/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */

 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)

  * All rights reserved.

  *

  * This package is an SSL implementation written

  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.

  * 

  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as

  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions

  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,

  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation

  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms

  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

  * 

  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in

  * the code are not to be removed.

  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution

  * as the author of the parts of the library used.

  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or

  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.

  * 

  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

  * are met:

  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the

  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software

  *    must display the following acknowledgement:

  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by

  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"

  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library

  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).

  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 

  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:

  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"

  * 

  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND

  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL

  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT

  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY

  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

  * SUCH DAMAGE.

  * 

  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or

  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be

  * copied and put under another distribution licence

  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]

  */

 /* ====================================================================

  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

  *

  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

  * are met:

  *

  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 

  *

  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

  *    distribution.

  *

  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"

  *

  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.

  *

  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

  *

  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

  *    acknowledgment:

  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"

  *

  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

  * ====================================================================

  *

  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim

  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

  *

  */

 #include <stdio.h>

 #include <errno.h>

 #define USE_SOCKETS

 #include "ssl_locl.h"

 #include <openssl/evp.h>

 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,

 			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);

 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);

 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)

 	{

 	/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase

 	 * packet by another n bytes.

 	 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified

 	 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.

 	 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf

 	 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)

 	 */

 	int i,off,newb;

 	if (!extend)

 		{

 		/* start with empty packet ... */

 		if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)

 			s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;

 		s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;

 		s->packet_length = 0;

 		/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */

 		}

 	/* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */

 	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&

 		extend)

 		{

 		if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)

 			n = s->s3->rbuf.left;

 		}

 	/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */

 	if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)

 		{

 		s->packet_length+=n;

 		s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;

 		s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;

 		return(n);

 		}

 	/* else we need to read more data */

 	if (!s->read_ahead)

 		max=n;

 	{

 		/* avoid buffer overflow */

 		int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;

 		if (max > max_max)

 			max = max_max;

 	}

 	if (n > max) /* does not happen */

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 		return -1;

 		}

 	off = s->packet_length;

 	newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;

 	/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:

 	 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',

 	 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */

 	if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)

 		{

 		/*  off > 0 */

 		memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);

 		s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;

 		}

 	while (newb < n)

 		{

 		/* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need

 		 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */

 		clear_sys_error();

 		if (s->rbio != NULL)

 			{

 			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

 			i=BIO_read(s->rbio,	&(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);

 			i = -1;

 			}

 		if (i <= 0)

 			{

 			s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;

 			return(i);

 			}

 		newb+=i;

 		}

 	/* done reading, now the book-keeping */

 	s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;

 	s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;

 	s->packet_length += n;

 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 	return(n);

 	}

 /* Call this to get a new input record.

  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error

  * or non-blocking IO.

  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in

  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record

  * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data

  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes

  */

 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */

 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;

 	int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;

 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;

 	SSL_SESSION *sess;

 	unsigned char *p;

 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

 	short version;

 	unsigned int mac_size;

 	int clear=0;

 	size_t extra;

 	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;

 	unsigned char *mac = NULL;

 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);

 	sess=s->session;

 	if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)

 		extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;

 	else

 		extra=0;

 	if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)

 		{

 		/* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER

 		 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 		return -1;

 		}

 again:

 	/* check if we have the header */

 	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||

 		(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 

 		{

 		n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);

 		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */

 		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;

 		p=s->packet;

 		/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */

 		rr->type= *(p++);

 		ssl_major= *(p++);

 		ssl_minor= *(p++);

 		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;

 		n2s(p,rr->length);

 		/* Lets check version */

 		if (!s->first_packet)

 			{

 			if (version != s->version)

 				{

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);

 				/* Send back error using their

 				 * version number :-) */

 				s->version=version;

 				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

 				goto f_err;

 				}

 			}

 		if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */

 		}

 	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */

 	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)

 		{

 		/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */

 		i=rr->length;

 		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);

 		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */

 		/* now n == rr->length,

 		 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */

 		}

 	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */

 	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,

 	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet

 	 */

 	rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);

 	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'

 	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which

 	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either

 	 * the decryption or by the decompression

 	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,

 	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 

 	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]

 	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */

 	/* check is not needed I believe */

 	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)

 		{

 		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */

 	rr->data=rr->input;

 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);

 	if (enc_err <= 0)

 		{

 		if (enc_err == 0)

 			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */

 			goto err;

 		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding

 		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).

 		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform

 		 * the MAC computation anyway. */

 		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;

 		}

 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG

 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);

 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }

 printf("\n");

 #endif

 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */

 	if (	(sess == NULL) ||

 		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||

 		(s->read_hash == NULL))

 		clear=1;

 	if (!clear)

 		{

 		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);

 		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)

 			{

 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */

 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto f_err;

 #else

 			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;

 #endif			

 			}

 		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */

 		if (rr->length >= mac_size)

 			{

 			rr->length -= mac_size;

 			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */

 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */

 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

 			goto f_err;

 #else

 			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;

 			rr->length = 0;

 #endif

 			}

 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);

 		if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)

 			{

 			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;

 			}

 		}

 	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)

 		{

 		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,

 		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption

 		 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,

 		 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this

 		 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */

 		al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	/* r->length is now just compressed */

 	if (s->expand != NULL)

 		{

 		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)

 		{

 		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	rr->off=0;

 	/* So at this point the following is true

 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record

 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record

 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte

 	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment

 	 *			   after use :-).

 	 */

 	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */

 	s->packet_length=0;

 	/* just read a 0 length packet */

 	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;

 	return(1);

 f_err:

 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 err:

 	return(ret);

 	}

 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)

 	{

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

 	int i;

 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;

 	rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);

 	i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,

 		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);

 	if (i < 0)

 		return(0);

 	else

 		rr->length=i;

 	rr->data=rr->comp;

 #endif

 	return(1);

 	}

 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)

 	{

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

 	int i;

 	SSL3_RECORD *wr;

 	wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);

 	i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,

 		SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,

 		wr->input,(int)wr->length);

 	if (i < 0)

 		return(0);

 	else

 		wr->length=i;

 	wr->input=wr->data;

 #endif

 	return(1);

 	}

 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'

  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.

  */

 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)

 	{

 	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;

 	unsigned int tot,n,nw;

 	int i;

 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 	tot=s->s3->wnum;

 	s->s3->wnum=0;

 	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)

 		{

 		i=s->handshake_func(s);

 		if (i < 0) return(i);

 		if (i == 0)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);

 			return -1;

 			}

 		}

 	n=(len-tot);

 	for (;;)

 		{

 		if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)

 			nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;

 		else

 			nw=n;

 		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);

 		if (i <= 0)

 			{

 			s->s3->wnum=tot;

 			return i;

 			}

 		if ((i == (int)n) ||

 			(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&

 			 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))

 			{

 			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment

 			 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */

 			s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;

 			return tot+i;

 			}

 		n-=i;

 		tot+=i;

 		}

 	}

 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,

 			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)

 	{

 	unsigned char *p,*plen;

 	int i,mac_size,clear=0;

 	int prefix_len = 0;

 	SSL3_RECORD *wr;

 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;

 	SSL_SESSION *sess;

 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written

 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */

 	if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)

 		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));

 	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */

 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)

 		{

 		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);

 		if (i <= 0)

 			return(i);

 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */

 		}

 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)

 		return 0;

 	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);

 	wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);

 	sess=s->session;

 	if (	(sess == NULL) ||

 		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||

 		(s->write_hash == NULL))

 		clear=1;

 	if (clear)

 		mac_size=0;

 	else

 		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);

 	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */

 	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)

 		{

 		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites

 		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */

 		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)

 			{

 			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;

 			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment

 			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later

 			 * together with the actual payload) */

 			prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);

 			if (prefix_len <= 0)

 				goto err;

 			if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)

 				{

 				/* insufficient space */

 				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 				goto err;

 				}

 			}

 		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;

 		}

 	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;

 	/* write the header */

 	*(p++)=type&0xff;

 	wr->type=type;

 	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);

 	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;

 	/* field where we are to write out packet length */

 	plen=p; 

 	p+=2;

 	/* lets setup the record stuff. */

 	wr->data=p;

 	wr->length=(int)len;

 	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;

 	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into

 	 * wr->data */

 	/* first we compress */

 	if (s->compress != NULL)

 		{

 		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);

 			goto err;

 			}

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);

 		wr->input=wr->data;

 		}

 	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input

 	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.

 	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */

 	if (mac_size != 0)

 		{

 		s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);

 		wr->length+=mac_size;

 		wr->input=p;

 		wr->data=p;

 		}

 	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */

 	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);

 	/* record length after mac and block padding */

 	s2n(wr->length,plen);

 	/* we should now have

 	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is

 	 * wr->length long */

 	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */

 	wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

 	if (create_empty_fragment)

 		{

 		/* we are in a recursive call;

 		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here

 		 */

 		return wr->length;

 		}

 	/* now let's set up wb */

 	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;

 	wb->offset = 0;

 	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */

 	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;

 	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;

 	s->s3->wpend_type=type;

 	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;

 	/* we now just need to write the buffer */

 	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);

 err:

 	return -1;

 	}

 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */

 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,

 	unsigned int len)

 	{

 	int i;

 /* XXXX */

 	if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)

 		|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&

 			!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))

 		|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);

 		return(-1);

 		}

 	for (;;)

 		{

 		clear_sys_error();

 		if (s->wbio != NULL)

 			{

 			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;

 			i=BIO_write(s->wbio,

 				(char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),

 				(unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);

 			i= -1;

 			}

 		if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)

 			{

 			s->s3->wbuf.left=0;

 			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 			return(s->s3->wpend_ret);

 			}

 		else if (i <= 0)

 			return(i);

 		s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;

 		s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;

 		}

 	}

 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.

  * 'type' is one of the following:

  *

  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)

  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)

  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)

  *

  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first

  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).

  *

  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as

  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really

  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.

  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store

  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol

  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):

  *     Change cipher spec protocol

  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored

  *     Alert protocol

  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)

  *     Handshake protocol

  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have

  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages

  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers

  *     Application data protocol

  *             none of our business

  */

 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)

 	{

 	int al,i,j,ret;

 	unsigned int n;

 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;

 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;

 	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */

 		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))

 			return(-1);

 	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||

 	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))

 		{

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 		return -1;

 		}

 	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))

 		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */

 		{

 		unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;

 		unsigned char *dst = buf;

 		unsigned int k;

 		/* peek == 0 */

 		n = 0;

 		while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))

 			{

 			*dst++ = *src++;

 			len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;

 			n++;

 			}

 		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */

 		for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)

 			s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;

 		return n;

 	}

 	/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */

 	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))

 		{

 		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */

 		i=s->handshake_func(s);

 		if (i < 0) return(i);

 		if (i == 0)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);

 			return(-1);

 			}

 		}

 start:

 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record

 	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data

 	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read

 	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */

 	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);

 	/* get new packet if necessary */

 	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))

 		{

 		ret=ssl3_get_record(s);

 		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);

 		}

 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */

 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,

 	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */

 		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))

 		{

 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);

 		goto f_err;

 		}

 	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away

 	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */

 	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)

 		{

 		rr->length=0;

 		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 		return(0);

 		}

 	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */

 		{

 		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we

 		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */

 		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&

 			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		if (len <= 0) return(len);

 		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)

 			n = rr->length;

 		else

 			n = (unsigned int)len;

 		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);

 		if (!peek)

 			{

 			rr->length-=n;

 			rr->off+=n;

 			if (rr->length == 0)

 				{

 				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;

 				rr->off=0;

 				}

 			}

 		return(n);

 		}

 	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake

 	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */

 	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,

 	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.

 	 */

 		{

 		unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;

 		unsigned char *dest = NULL;

 		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;

 		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)

 			{

 			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;

 			dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;

 			dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;

 			}

 		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)

 			{

 			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;

 			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;

 			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;

 			}

 		if (dest_maxlen > 0)

 			{

 			n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */

 			if (rr->length < n)

 				n = rr->length; /* available bytes */

 			/* now move 'n' bytes: */

 			while (n-- > 0)

 				{

 				dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];

 				rr->length--;

 				}

 			if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)

 				goto start; /* fragment was too small */

 			}

 		}

 	/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;

 	 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.

 	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */

 	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */

 	if ((!s->server) &&

 		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&

 		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&

 		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))

 		{

 		s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;

 		if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||

 			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||

 			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		if (s->msg_callback)

 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

 		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&

 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&

 			!s->s3->renegotiate)

 			{

 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);

 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))

 				{

 				i=s->handshake_func(s);

 				if (i < 0) return(i);

 				if (i == 0)

 					{

 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);

 					return(-1);

 					}

 				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))

 					{

 					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */

 						{

 						BIO *bio;

 						/* In the case where we try to read application data,

 						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with

 						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may

 						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */

 						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

 						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);

 						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);

 						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);

 						return(-1);

 						}

 					}

 				}

 			}

 		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,

 		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */

 		goto start;

 		}

 	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)

 		{

 		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];

 		int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];

 		s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;

 		if (s->msg_callback)

 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

 		if (s->info_callback != NULL)

 			cb=s->info_callback;

 		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

 			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

 		if (cb != NULL)

 			{

 			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;

 			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);

 			}

 		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */

 			{

 			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;

 			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)

 				{

 				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;

 				return(0);

 				}

 			}

 		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */

 			{

 			char tmp[16];

 			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);

 			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);

 			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);

 			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;

 			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);

 			return(0);

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		goto start;

 		}

 	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */

 		{

 		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

 		rr->length=0;

 		return(0);

 		}

 	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)

 		{

 		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know

 		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */

 		if (	(rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||

 			(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		/* Check we have a cipher to change to */

 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		rr->length=0;

 		if (s->msg_callback)

 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

 		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;

 		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))

 			goto err;

 		else

 			goto start;

 		}

 	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */

 	if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&	!s->in_handshake)

 		{

 		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&

 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))

 			{

 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and

        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting

        * protocol violations): */

 			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)

 				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT

 				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;

 #else

 			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;

 #endif

 			s->new_session=1;

 			}

 		i=s->handshake_func(s);

 		if (i < 0) return(i);

 		if (i == 0)

 			{

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);

 			return(-1);

 			}

 		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))

 			{

 			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */

 				{

 				BIO *bio;

 				/* In the case where we try to read application data,

 				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with

 				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may

 				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */

 				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

 				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);

 				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);

 				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);

 				return(-1);

 				}

 			}

 		goto start;

 		}

 	switch (rr->type)

 		{

 	default:

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS

 		/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */

 		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)

 			{

 			rr->length = 0;

 			goto start;

 			}

 #endif

 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);

 		goto f_err;

 	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:

 	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:

 	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:

 		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception

 		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that

 		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */

 		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

 		goto f_err;

 	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:

 		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,

 		 * but have application data.  If the library was

 		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data

 		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data

 		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),

 		 * we will indulge it.

 		 */

 		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&

 			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&

 			((

 				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&

 				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&

 				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)

 				) || (

 					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&

 					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&

 					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)

 					)

 				))

 			{

 			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;

 			return(-1);

 			}

 		else

 			{

 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);

 			goto f_err;

 			}

 		}

 	/* not reached */

 f_err:

 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

 err:

 	return(-1);

 	}

 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int i;

 	const char *sender;

 	int slen;

 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)

 		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;

 	else

 		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;

 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)

 		{

 		s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;

 		if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);

 		}

 	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))

 		return(0);

 	/* we have to record the message digest at

 	 * this point so we can get it before we read

 	 * the finished message */

 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)

 		{

 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;

 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;

 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;

 		}

 	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,

 		&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),

 		&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),

 		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);

 	return(1);

 	}

 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)

 	{

 	/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */

 	desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);

 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)

 		desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */

 	if (desc < 0) return;

 	/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */

 	if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))

 		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);

 	s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;

 	s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;

 	s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;

 	if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */

 		s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);

 	/* else data is still being written out, we will get written

 	 * some time in the future */

 	}

 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)

 	{

 	int i,j;

 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;

 	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;

 	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);

 	if (i <= 0)

 		{

 		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;

 		}

 	else

 		{

 		/* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.

 		 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,

 		 * we will not worry too much. */

 		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)

 			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);

 		if (s->msg_callback)

 			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

 		if (s->info_callback != NULL)

 			cb=s->info_callback;

 		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

 			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

 		if (cb != NULL)

 			{

 			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];

 			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);

 			}

 		}

 	return(i);

 	}