) sl@0: { sl@0: if (!X509_keyid_set1(x509, ckid->data, ckid->length)) sl@0: { sl@0: X509_free(x509); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: } sl@0: if(fname) { sl@0: int len, r; sl@0: unsigned char *data; sl@0: len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname); sl@0: if(len > 0) { sl@0: r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len); sl@0: OPENSSL_free(data); sl@0: if (!r) sl@0: { sl@0: X509_free(x509); sl@0: return 0; sl@0: } sl@0: } sl@0: } sl@0: sl@0: sl@0: if (lkey) { sl@0: *keymatch |= MATCH_CERT; sl@0: if (cert) *cert = x509; sl@0: else X509_free(x509); sl@0: } else { sl@0: if(ca) sk_X509_push (*ca, x509); sl@0: else X509_free(x509); sl@0: } sl@0: break; sl@0: sl@0: case NID_safeContentsBag: sl@0: return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen, sl@0: pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch); sl@0: break; sl@0: sl@0: default: sl@0: return 1; sl@0: break; sl@0: } sl@0: return 1; sl@0: } sl@0: